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Too Important for the Experts

We printed in our last issue a quietly thoughtful piece by H. A. Feiveson, "Can We Decide About Nuclear Weapons?" Mr. Feiveson wrote about the difficulties ordinary people face in trying to reach political conclusions about nuclear policy, yet the necessity that somehow, even if not experts, we come to such conclusions.

The question his article raised is important not only in its own right—it involves the very future of democracy, since more and more problems seem to become increasingly complicated and beyond our grasp. It is a question that has been answered, at least partly, by significant portions of the American people. Town meetings, gatherings of professionals and academics, local forums, major segments of the Catholic hierarchy, and even such starchy establishment figures as Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy—all have come up with proposals regarding "first strike," "nuclear freeze," etc.

We take this to be a very good sign. If any proof were needed, the evident irritation of the "experts" is quite enough—they seem to think that if you aren't affiliated with a Strategic Institute you should keep your mouth shut. People feel, however, that on matters regarding human survival all of us, whether or not we are up to date on "warheads," must speak out. And they are right.

A recent letter to the editor in the *New Republic* puts with a nice precision the reasons for this encouraging outburst of popular expression. Here is what Mr. Tobias K. Seggerman of Washington, D.C. writes:

> One can find much to disagree with in the specific language of all the resolutions. But the debate over which "freeze" is the best freeze is largely irrelevant.
>
> The one thing all the freeze resolutions have in common is that they are reactions to profound fears among the American public that the Reagan administration is not serious about arms control. The message of the freeze movement is simply, "End the madness of the nuclear arms race." . . .
>
> It is no accident that the nuclear freeze movement appeared only in the past year. The Reagan administration in large part created the movement by making frightening statements about achieving nuclear superiority, fighting a limited nuclear war in Europe, firing nuclear warning shots, and telling people that everything will be O.K. in the event of nuclear war if there are enough shovels to go around. These statements, coupled with the huge increases in the strategic nuclear forces budget, have fostered a feeling that the Reagan administration is somewhat cavalier about the prospect of nuclear war.
>
> Candidate Reagan said he would open strategic nuclear arms talks with the Soviets "immediately" if he were elected. Eugene Rostow, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, said he thought START talks would begin by March 1982. March has come and gone, and "immediately," by whatever definition, has long since passed. Yet we are still waiting for strategic arms talks.

DISQUIET ABOUT the nuclear problem is intensified by the common perception that the experts are quite as divided among themselves as everyone else. It sometimes seems you can find, perhaps even hire, an expert for any opinion along the spectrum of nuclear controversy. Knowledge is necessary, it is too late for populist "know-nothingism"; but when expert opinion falls pretty much along the same curve as that of ordinary opinion, it may well follow that what matters most is political sense and moral sensitivity.

The present mood of gathering interest and indignation won't of course last very long. It will be replaced by a more contentious moment, in which we shall have to make hard choices of judgment and take "positions."

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Tomorrow: the rise, no doubt, of various simplicities, from rigid pacifism to rigid anti-Americanism, as these have always troubled our protest movements. We will have to find workable proposals for the limitation and reduction of nuclear arms that recognize the need for a reasonable defense policy and the reality of the problem of totalitarianism. But today: pleasure in the reassertion of popular will, in the readiness of people to speak out and initiate public debate.

I. H. □

George Eckstein

Europe Between the Superpowers

For some time now, the new world order that emerged after World War II has been profoundly shaken. America no longer is the unchallenged Number One. Yet that conviction seems to die hard in this country—just as the trend of isolationism still has a way of popping up when things don't go our way abroad. Indeed, the Reagan sweep owed much to the frustrations caused by the last decade's successful challenges to United States power—from the defeat in Vietnam to the hostages held in Iran.

In Europe, the de facto dividing line established at Yalta and Potsdam between the two superpowers' zones of influence has long been fortified by the military alliance systems, and was again more recently officially recognized in the Helsinki agreements. But the two superpowers' absolute and relative strengths have undergone considerable changes. In the military realm, the United States lost its nuclear monopoly over 30 years ago and, during the last decade, its substantial margin over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. Despite several attempts at some sort of control—from the first Test Ban treaty under Kennedy and Khrushchev to the unconfirmed but so far honored SALT II under Carter and Brezhnev—the nuclear arsenal on both sides has reached a level of mutual overkill, thereby increasing the danger of conflagration.

Today both superpowers face harsh tests of their stability. Over the decades, the Soviet regime has had to cope with increasingly severe rebellions in its satellite countries. And within the U.S.S.R. itself, the Kremlin faces problems with its various nationalities, exacerbated by the imbalances caused by the higher birthrates of its Asiatic peoples and the lower one of the Slavic sector. And of course, ideological calcification and increasing contact with the outside world have produced dissidence, defections, and expulsions.

The economy is perhaps the Soviet Union's weakest area: its agriculture is in permanent disarray, making the country dependent on massive food imports; its bureaucratized industrial organization has resulted in low productivity; substantial permanent inflation appears in a flowering of the black market; and a huge part of the GNP is reserved for the military sector. Trade with the West, on the other hand, and with West Germany in particular, financed by large Western credits, has become a significant factor—one of the results of the Ostpolitik that was initiated by Willy Brandt with the reluctant support of President Nixon.

During this period, the United States also had to register a substantial loss of prestige and power. The Vietnam War caused a trauma from which the country has not fully recovered, recent attempts of "rehabilitation" notwithstanding. This experience has also undermined the general confidence in American leadership upon which Western Europe's security had been built. If President Carter's hesitations were not exactly reassuring, at least one knew that he was aware of the nuclear danger. His successor's rhetorical challenges and loose talk of "limited" nuclear warfare were bound to kindle fears of sliding into a nuclear conflict—a fear that

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is bound to be felt most acutely in Europe. For twice in this century Europe, unlike the United States, has suffered the experience and the consequences of being the battlefield in major wars. Now Europeans feel exposed to possible extinction while having only very limited influence on big-power decisions. This is particularly true of West Germany, the most valuable object of any possible Soviet expansion. Unlike France, which, thanks to de Gaulle, has a small but effective intermediate-range nuclear *force de frappe*, the German Federal Republic has renounced all nuclear weapons and thus has put itself in effect at the mercy of U.S. and U.S.S.R. intentions.

Without going into the often perverse calculations that seem to occupy nuclear strategists, one thing can be said: *every step that will increase the quantity and/or variety of nuclear weapons, or the modes of their delivery, is bound to increase insecurity rather than to diminish it.* Thus the development of U.S. intermediate missiles now in the works, and their planned deployment in Western Europe, might be valuable as bargaining chips for gaining reduction or withdrawal of the Soviets' SS–20s. But once they are put in place, the level of insecurity will be raised for both sides.

THESE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES have broadened Europe's concept of itself. Contrary to American perception, Europe does not end at the river Elbe. Not the least consequence of the recent events in Poland is that they have clearly extended Europe's eastern frontier up to the river Bug. For years now, the border barriers between Eastern and Western Europe have been eroded—by trade and credit, by intellectuals and artists, workers and scientists.

No one has held on so tenaciously to this concept of a Greater Europe—a Europe that extends from the Atlantic, if not to the Urals, to the Russian border—and no one has done as much to shape it as Willy Brandt. This effort has guided his policy from the start. Let me quote here from a remarkable article Brandt published in the January 1982 issue of the German socialist journal *Frankfurter Hefte* (entitled *"Zweifel, Berechenbarkeit und Vernunft in der Politik"*):

> We must break the infernal circle from catch-up arming to catch-up arming, each time in order to equalize the adversary's real or imagined lead. . . . I doubt that confrontation between East and West stems from an iron law of nature. I see no alternative but to create the conditions that will help us to return to the policy of détente. This means, among other things, that the two superpowers must recognize each other's equality of status and practice maximum restraint in the pursuit of their interests. . . . Today security can only be achieved in common: I no longer am safe from my adversary except *with* him. . . . The only way that remains is to cooperate in securing the common safety of the world.

In this task, says Brandt, Europe has a special role to play: "In the period of the Cold War, Europe was the main area of world tensions. It is that no longer: the tensions have expanded worldwide, and have moved away from Europe." Having largely overcome its "diseases of hatred, chauvinism, and racism," Europe now can bring into play its own experience in creating stability. But Brandt warns the peace movement and the neutralists: "Europe can achieve this only *within* the system of alliances, not by trying to detach itself from them. To undermine them, to dissolve them, would mean to endanger stability. . . . Individuals can drop out, nations cannot."

In his role as elder statesman, Brandt cuts an impressive figure. Things change somewhat when he has to descend to daily politics. When, as head of the Socialist International, he had to react to General Jaruzelski's coup against Solidarity, he went to extremes of caution in order not to antagonize the Kremlin. Yet Brandt did support Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his thankless task of nudging a confrontationist American government into a more cooperative attitude, notably in regard to the problem of intermediate-range missiles. On this issue Schmidt was facing a rising rebellion within the ranks of his party, for part of the SPD membership is sharply opposed to the stationing of any such missiles on German soil.

Schmidt's position is not made easier by the domestic recession (including, as of May, an unemployment rate of 8 percent), at least partly caused by high American interest rates that draw away investment capital. At the Social Democrats' party convention in April, Schmidt managed to win a good-sized majority for his policies. But his hold on the party and on the government coalition with the Free Democrats remains precarious. His reelection in 1984, and even the government's survival until then, is in doubt—making a conservative government a distinct possibility.

However pleased Reagan might be with a new, conservative government in West Germany, it would be imprudent to expect that the change would result, in the long run, in a more compliant foreign policy, even with regard to the now so explosive issue of the placement of intermediate-range missiles on West German soil. In the short run, a change in policy may follow a changing political climate. But long-term policy tends to be guided by less volatile factors, such as geopolitical

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location, relative economic strength, social coherence. Prusso/German cooperation with Russia has long been a strand of Germany's political tradition. From Frederick the Great to the Napoleonic wars, from Bismarck to the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo, and on to the Stalin-Hitler pact in 1939, German right-wingers and conservatives have shown a latent readiness to opt for a Russian alternative—far more than Germany's West-oriented democratic forces.

ALL OF WESTERN EUROPE, at the moment at any rate and despite United States pressure, seems to stand firm on the question of expanding trade and credit relations with the Eastern Bloc. This reflects not only Europe's new economic strength but also its conviction that expanding trade eastward will further an interdependence with the Soviet bloc—an interdependence that, Europeans feel, has already produced some softening political effects.

A major project such as the gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe entails a certain risk of blackmail, but the project's economic value for the Soviets is such that they presumably would think twice before using it for political pressure. For Western Europe today, a return to a policy of cold-war confrontation has become undesirable, if not unthinkable. This need not lead to neutralism or "Finlandization." But it does imply, among other things, a limit on Europe's military expenditures at a level well below that desired by the Reagan administration.

Some governments are coming under growing pressure from a more or less neutralist peace movement, aroused by the trigger-happy rhetoric of the present American leadership and frightened by the prospect of becoming the superpowers' battleground. So far the pacifist appeals are usually directed at both sides. In the two Germanys, some

A Framework for a New National Security Policy

After a careful review of the available options, we conclude that the following initiatives are urgently needed to enhance the security of the United States and its allies:

1. The NATO Alliance should, at this time, announce its intentions to adopt a Policy of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons in Europe. This will necessitate the development, over several years, of conventional strength so that a nonnuclear attack by the Soviet Union can be repelled without reliance on nuclear weapons. While strengthening its forces NATO should withdraw forward-based tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union should withdraw its own tactical nuclear weapons as well.

2. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should immediately begin negotiations covering strategic and medium-range nuclear forces. These should aim for greatly reduced arsenals by the end of the decade, attained by continued and verifiable reductions. Massive cuts can be made that would still leave each side with adequate retaliatory strength. Negotiations on the tactical nuclear forces are important as well.

3. In order to provide an environment conducive to successful negotiations, the U.S. should, at this time:

i) announce its readiness to engage in an immediate bilateral freeze on the build-up of strategic nuclear weapons, and on the flight testing of new strategic missiles; and

ii) announce its intentions to renew negotiations leading to a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty covering all nuclear explosions.

4. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. should develop and implement a joint program for curtailing the spread of nuclear weapons. Such efforts will lack credibility if the two superpowers fail to curtail their own arms race. □

This statement is taken from an advertisement of the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1384 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

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meetings have been held with participants, mainly intellectuals and church people, from both sides of the border. An interesting case was a peace meeting in East Berlin, held by writers from both sides and organized by the East German poet Stefan Hermlin. Upon Hermlin's insistence, the sessions were carried by West German radio and television, which insured an uncensored coverage accessible to the West and most of the East German population.

West Germans may feel powerless vis-à-vis the nuclear threat; but their country is too strong a factor in the world, too tempting a target for a Russian expansionist drive (however unlikely at the moment), to be able to afford a neutral position. At the most, such a position might be tolerated on the part of lesser powers such as the Scandinavian countries or the Netherlands. France is in a different position, thanks to its nuclear deterrent capability. Thus it is no accident that there is no significant peace movement in France—despite both a strong pacifist tradition (Jaurès) and a declining, but still substantial, Communist party that is faithful to Moscow.

The big question is whether, how soon, and to what extent the Reagan administration will respond to foreign resistance, domestic critics (now including prominent officials of past administrations), and the economic pressures, to change the dangerous course of its military policies. □

Eric R. Terzuolo

The Italian Communists & the Polish Crisis

A historical phase is ending. The momentum originating with the October Revolution is exhausted. The societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have lost their capacity for renewal.

Enrico Berlinguer, head of the Italian Communist party (PCI), spoke these words on December 15, 1981, two days after General Jaruzelski's move against Solidarity.

The PCI's new position emerges clearly from a document of December 30. Signed by the Direzione (Politbureau), it is the first truly thoroughgoing condemnation of the Soviet and East European Communist experience published by the Italian Communist press.

Part of the document addresses the Polish events directly. It reiterates demands for the easing of repression, the restoration of civil rights, the rights of the unions, and the release of arrested Solidarity activists. Turning to the sources of protest in Poland, the PCI leadership emphasizes political factors: the inability of the Polish government to devise an economic program that is consistent with the country's real needs, the absence of democracy, the persistence of dogmatic attitudes, the corruption within the Polish Communist ranks.

The Italian Communists argue that, after the Second World War, all the East European countries were forced to adopt a single political and economic model—the Soviet model—with no regard for distinctive socioeconomic structures, cultures, or traditions. The unsuitability of this model has condemned Eastern Europe to recurring crises.

For a time, de-Stalinization held out the possibility of adapting communism more closely to national conditions. But, in the long run, de-Stalinization has proved a superficial process. Soviet leaders have not carried out comprehensive reforms or even exercised substantial self-criticism. Thus the Soviet Union continues to suffocate any autono-

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mous development of countries in its sphere of influence.

PCI LEADERS DRAW the conclusion that, under conditions of continued Soviet control, there is no way for East European societies to move out of their present impasse. The only hope for a genuinely democratic socialism, according to the Direzione, lies in the growth of socialist forces in the advanced capitalist countries, especially in Western Europe, and socialistic movements in the Third World. The PCI leadership thus plans to abandon the practice of maintaining preferential ties to other Communist parties. Furthermore, it promises to seek more energetically a "third path," a type of socialism distinct from both the Soviet model and that of the West European Social Democratic parties. (In fact, however, the PCI's analysis of Polish events is rather close to that of Germany's Social Democratic party.)

The thrust of Berlinguer's report to the Central Committee of January 11 was very similar to that of the Direzione's document. He added an explicit warning that changes in the European balance of power favorable to the U.S.S.R. would lead to an "unacceptable extension" of the Soviet model. The General Secretary also made some pointed remarks aimed at his own party members, warning them against allowing ideology to become a credo, against accepting the Soviet experience in uncritical fashion. Berlinguer carried the day in the Central Committee. Especially enthusiastic was the left wing of the PCI, which has long favored a trenchant critique of Soviet practice. The leader of the left, Pietro Ingrao, was more explicit than Berlinguer in denying that what exists in the U.S.S.R. can be called socialism.

Some figures close to Berlinguer, including the PCI's number-two man, Alessandro Natta, have argued that the positions expressed in Berlinguer's report and the Direzione's document are essentially extensions of past criticisms of Soviet policies. Yet not even the PCI's harsh comments on the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan were accompanied by such a broad-ranging critique of the *Soviet system* and *Soviet hegemonism*. The analysis of the U.S.S.R.'s role in postwar East European history in itself is not new. But the PCI's explicit and forceful adoption of such an analysis certainly is new. Both *Il Manifesto*, to the PCI's left, and Antonio Gambino, an important political commentator to its right, have recognized that the PCI has made a substantial leap.

PCI members critical of the Direzione have found a mouthpiece in Armando Cossutta. Cossutta, who is closely tied to the workers of the Milan area, has been in the upper echelons of the PCI since the late 1950s. At one time he was rather close to Berlinguer, but in recent years he has become an insistently pro-Soviet voice. Writing in the PCI daily *L'Unità* on January 7, Cossutta expressed his continued belief in Soviet primacy. He took the Direzione to task for dismissing all "socialist" societies hitherto realized, for implicitly placing Communist and Social Democratic parties on the same level, and for desiring a definitive break with the Soviet party. In the Central Committee Cossutta cast the lone vote against Berlinguer's report.

In the short run, the Direzione opted to tolerate Cossutta's dissent. They perhaps hoped it would highlight their own critique of Soviet conduct. Such dissent could be taken as evidence of a certain pluralism in the PCI's internal life. But Cossutta's insistence led to a rather sharp warning, approved by the Central Committee on February 9. It seems clear that Cossutta has quite a bit of support within the party's mass base. Dissatisfaction is especially strong among Communist workers in major industrial centers, especially in Milan. A substantial percentage of older PCI members is much more pro-Soviet than the leadership would like, but younger activists also seem to be playing a

Kim the First, Kim the Second

To the list of political hybrids our society has produced or our political scientists have named—"democratic totalitarian," "friendly authoritarian," "state socialist," etc.—add now "Communist monarchy." Kim Il Sung, the Beloved Leader of North Korea, having reached the age of 70 and begun, apparently, to feel the stirrings of mortality, has started a campaign to have his son, Kim Jong Il, succeed him. The masses of North Korea are said to be wildly enthusiastic about this prospect of a Communist monarchy: Beloved Leader the First, Beloved Leader the Second, etc.

Interviewed by our roving correspondent, a taxi cab driver in North Korea who preferred that his name not be used told us that he regarded Kim Jong Il as "a chip off the old block." □

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major role in the "neo-Leninist" current. Many of the so-called *kabulisti* or *afgani*—who protested the PCI's condemnation of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan—have been organizing opposition to the Direzione's latest initiative. Opposition is substantial but diffuse and difficult to gauge in percentage terms. Perhaps between 10 and 20 percent of PCI members could be classed as dissatisfied. Yet it would be a serious error to assume that all opposition stems from pro-Soviet sentiment.

First, this present effort, like all PCI efforts to move away from the Soviet party, originated in the highest echelons rather than at the grass roots. The sense of a radical shift imposed from the top is vexing even to some party members sympathetic to criticisms of the U.S.S.R.

Second, one should expect some apprehension at any radical break, especially when the new course to be followed (in this case the "third path") is as yet poorly articulated. As one Communist member of the Chamber of Deputies put it:

> *Il socialismo reale* [socialism as built in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe] doesn't mean anything at all to me. But I worry that cutting ourselves off from the East means moving lock, stock, and barrel into the Western camp, and I'm not comfortable with that. It's easy to talk about a "third path," but we would like to know in more concrete terms what these new PCI positions mean.

The party leadership has been a bit vague as to precisely where it would like to settle along the East-West line, emphasizing its rejection of both great power blocs and making statements reminiscent of the nonaligned movement. In practical terms, however, the critique of the Soviet Union has brought the PCI closer to the Socialist and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe.

Finally, it is important to remember some specific sources of unease regarding Solidarity. Even the Direzione's document states that some of the Polish union's demands had far exceeded the capacity of Poland's economy, and a sense that Solidarity had gone "too far" seems not uncommon among Italian workers (not just those associated with the PCI). Furthermore, the deeply religious strain in the Polish movement has been difficult for many Italian workers to accept.

One suspects that many of these apprehensions will prove to be temporary. This is not the first time the PCI has faced a crisis of disorientation. At present there is no party on the Italian left that could attract PCI members of a pro-Soviet bent. The U.S.S.R. might try to create a pro-Soviet Communist party, as it has done in Spain, Sweden, and Japan, but in Italy the practical inducements for joining a small leftist party are few. For a while, PCI militants now may tend to be generally less active. Party membership, a problem in some regions, might take a small temporary dip. Yet the break with Moscow might allow the PCI to pick up some support on its immediate right.

THE PCI'S CRITIQUE of the Soviet Union is closely intertwined with the matter of relations between the Communists and the Italian Socialist party (PSI). Socialist leader Bettino Craxi, who is less than whole-hearted in his support of the Spadolini government, has been eager to force new elections, in the hope of making substantial gains. Had the PCI failed to attack Soviet interference in Poland, Socialist electoral propaganda would have charged the Communists with continued subservience to Moscow, and in all likelihood this would have hurt the PCI at the polls.

Since the break, the PCI leadership has taken the initiative, calling for closer PCI–PSI relations, something that a majority of the Socialist rank and file seems to favor. Closer relations could work to the long-term benefit of the Communists. Under Craxi's leadership, the PSI has seemed to abandon

Who's "A Bunch of Thugs?"

Word comes from Washington that members of Secretary Haig's party trying to negotiate a compromise on the Falkland Islands have described the Argentine junta as "just a bunch of thugs." Well, now! When reports came up from Buenos Aires that some 15,000 people had been seized and murdered by the agents of these thugs, we were told by the Reaganites and their neoconservative pals that after all something had to be done to stop terrorism, etc. etc. Nothing said about "thugs." When Jacobo Timerman told us that the Argentine junta is composed of "thugs" (being high-falutin', he called them fascists), there followed a barrage of denunciations by deep thinkers who explained the difference between totalitarianism (bad) and authoritarianism (bad, but not so bad, or maybe just somewhat deplorable . . .). Not a word about "thugs." But now that U.S. diplomacy has been thwarted, we hear about "thugs."

To live in the 20th century takes strong nerves; to live in the present moment, a strong stomach. □

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even the pretense of socialism, presenting itself essentially as something "in between" the Communists and the Christian Democrats. Furthermore, many prominent Socialists have been implicated in recent political and financial scandals. Under conditions of reduced interparty conflict, a thoroughly "Western" and staunchly anti-Soviet PCI might gain some votes at the Socialists' expense.

Although some important elements in the Christian Democratic party initially applauded the actions of the PCI's Direzione, no return to the "historic compromise" is in the works. Relations between the two parties are thoroughly antagonistic at present, and the Christian Democrats seem to be searching for a new means of discrediting the PCI. The PCI's immediate future certainly will be difficult—that much, at least, can be said with certainty. □

Beate Echols

The Chimera of Enterprise Zoning

As the debate about America's urban crisis sharpens and "reindustrialization" gains momentum on the Republican agenda, a controversial proposal to aid distressed urban areas is making the rounds in policy-making circles. With nostalgic appeals for a return to traditional American values (entrepreneurialism, self-help), enterprise zones are being marketed as a panacea for urban blight and unemployment. Yet the opinions of legislators, planners, and interest groups on the program's effectiveness, merits, and impact remain largely divided. Some believe enterprise zoning, which is based primarily on tax "incentives" to business, will remedy inner-city decline. Others suspect it is simply voodoo urban policy or, in the words of George Sternlieb of Rutgers, "a merchandisable phrase in search of a program."

President Reagan, who has presented these enterprise zones as the cornerstone of his urban policy, recently sent the details of his zone plan to Capitol Hill on the chance that Congress will adopt it by early summer. The White House measure is modeled after the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act of 1981 (HR 3824), cosponsored by Representatives Jack Kemp and Robert Garcia. Like the Kemp-Garcia bill, the Reagan proposal rests primarily on the removal of "government barriers, freeing individuals to create, produce, and earn their own wages and profits," the elimination of the "inefficiencies of monopolized government services," and an "increased reliance on the private sector"—in short, an "open-market environment."

Like its sibling Kemp-Roth, Kemp-Garcia is based on the concept of stimulating business through special investment and tax policies. Congressman Kemp, a conservative Republican from Buffalo and esteemed Reagan adviser, and his colleague Robert Garcia, a liberal Democrat representing New York's blighted South Bronx, have touted their measure (largely inspired by a British experiment implemented under Thatcher) as a way to improve the fiscal health of ailing cities, revitalize neighborhoods, and employ the inner-city jobless, mostly blacks and other minority groups. The Enterprise Zone Act will allegedly provide these urban poor with opportunities for financial success and upward mobility, similar to Puerto Rico's 1947 Industrial Incentives Act. Puerto Rico's "Operation Bootstrap" and Kemp-Garcia-Reagan resemble each other ideologically and politically in that both rely primarily on tax incentives and relaxed regulation, along with implicit guarantees of cheap—and docile—labor, to induce private investment in areas to which it would normally not flow.

Originally introduced in the House of Represen-

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tatives as HR 7563 in June 1980, the Urban Jobs and Enterprise Zone Act, reintroduced 12 months later as HR 3824, is much the same and yet different from the old bill. Both versions share the underlying assumptions that government taxation and regulation are most responsible for the nation's low rate of growth in recent years, and that reintroducing the freedom of action enjoyed by 19th-century capitalists and contemporary Hong Kong entrepreneurs will lure new business activity into distressed zones, create jobs, and "greenline" decaying urban neighborhoods. Both measures thus subscribe to the Administration's "supply-side" and trickle-down economics.

The 1981 version rests on incentives to meet two goals explicitly stated by its sponsor Kemp. First, it would create "a new sense of economic buoyancy within the zones, by drastically expanding entrepreneurial activity"— (a) it would eliminate capital-gains taxes on investment within the zones; (b) and exclude half of all income earned by zone enterprises from taxation; and (c) it would substantially remedy any loss carried forward by allowing zone enterprises to write off initial losses against long-term gain. Second, it would "recognize that the poor on welfare may face the highest marginal tax rates of all" and "entice the poor when able to seek taxpaying jobs." This objective is to be met through such tax breaks as refundable personal tax credits for wages earned by zone employees and also by refundable business income tax credits, both within specified limits. The last provision "is meant to offset the disincentives of the Social Security payroll tax," prominent in the 1980 bill, which "discourages employers from hiring untrained poor, particularly untrained teen-agers." Other provisions include requirements for "coordination and streamlining of other federal programs within the zones"; declaring zones to be "small entities" for the purposes of the Regulatory Flexibility Act and designating the provision of low-income housing as "zone enterprise" for income tax purposes; establishing foreign trade zones within zones wherever feasible, and directing the Internal Revenue Service to simplify the administration of all tax incentives as much as possible.

In the 1981 version, zone designation criteria, strictly prescribed in HR 7563, were loosened substantially—presumably to bring the measure more in line with the Reaganites' "New Federalism." According to HR 3824, local governments may apply for enterprise-zone status if the area meets certain general qualifications. The secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, in consultation with the secretaries of Commerce and the Treasury, will designate 10–25 zones a year over an initial three-year period, thereby giving preference to zones with the worst conditions, the broadest community support, and—most important—the best "contracts" offered by local governments. Such contracts, required "to insure that local governments are committed to making enterprise zones work," should outline steps the local unit is willing to take "to reduce burdens on employers and employees within the zone." These steps could take the form of local property tax reductions, regulatory "reform," improved local services, and/or commitments from private groups to provide assistance to zone entrepreneurs and residents. The relaxation of zone designation criteria is most crucial in view of the impact it would have on neighborhoods, communities, and cities, as will be discussed below.

The Social Security tax-cut provision has been struck from the 1981 bill as a result of strong opposition not only on the part of special interest groups but of the general public as well. In addition, the requirement that at least 50 percent of the employed work force be zone residents has been relaxed to lend the zone concept an added flexibility. HR 3824 is far more refined, elastic, and politically palatable than its 1980 forerunner. The fact that Jack Kemp and Robert Garcia are at opposite ends of the political spectrum has made the whole concept all the more credible and acceptable. According to Garcia, the strong bipartisan support the measure has thus far received—reaching from conservative coalitions to minority-oriented and pro-urban groups, including the Congressional Black Caucus—proves that the proposal "is far more pragmatic than ideological."

ENTERPRISE ZONING is by no means a novel concept. Garcia himself likened his proposal to "Operation Bootstrap that helped stabilize Puerto Rico in a difficult time." The effects of "Bootstrap" or the Industrial Incentives Act, passed in 1947 to create, according to its stated purposes, "a second-to-none investment climate," are well-known. In spite of massive direct U.S. investment, the Puerto Rico of today, far from moving toward greater autonomy and self-sufficiency, is more than ever a colonial extension of the United States. U.S. investment funds have not reduced unemployment on the island, which is now at the 25-percent level. Gradual wage increases, finally approximating the United States minimum, have reduced the competitive edge of local workers vis-à-vis other sources of low-cost labor, mostly overseas. The Puerto Ricans today are increasingly a nation of transients, compelled to travel ever-widening circles in search of stable employment at a living wage.

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Operation Bootstrap illustrates that a random application of tax incentives and deregulation measures, without any form of comprehensive planning, does not accomplish much in the way of "revitalizing" an ailing economy—that is, if economic revival is to be measured in terms of effective demand, levels of productive employment, and standards of living. It is likely, however, to accomplish something else: to set a pattern for the exploitation of certain segments of the labor force. Enterprise zoning in particular is bound to affect different geographic areas, industries, population and labor-market segments nationwide.

The Kemp-Garcia-Reagan approach will force distressed areas in urban America to enter a bidding game for industry and jobs. It will also subject zones to competition from such foreign countries as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea, which have already siphoned off many light industries from the United States. The implication is that in order to make American enterprise zones work, the price of labor, the docility of the labor force, and the low level of regulation would have to outdo overseas sweatshop economies in order to be attractive to business.

The Kemp-Garcia Bill, like the Reagan measure, will be national in scope. And so the ailing Northeast-Midwest corridor, with its heavy concentration of minority populations, will not gain a competitive edge over other distressed areas. Industry will continue to relocate in the South and Southwest, where the cost of living and the wages are lower and unionization is at a minimum. In order to compete effectively with the Sunbelt, the older cities of the Northeast will have to reduce the price of labor, ease land-use controls and other regulations, and lower their local tax rates substantially. In view of the inevitable shrinkage of public services and a deteriorating infrastructure, this bidding contest for business investment is certain to impair the long-term social, economic, and physical health of already troubled communities. Distressed Northern cities and their inner-city black populations will be pitted against each other in their quest to obtain zone designation. Local political pressures will surely influence decisions at the federal level, making the struggle for zone status particularly relentless. This "pockets-of-poverty" approach ill-suits a time when the nation's overall economic picture is one of high unemployment and

Labor Prepares for the Elections

We asked a friend who works as a union organizer about labor's role in the November elections, and here's his reply:

We're halfway between Solidarity Day I and Solidarity Day II. At the AFL-CIO convention last fall, the delegates proclaimed Election Day as the follow-up to the extraordinary march on Washington. This November labor hopes to vote enough Reagan supporters out of office to make them a harmless congressional minority.

A year of the Reagan administration has settled the issue long debated on the left under the heading "Political Action"—the two old parties are not simply Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Even the Democrats who might temporize over the planks of labor's economic platform are sorely missed today when it's time to tackle a wide range of issues about which labor and all the other Solidarity Day participants care very much. These include civil rights and civil liberties, regulatory issues affecting the workplace and the environment, foreign-policy issues involving human rights. Also: the economic issues on which Reagan hasn't yet gotten his way but will certainly try for if given a renewed mandate in November—such as Social Security benefits, the sub-minimum wage, and what's left of the "safety net."

But the economic issues that are fundamental to Reaganism are labor's main reason to participate in this year's elections. Many Democratic standard-bearers do not adhere to labor's alternative economic strategy. Whether it is the witchery of the balanced budget dogma or the blandishments of special interests pleading for higher returns and lighter taxes on capital, conservative economics are widely accepted by a large number of the Democratic candidates. In a few places, economic alternatives were debated in Democratic primaries, but this was not labor's doing. Labor has not demanded that Democrats embrace its economic program.

Theoretically, Solidarity Day II might have a grass-roots lobbying effect on the '83 budget. The AFL-CIO is experimenting with grass-roots lobby-

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distress. Yet there is the Reaganite assumption that the sufferings of some areas and industries from the impacts of stagflation are merely "temporary economic dislocations," in Reagan's own words, from a basically sound and functioning, albeit temporarily weakened economy. This approach indeed condemns the United States to a prolonged game of musical chairs, in which communities move into and out of a "distressed" status.

As high-technology or low-wage industries locate in poverty areas with high percentages of nonwhite populations, the Kemp-Garcia-Reagan program—by forcing inner-city minority communities to copy the Hong Kong/Taiwan model—will perpetuate institutionalized racism and create a permanent underclass in the nation's ghettos. Without guarantees to the contrary, enterprise zoning will most likely lock minority workers into underpaid, short-term, and dead-end jobs that no one else would take. The Kemp-Garcia model is a direct attack on organized labor in that the thrust of the concept is to shift employment from nonzone to zone areas. This shifting not only endangers the security of existing jobs but is likely to result in downward pressures on wages across all the trades and blue-collar occupations. With the bargaining power of unions thus reduced, the zone program can in effect be seen as a measure to deunionize the declining Northeast.

Moreover, notwithstanding its stated purposes, Kemp-Garcia does not guarantee the creation of a single job, nor does it ensure that the jobs that may in fact be created would benefit the jobless or underemployed. The proposal conveniently ignores the forces that produce structural unemployment in urban areas. Meanwhile the prospects that, as a result of enterprise zoning, substantial benefits and windfall profits will accrue to certain industries appear as certain as the chances that this measure will improve the lot of the urban poor seem remote.

Labor-intensive firms are likely to gravitate toward enterprise zones in order to take advantage of the existing secondary labor force, consisting mostly of blacks and other minority-group members. Secondary-market jobs typically offer low wages, few benefits, little job stability, and no upward mobility. According to the American Federation of State, City and Municipal Employees, the enterprise-zone scenario will enable secondary-sector firms "to exploit the presence of low-skilled

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ing, most notably over decontrol of natural gas in cooperation with the Citizen/Labor Energy Coalition. In some places Union staff now devotes a lot of time to drumming up pressure on congressmen, and the success of COPE and CLEC in holding off natural gas decontrol is a remarkable achievement, meriting emulation.

But grass-roots lobbying requires the reorientation of political-action structures, a lot of training, and a lot of new resources. Local COPE committees are not accustomed to activity other than election work. It is only when labor's political activists have worked at the grass roots on the economic issues that they can be expected to make those issues decisive in candidate selection.

So the strength displayed on Solidarity Day wasn't available during the budget debate, but many of the half-million who made the trek to Washington have enlisted in congressional campaigns.

The war between business and labor, of course, is not just going on in Washington. It is reflected in every take-away demand at collective-bargaining tables across the country. Each union is on its own as it struggles to resist these demands, to maintain jobs and buying power. But the spirit of Solidarity Day surely must show that labor knows now it can unite against attacks. The habits of solidarity are slowly coming back after decades of neglect.

For labor to really "win" those congressional elections, the resulting majority must be willing to fight for programs that actually increase labor's bargaining power: improved unemployment insurance; labor-law reform; massive public-works and public-service employment programs aimed at full employment; easy money (with credit controls); wage and price controls to keep inflation down (particularly energy price controls); and a reversal of the tax give-aways enacted in 1981.

The labor movement, and many of its allies, will support plenty of Democrats this fall who don't come out for these economic planks, often for reasons of self-preservation. But starting the day after the election, labor will have to mount a grass-roots lobbying drive to obtain their votes on the congressional floor, with the threat of turning them out in 1984 primaries if they let the labor movement down.

PAUL BOOTH □

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workers without making a dent in the underlying problem."

Aside from the unequal treatment of different labor-market segments, the Kemp-Garcia approach discriminates against small firms that, according to David Birch of MIT, create more than two-thirds of the nation's new jobs. The proposal provides neither adequate sources of venture capital nor mechanisms to help small-business start-ups survive the initial years. Its tax incentives are mostly geared toward benefiting larger, more resilient firms that can substantially increase their after-tax profits by taking advantage of the offered corporate tax-rate reductions.

The alleged beneficial impact of HR 3824 on low-income housing is dubious. There are many questionable and complicated aspects here. For example, without explicit provisions for low-cost housing, an enterprise will be forced to draw its workers from outside the zone, thereby defeating the program's stated purposes. On the other hand, the capitalization of tax benefits, conditioned on zone location, will create substantial windfall profits for landowners within a zone, which will in turn provide incentives for land speculation, inflate land costs, and thus bar smaller firms from enjoying zone benefits. Along with the discretion allowed local governments, in which real-estate interests usually have a strong stake, this might create some bizarrely gerrymandered zones in order to include politically important land parcels. As a result, a large portion of zone investment could merely shift the location of firms for whom taxes are an insignificant factor in new zone decisions; in short, it's a zero-sum game.

THE KEMP-GARCIA SPONSORS ALTERNATE between claims that the act embodies a revolutionary urban strategy that is replacing the failed liberal handouts of the past, and more modest pronouncements describing the measure as a mere adjunct to the array of social programs that are now being systematically dismantled. Drastic cuts of federal funds for urban areas have caused great concern even among many staunch supporters of enterprise zoning. They feel that Kemp-Garcia does not constitute a supply-side alternative that is sufficient to replace vital federal programs. They also worry about the "fiscal magic" underlying enterprise zoning, in that a variety of taxes are forgiven without these giveaways being treated as actual federal outlays.

All this leads me to suggest that enterprise zoning, as promoted by Kemp, Garcia, and Reagan, runs directly counter to the very interests of those it purports to aid. I agree with sociologists Frank Bonilla and Richard Campos, who argue that "... the very practices that seek to divide, divert, and deny the capacity to act to classes, races, and peoples at the same time create the conditions necessary for political combination among U.S. 'minorities.' " Enterprise zoning, therefore, could actually become a tool for coalition-building among the politically weak in order to fight Reaganomics and other manifestations of economic exploitation. □

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Bogdan Denitch

Toward a Sane Defense Policy

It is essential for people of the democratic left to begin a fundamental examination of the assumptions behind U.S. defense policy—because Reagan continues to follow, in magnified form, a trend that began under the Carter administration. There has been broad bipartisan agreement that a major increase in military spending is necessary for the U.S. and its allies. And only very recently has the debate on this matter broadened to include questions traditionally left to the Pentagon and military experts: what kind of defense establishment is appropriate for a democracy? and what sort of technology and weapons systems do we need? But the fundamental questions of defense *policy* are rarely if ever discussed.

There is even less debate on assumptions and comparisons regarding the two superpowers' military and political capabilities. There now is, after all, a broad agreement that the U.S.S.R. has succeeded in shifting the balance of power in its favor, which gives urgency to the demand for greater military expenditures. Not only is it assumed that a major military shift has occurred in that balance—a half-truth at best—but also that the West is increasingly at a political disadvantage.

The acceptance of this view surely is the major reason for greater defense spending—neither the Soviet adventure in Afghanistan nor the repression of Solidarity in Poland has changed the balance of power. While democrats must condemn the dirty colonial war in Afghanistan and the military repression of Solidarity, it is clear that both are signs not of Soviet strength but of Soviet weakness. But in both these examples, the current U.S. arms buildup, even if completed, would not have made any difference. Would Poland be independent if the MX, the B–1 bomber, the 640–ship navy, and the new Mark Abrams tank were on hand? Would Solidarity be unrepressed if the Soviets had not deployed their new SS–20 rockets?

Unless the new weapons are also coupled with the long-defunct Dulles doctrine of "rolling back" the Iron Curtain, they can hardly help liberalize the regimes in Eastern Europe. The high point of liberalization occurred in the period of détente, not during the old or new Cold War. But then we are told by at least one major adviser and Soviet expert of this Administration that war is inevitable unless the Soviet regime changes. This thesis of Professor Pipes of Harvard is at least clear, and if one believes it—as well as the mad notion that a nuclear war between the superpowers is "winnable"—then a vast expansion of the West's military arsenal might indeed make some sense.

Matters of Defense —and Foreign Policy

PERHAPS THE MOST remarkable fact about the defense debate is how little attention is paid to the political dimension. Neither the Soviets' military superiority nor their clever political maneuvering in the Third World has been the major cause for the decline of the United States as a world power. Precisely at the time when the U.S. had absolute military superiority, a near-monopoly of nuclear weapons, and hegemony over the world economy, the Soviet Union consolidated its hold over Eastern Europe and the Communists their power over China. The only major defeat—Korea was a stalemate—suffered by the Russians in that period was the successful breakaway of Communist Yugoslavia. Later, Western aid did help the Yugoslavs, but it was their own resolve that made possible this first successful break in Eastern Europe.

As for the decolonization of the Third World, that took place through a series of wars

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of liberation or as the result of more-or-less orderly Western withdrawals. In the course of this long-overdue process, the Soviet Union played only a small role. And insofar as these anticolonial upheavals signified a "defeat" for the West, it was clearly the political bankruptcy of Western colonialism, not Soviet power, that was the crucial factor. For it was not a lack of weapons that caused the defeat of U.S. clients and allies in Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.

Given this historical backdrop to the decline of U.S. influence, it is remarkable how little the present administration, and even many of its mainline critics, have learned from the past. The present U.S. policy—justified in terms of strategic, that is, defense needs—in Southern Africa, Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador can only guarantee further and perhaps even deeper defeats.

In the absence of even a modest political understanding, the more "imaginative" additions recently proposed for the U.S. arsenal, such as the Rapid Deployment Force, constitute invitations to disaster. By defining U.S. interests in a way that ties us to unpopular and repressive regimes, a vicious circle is created. Inevitable defeats arouse more and more sentiment at home for military solutions to what are essentially political problems.

Such defeats would continue to occur even if by some miracle the Soviet Union ceased to exist. Meanwhile, however, they fuel nationalist sentiments, which find expression in the slogan that the United States must be "Number One." That is why we cannot have a sane defense policy without a democratic foreign policy.

This policy must be linked to clearly understood objectives of defending the United States and helping its allies against possible aggression. Such a policy does not require military superiority in numbers, in view of the advantages that defense has been given by the present military technologies; it must also be uncoupled from adventures in the Third World. I will further argue that the purpose of a sane defense policy is to buy time for a gradual, negotiated cutback of nuclear arsenals, since ultimately no sane defense policy can be based on the threat of mutual atomic suicide.

"The Decline of the West"

THE POSTURE OF the Reagan administration on defense and foreign policy has struck many U.S. and West European analysts as unbalanced to the point of irrationality. The administration puts forward a parochial argument that is almost entirely geared to domestic American politics:

- The U.S. must be Number One, not only vis-à-vis the Soviets but also in dealing with the restive West European allies; Third World insurgencies are approached simply in terms of U.S./Soviet confrontation; whatever the state of nuclear arsenals, more is better; and in buying weapons, high technology also is better. In the terms of this rhetoric, *will* is the substitute for *policy*.

- We must strengthen our military, but of course universal military service is out of the question; the Soviets must be made to pay for the repression in Poland, but of course no grain embargo is to be imposed; the nation must make sacrifices to pay for a strong defense, but of course Reagan goes ahead with income-tax cutbacks for the well off.

While the power and influence of the West have been in decline (in the sense of its ability to impose its will on other parts of the world), this decline has not been accompanied by a parallel growth of Soviet influence. For every Western "defeat" in the Third World one can find an equivalent for the Soviet bloc. In the Manichaean vision of the American right and the Reagan administration, our weakness is always the result of *their* activities. But is that really so? Without even discussing the miserable performances of the East European and Soviet economies and their increasing dependence on loans, credits, and technology from the "decadent" West, there are political and strategic Soviet defeats for all to see. Let me mention just a few:

Loss of Yugoslavia and Albania; loss and subsequent enmity of China; defeat in Indonesia; defeat of insurgencies in Malaysia and a half-dozen other countries; loss of influence in Algeria, Sudan, Somalia; major military and political investments written off in Iraq, Uganda, Guinea; transformation of Egypt into a

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U.S. ally. Hardly what one would call a "historically inevitable" march toward a Soviet-dominated world! One might add to this list the loss of the largest Communist party in Western Europe, that of Italy.

Most of these defeats and losses the Soviet Union has suffered are in no way attributable to American skill. In the case of both mainland China and the Communist party of Italy, the U.S. may even have delayed what was probably an inevitable process. And the Reagan administration might yet succeed in prodding the Chinese government to try to patch up its differences with the U.S.S.R. Clearly, both the superpowers' defeats and losses have had little to do with military hardware as such. I am not arguing that such hardware is unimportant, merely that it has played much less of a role than we are accustomed to think.

Major changes in the Third World did indeed weaken the Western alliance, at least insofar as its condition is defined by its major partner; but these changes were not primarily or merely the consequence of Soviet actions. West European labor and socialist parties (to which we may now also add the Italian Communists) also see themselves as part of "the West," but their West did not judge the anti-colonial revolts as a "defeat." The multipolar world these events opened up have created possibilities for both good and bad—peace and nuclear disarmament can no longer be settled by Moscow and Washington alone. Nevertheless, it is true that this more complex multipolar world does represent a weakening of the traditional Western alliance. The United States will now have to learn how to deal with allies rather than dependents, and in this regard two central factors must be noted.

• FIRST, there is the shift in relative economic weight between the U.S. and its major allies, Western Europe and Japan. One clear reason why the U.S. cannot "manage" its alliance as it used to do is that Western Europe and Japan have—in good measure thanks to U.S. aid after the Second World War—become major players in the world market. This also means that U.S. interests or perceived interests are no longer automatically the same as those of the alliance. This, in turn, means that NATO at least has to be redefined as a genuine alliance for mutual protection limited to that region.

Most U.S. defense planning has been based on the scenario that a major war in Europe could occur short of a massive nuclear exchange between the superpowers. Both the U.S. Army and Navy have developed weapons systems primarily for that contingency—NATO forces to hold off a massive tank assault from the East while the Navy clears the Atlantic in order to rush U.S. troop reinforcements to Western Europe. Put another way, the problem—in light of the perceived superiority of the U.S.S.R. in land forces—is how to introduce "cheap" atomic weapons that (a) do not threaten to escalate into a general nuclear exchange, (b) do not involve a German finger on the nuclear trigger (something that would frighten other West Europeans), and (c) assure that the U.S. will not abandon Western Europe. Many solutions have been proposed, all messy. There was an abortive attempt to build a multinational nuclear force, which proved too complicated, as did various combinations of NATO and U.S. forces. All these proposals, like the current proposal to install the Pershings II, had one thing in common: the finger on the trigger of those weapons must be American.

But there are major difficulties with the current U.S. proposals:

(a) An intermediate rocket that can hit Moscow is not regarded as "intermediate" by the Soviets;

(b) There is a growing West European popular opposition to these proposals, and it seems rather likely that the Pershings will never be installed. This West European resistance is eminently sensible and almost completely misunderstood in the U.S. Little of it is based on pacifism or pro-Soviet illusions. On the contrary, most West European countries have armies based on universal service, with little internal opposition, and pro-Soviet illusions today are probably at a historical low point.

• SECOND, the French deterrent is no longer negligible—which means that France, not a superpower, must now be included in any negotiations for the reduction of nuclear arms. The Russians quite reasonably refuse to negotiate

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reductions in Europe if the French and smaller British nuclear weapons systems are left out of such considerations. If a nuclear conflict becomes less probable in Europe, two things follow: our forward-based nuclear systems can be cut back and conventional conflict possibilities must be reexamined. Here again we have to deal with the *political* dimension of defense issues.

More to the point, a nonnuclear defense policy for Western Europe raises questions about a popular, broadly based armed resistance. This is an area where Sweden and Switzerland have pioneered, and without going into detail, all one need say is that such defense systems do not necessarily come cheap. The question of cost, however, is more than offset by the fact that the costs of a conventional West European defense must be borne primarily by the West Europeans.

At this point, an additional issue needs to be addressed. Do the Soviet armed forces have a major advantage in the European theater? The numbers game here is difficult to follow since we are comparing two very different defense systems; but the answer must be, no, the Soviets do not have a major advantage. In manpower, the figures are close. The Soviet bloc has a major edge in tanks (1½ or 2 to 1), but the West has great superiority in antitank weapons, tactical aircraft, radar, and mobility. The absence of a major Soviet advantage argues against a U.S. crash program and instead for a gradual phasing-out of obsolete systems and the reorientation toward broad-based popular defense—that is, a strong conventional defense based on citizen armies backed up by easily mobilized massive reserves. Here major savings can be achieved through interchangeability and efficiencies of scale. In turn, this leads to consideration of a general U.S. weakness in weapons procurements: our fix on high technology.

The High-Technology Fix & Gold-Plating

IT IS A NOTORIOUS FACT that the U.S. has tended to produce more complicated and expensive weapons systems as the quality of its maintenance personnel has decreased. Our planes are excellent, but they can stay combat-ready for shorter and shorter periods. The new tank is a monster that may make Chrysler rich, but it has a horrendous breakdown rate and no clear function in any thought-out, probable conflict —unless we believe that we can replay Patton's dash across northern France on the plains of Poland.

If, however, it is a mistake to assume—as the major strategic conception behind our current defense policy does—that Western Europe is the most likely theater of war, either short of an all-out nuclear exchange or as a prelude to such an exchange, then certain fairly obvious consequences follow. These consequences pertain to both the quantities and kinds of weapons systems that should be provided for by a sane defense budget. For one thing, the increasing alarm over what I have called the technological fix or "gold-plating" of weapons points to shifts that are not only possible in behalf of large savings but necessary for a more effective defense.

The problem is basically simple: there's a conflict between the most sophisticated technology and the technology most appropriate for a given task. It is a problem complicated by our system of military procurement (superbly described in Gordon Adams's *Iron Triangle*), which pushes toward more profitable—that is, more complex—products. The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that we have not one but three and a-half military bureaucracies, all mutually competitive when it comes to the budget and "ownership" of major weapons systems.

The Navy, Air Force, and Army needlessly duplicate each other's weapons or—worse—sometimes insist on overspecialized systems specific to narrowly defined tasks. The best examples are probably the duplication of complex fighter aircraft and the creation of a completely unnecessary, and very expensive, Rapid Deployment Force. The last does poorly, for more money, what the Marine Corps is designed for. The Soviets are less prone to overrefinements, and it is no accident that the most successful *general* weapon used throughout the Third World is their AK semiautomatic rifle. Their tanks are less fancy, but they work and are easier to maintain. Mary Kaldor, in her excellent book *Baroque Weapons*, beautifully

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makes the point that ever more elaborate weapons get in the way of imaginative innovations, since too much is invested in the existing systems, which turn out to be designed for former wars.

Brush-Fire Wars and Rapid Deployment

IF WESTERN EUROPE is not the place where a conflict is likely to erupt, the next most often mentioned spots are the Persian Gulf, or the Middle East in general, and the countries that are candidates for what is covered by the generic term "brush-fire wars," which are presumably those fought in the Third World. Given Reagan's preferences among Latin American, South African, and Asian regimes, I find it almost inconceivable that U.S. intervention in a "brush-fire war" could be anything but a political, military, and moral disaster. Still, we cannot completely write off the possibility that a different administration might move toward a democratic foreign policy and thus have alliances that are not only defensible but worth defending. That contingency is well covered by what is probably the most efficient branch of our military—the Marine Corps. What we often forget in comparing the relative strengths of the two superpowers is that this is an area where the U.S. is clearly superior, with some 120,000-plus men and women in the marines—versus some 12,000 in the naval infantry of the Soviet Union.

Just as the problem of "brush-fire conflicts" is primarily though not always exclusively a political one, so is the problem of the Middle East and its oil supplies. Surely, the dependency on Middle East oil should be broken, but this is largely a matter of a responsible energy policy. The central problem in the Middle East lies in the intransigent postures of the contending forces. Pressure for an acceptable settlement—including reasonable security for Israel and recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination—should therefore be stressed. Negotiations with the Soviet Union to cut back the arms buildup in that area make far more long-range sense than the present arms race, for which both sides share responsibility.

The history of Middle East alliances should by now have prepared both superpowers to be skeptical about just how much they are buying with the billions of dollars worth of arms. As the case of Iran will show all too clearly, modern arms and military establishments do not provide political or social stability. To achieve such stability, however, requires that we move away from confrontational rhetoric with our "competitive-relationship" partner. Unfortunately, tough talk seems to be politically useful at home even though it scores no points abroad and does nothing to increase our security.

What Is the Balance of Conventional Forces?

MUCH NONSENSE has been written about the East/West power balance of the conventional forces. This is important, since the United States' refusal to state that it would refrain from first use of nuclear weapons in Europe is based on an assumption of gross Soviet and Warsaw Pact superiority over the U.S. and NATO forces. The following figures are given in *Military Balance 1981–1982* (pp. 124–25), the yearly study of the Institute for Strategic Studies in London, issued by Facts on File publications. This is the acknowledged, objective though somewhat pro-Western, source for most of such unclassified information. These figures include, for the NATO side, the U.S. forces in Europe and the French forces, but not the Spanish forces, while the Warsaw Pact figures include Romania.

Whatever else these figures project, they do *not* show an overwhelming Soviet–Warsaw Pact superiority in conventional forces in the European theater. While the "mix" of weapons clearly is a reflection of the differing doctrines of the two alliances, on balance, the West does not seem to be in trouble. If one were to factor in morale—and I do not merely mean the obvious unwillingness of most East Europeans to fight for their Soviet masters—it seems absurd to push alarm buttons about the state of the balance of conventional forces in Europe.

No expert dove or hawk has ever claimed that the West does not have the edge in naval and submarine forces. And no expert claims that the U.S.S.R. and its allies have an air-

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borne deterrent. For that matter—since the overwhelming majority of Soviet missiles (there are no non-Soviet, Warsaw Pact nuclear forces) are land-based, while 80 percent of the U.S. ones are sea- or air-based and thus all but indestructible, if a "window of vulnerability" can be said to exist at all, it exists for the Soviet Union.

WHILE CONVENTIONAL FORCES are often discussed when comparing the U.S. and Soviet military establishments, it rarely is argued that the Soviet superiority in this field, real or imagined, threatens the U.S. directly. I would argue that there is a rough balance in conventional weapons and armies, if we consider the nature of the Western alliance on the one hand, and that of the Soviet alliance on the other. This balance becomes even clearer if we keep in mind that the Soviet Union, facing both the Western alliance and China, has to think in terms of a two-front war. Since much of the conventional Soviet military force has to be deployed on the Chinese frontier, there is a rough equivalence in Europe—despite the fact that the Soviets traditionally have stressed land forces far more than the West.

In considering defense, however, particularly when dealing with conventional forces, the troops' reliability becomes a major factor. Reliability, of course, is not a fixed category. Armies can be reliable— (1) for internal purposes, as in the case of the Polish troops versus Solidarity; (2) for defensive purposes against an external enemy; (3) for offensive purposes. Here the Soviet Union has a major disadvantage, which facilitates a popular nonnuclear defense of Western Europe. The disadvantage lies in the rarely examined nature of the Warsaw Pact armies—the reliability of 60 East European divisions that are counted as part of the Soviet military force in Europe. I would argue that those armies may well be reliable in the first sense of the word, that is, for internal purposes; possibly in the second; and almost not at all in the third.

This means that one must scale down quite sharply the estimates of effective Warsaw Pact troops in Europe—an additional argument for believing that a conflict between the two blocs in Europe is unlikely. But if the grand sweep of the Warsaw Pact armies recedes in probability, we are still left with the huge nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers.

	U.S. Only	*NATO Total*	*Ratio*	*Warsaw Pact Total*	*U.S.S.R. Only*
Manpower (total):	2,049,000	4,933,000	1.03:1	4,788,000	3,673,000
Forces in Europe (total):	221,000	2,123,000	1.26:1	1,669,000	881,000
Equipment: Main Battle Tanks	3,000	17,000	1:1.54	26,300	13,300
Antitank Ground Launchers	640	5,784	4.03:1	1,437	1,150
Submarines (attack)	52	191	1.2:1	158	8
Carriers	6	12	3:1	4	4
Destroyers	43	128	5.57:1	23	1
Frigates	34	178	1.63:1	109	4
Naval Air: Attack Fights	194	413	2.47:1	127	42
Fighters	144	159	——	0	0
Helicopters	48	321	1.87:1	172	12
Landbased Air: Bombers	0	81	1.4:51	365	0
Attack Fighters	492	2,293	1.31:1	1,755	585
Interceptors	0	572	1.2:61	1,490	1,490
Helicopters (armed)	330	733	4.70:1	156	56

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Nuclear Weapons—Strategic Forces

WHEN THINKING about the nuclear weapons systems (strategic, tactical, and intermediary), there is always a danger that one will get lost in the sheer technical complexities. Some relatively clear facts do emerge after a prolonged and depressing immersion in the Doctor Strangelovian language of nuclear weaponry. It is reasonably clear that a major trend toward "destabilization" of the traditional deterrence system—or mutual, assured destruction (MAD)—has been under way for a decade. The two superpowers share the blame. But that is almost irrelevant, because even if the blame were not symmetrically distributed, both powers clearly now must share in the massive cutbacks that are so urgent, if only to buy time for a general scaling-down of nuclear and conventional arsenals.

The sheer number of nuclear warheads is numbing when one considers that in the 1960s Robert McNamara's analysis assumed that 400 warheads delivered to Soviet targets were enough to assure deterrence. Today the two sides have some 16,000 strategic warheads alone! The shift in doctrine since the early '70s, coupled with new weapons systems, is even more frightening. I repeat, the number of warheads and delivery systems is many times greater than what was projected as adequate for deterrence, on both sides.

In the case of the U.S., each "leg" of the strategic triad—the strategic missiles, airborne and submarine-launched missiles—meets the full deterrence capacity. Put another way, each leg of the triad assures enough massive destruction by itself (even if the other two are destroyed) to make the cost of any attack on the U.S. prohibitive for its adversary. Thus presumably modest and continual improvements in the triad should create a "safe" defense capacity.

The U.S. plans to add three new items to its nuclear arsenal: the cruise missile, the MX missile, and the new Trident II system. All three are inherently destabilizing in an already tense nuclear balance, not only because they guarantee a new turn upward in the arms race but because the very nature of these systems permits changes in our strategic doctrine. The cruise missile is cheap, accurate, and slow, and can be launched from the projected B–1 bomber, from the newer Stealth bomber, from the present planes of the Strategic Air Command or, for that matter, from mobile launchers on land or sea. It is destabilizing because it is accurate enough to be directed against silos rather than cities, and above all because it can carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead. It thus opens the possibility of a "first strike," which could knock out Soviet rockets while still leaving the U.S. with the triad, and it makes arms inspection much more difficult.

The MX, even without the Rube Goldberg delivery system proposed by the Carter administration, is also an unnecessary addition to our arsenal and makes no sense whatsoever if it is to be placed, as now proposed, in existing silos. It, too, is accurate enough to be a "counterforce" rather than a "countercity" weapon and therefore could be used in a first strike. The Trident II system increases the accuracy of submarine-based missiles to a point where it becomes a counterforce weapon as well. I am arguing that our first priority has to focus on eliminating counterforce weapons and on rejecting the doctrine of first-strike capability by both sides.

The technical advances making a counterforce weapon possible are accompanied by two shifts in doctrine. The reasonable-sounding shift from MAD (an all-or-nothing exchange that is meant not to happen) to a counterforce approach (that would target not the cities but the weapons systems, silos, and command centers of the enemy) posits the possibility of actually fighting a nuclear war. And as I will try to show, it also presumes a first strike, as a stepping stone to the more explicit theories of graduated use of nuclear weapons (nuclear use theory—NUTs).

Grim Concepts—"First-Strike" & "Counterforce" Capacity . . .

COUNTERFORCE ASSUMES that it is possible to destroy all, or nearly all, of the enemy's capacity to retaliate, after which the remaining nuclear weapons of the side initiating such an attack hold the enemy population centers as essentially defenseless hostages. The terrible

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danger is that, given no agreement to scale back the weapons systems or even a more modest SALT II agreement, both sides will feel forced to develop counterforce capacity. Counterforce relies on surprise and first strike, which makes the United States' repeated refusal to say it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons sound grim indeed.

The theories about the graduated use of nuclear weapons, professed by nuclear theorists, assume that one can turn up the scale of nuclear destruction while stopping short of a holocaust. These theorists, in other words, treat nuclear weapons as simply more powerful versions of conventional ones. Such a "downscaling" of nuclear weapons sharply increases the probability that they might be used. It also assumes angelic mutual confidence among the two rival powers and an acceptance, even though hypothetically, of the notion that both would agree to a common definition of what constitutes a tactical or intermediary weapon as against a strategic one. It is simply impossible to believe that either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S. would accept defeat in a major conflict rather than move up one notch on the scale of nuclear exchange. What these theorists are playing with, therefore, is something far beyond any reasonable assumption of security or defense: in question is, at that point, the existence of humanity itself. Here the Reagan insistence that the U.S. must regain the lead in nuclear weaponry is a prescription for disaster.

We must therefore insist upon substantial negotiations with the Soviets toward a drastic scaling-back of existing nuclear systems. A beginning could be the ratification of SALT II. More fruitful still would be some version of the Kennan proposal for a mutual 50 percent reduction across the board of the nuclear arsenals. "Linkage" in any form is beside the point, since mutual cutbacks are not supposed to reward the Soviets for good behavior but express a joint interest. We are for symmetrical cutbacks because they are beneficial to us, whether or not there remain other disputes with the Soviets.

I am arguing, in terms of cutbacks, for a stop to the funding of the MX, a stop to the development and building of cruises, for elimination of the B–1 bomber and its successor, the Stealth. While these measures will result in huge savings, let us emphasize that they still leave in place the essential "deterrent" in the form of the triad. They also still leave the U.S. with over 9,000 strategically deliverable warheads: surely, by any criteria, a massive nuclear overcapacity.

This is why it is essential to move toward cutbacks that would limit both sides to no more than some 400 delivery vehicles including all their systems, on land, sea, and in the air. A successful mutual scaling back to this, still very high, level can shape the backdrop for further arms reductions by both sides.

There are at least two other items in the Reagan "defense" budget that should be eliminated. It is playing with fire to develop satellite killers that would endanger inspection and lasers that can be turned into antiballistic missile weapons (again, the first-strike problem). I also oppose, as do most of our West European allies, the resumed development of nerve and other poison-gas weapons. A decidedly undovish Nixon had stopped their manufacture.

At some point it will become necessary to reexamine the assumption behind the "triad," even as an intermediary stage to a more general nuclear disarmament. I can conceive of a prolonged period of time during which the two blocs live with a nuclear deterrent on a far lower level than the present one while continuing to negotiate for further reductions in all weapons. It would be surprising if that period was not marked by superpower rivalry, indirect local conflicts, and maneuvering for unilateral advantage. The point is to get away from the danger of nuclear or all-out conventional conflict. On the part of the United States, I would favor moving unilaterally toward elimination of all ground-based missile launchers, and to move whatever remains out to sea. That is as close as we can come to a civil defense policy in the nuclear era. And this is one more reason to try to move as quickly as possible to a nuclear-arms-free world.

Some Conclusions

THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT must take defense issues seriously. We must insist that we are not opposed to a sane, reasonable defense of legiti-

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mate U.S. interests. A sane defense policy is considerably more feasible if coupled with substantial negotiations with the Soviets and with moves both through some unilateral initiatives and mutual agreements to cut back nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, we ought not to be for cutting everything in the defense budget. This may be appropriate for pacifists, but not for those of us who want to develop an alternate politics for a democratic majority. It is essential to show that we do accept the idea that there should be some efficient, effective defense for the United States.

There are areas where I, for one, would be more generous than this Administration where defense is concerned. We need to keep skilled technicians to maintain planes and complex weapons. We need to pay the men and women in the armed forces decent wages and probably should restore something like the old GI Bill to make military service more attractive. For that matter, we should be troubled about the whole idea of a professional army in a democracy. While I do not favor the draft right now, at some future time a military based on universal male and female service, with generous exemptions for conscientious objectors, would be appropriate for a democratic polity. More funds are needed for maintenance and upkeep of existing weapons. The present Reserve system is clearly inadequate, and we should favor more emphasis on studying broad-based citizen-army defense systems and on developing military technologies that are appropriate.

Defense is too important an issue to leave to the military. It is also too vital a question to leave in the hands of the right and the hawks—just as peace is too important an issue to leave to the peace movement. □

This article is based on a chapter that will appear in *What Reagan Is Doing to Us*, Frank Reissman, ed., to be published by Harper & Row later this year.

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Murray Hausknecht

Waiting for the End?

Prospects for Nuclear Destruction

The bellicose nationalism of Ronald Reagan's 1980 campaign and his insistence on the need for "nuclear superiority" help explain the interest stirred by Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth* when it first began to appear in the *New Yorker*. The book along with news of the European antinuclear movement has probably helped rally, in turn, antinuclear sentiment in this country. For those involved in the movement here Solly Zuckerman's book, though it arrived with less fanfare, should be of considerable interest. Zuckerman, a leading British scientific adviser to the Macmillan and Wilson governments of the '60s, writes with admirable brevity about matters of immediate political relevance, but inevitably *The Fate of the Earth* will continue to attract the lion's share of attention.*

Schell's book consists of three parts. The first is devoted to an "account of the principal consequences of a full-scale nuclear holocaust" based on a meticulous search of the best available technical literature. It leads to a stark conclusion: a nuclear holocaust can destroy the human species. This is far from a certainty, but since it cannot be ruled out, any thinking about nuclear warfare must assume this result. The premise is the ground for the second part in which Schell reflects upon how human existence is affected by our ineradicable knowledge of the means of destroying mankind. These reflections lead to the logical question, what is to be done?

Schell is good at detailing the meaning of nuclear war on a concrete human level. After recalling for us some previous descriptions of what actually happened to Hiroshima and its inhabitants, he describes the anticipated effects of a nuclear bombing on New York City. An example: If a 20-megaton bomb

> one thousand six hundred times the yield of the Hiroshima bomb [and the one most likely to be used against New York, were to be dropped on the Empire State Building, then] people caught in the open twenty-three miles away from ground zero, in Long Island, New Jersey, and southern New York State would be burned to death. . . . The mushroom cloud would be seventy miles in diameter. New York City and its suburbs would be transformed into a lifeless, flat, scorched desert in a few weeks.

After reading Schell and Zuckerman, who uses many of the same sources, it is easy to accept the former's conclusion that "a full-scale holocaust would, if extended throughout the Northern Hemisphere, eliminate the civilizations of Europe, China, Japan, Russia and the United States."

But Schell goes further. It is not implausible to consider the earth, its various forms of life, and the atmosphere surrounding it as making up one complex, interacting system, very much like a cell of an organism. By definition, a disturbance in one part or element of the system affects the whole. There would be, therefore, long-term as well as short-run consequences of a nuclear holocaust for animal and plant species, climate, and the atmosphere, separately and as parts of an interdependent whole. Taking everything we know into consideration and in awareness of much still unknown, "a full-scale nuclear holocaust could lead to the extinction of mankind." The conclu-

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* Jonathan Schell, *The Fate of the Earth* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).

Solly Zuckerman, *Nuclear Illusion and Reality* (New York: Viking Press, 1982).

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sion is a rational reading of available knowledge, although, as Schell is at pains to point out, our areas of ignorance far exceed our knowledge, and it is far more speculative than the conclusions reached by scientists about the immediate effects of nuclear explosions. Still, Schell asserts, it is in the realm of the possible, and therefore we must assume that it will happen—extinction allows for no second chance.

Though the conclusion is dramatic and riveting it runs against the grain of the book's purpose. To make the issue of nuclear arms and war *the* critical moral and political question of our time—this is the obvious end of the book—requires overcoming the drag of indifference that has surrounded the question in the past decade. Pointing to the threat of extinction cannot by itself dispel that indifference. On Schell's own evidence, extinction of the species is merely a logical possibility, and thus the claim is vulnerable to a type of rebuttal that has already been voiced. One expert, who himself directed a study of nuclear war, told a *New York Times* reporter that Schell uses a National Academy of Science study "without mentioning that its bottom line is the exact opposite of his bottom line. The Academy said that the preponderance of evidence is that human life would survive even the largest nuclear war." The response obscures the essential point that Schell is making and distracts attention from our common peril; but it is a type of response that Schell's presentation invites.

The important implication is not the possible extinction of the species *homo sapiens* but the irremediable damage to human beings. After a holocaust the survivors would still be members of the same biological species as before the catastrophe, but they would bear only the faintest resemblance to the humans who exist now. Human beings are *human*, that is, something "more than" members of a species, because they are enmeshed in that complex, tangled snarl of social relations, the material artifacts they produce, the institutions they evolve, the history they share along with what is labeled philosophy, theology, science, and art that is collectively termed "civilization." When, for example, we use the commonplace of intellectual discourse, "the vast changes modernization brings to societies," we are implicitly recognizing that there are historic events that fracture communities, that result in massive disjunctions affecting the structure of human personalities and social institutions.

But throughout human history, no matter how severe the consequences of such fractures, there has always been enough continuity so that those who came after could recognize and feel some affinity, some kinship with those who preceded them. Those who survive a nuclear holocaust will still be biologically (despite the damage done by radiation) members of the same species as ourselves, but they will not be "human" in the sense that we understand the term today. If we conceive of history as the record of continuity in discontinuity, a holocaust would mark the start of another kind of history in which the sense of continuity is almost wholly submerged in the sound of exploding nuclear weapons. This, I think, is a more likely outcome and one perhaps more terrifying than the vision of extinction.

But it is the latter vision that grips Schell's imagination and governs his examination of its implications for "the human condition." The writing here tends to be both portentous—"The question now before the human species, therefore, is whether life or death will prevail on earth?"—and repetitious. Even those who accept the basic premise will find this heavy going and will turn with relief to the consideration of what must be done if death is not to prevail.

Current doctrine on prevention of nuclear war invokes a deterrence theory that assumes a potential aggressor will not launch a "first strike" if he is convinced that the enemy can respond with a powerful retaliatory "second strike." The theory also assumes both sides will accept the notion that "in the present-day nuclear world 'victory' is oblivion." But if "victory" is impossible and the second strike "means the end of us," the capacity for the retaliatory response is not a credible threat. Schell asks us to imagine

> the circumstances of leaders whose country has been annihilated in a first strike . . . their coun-

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try is on its way to becoming a radioactive desert. . . . What rational purpose could they have in launching a retaliatory strike! . . . [it] might be the action that would finally break the back of the ecosphere and extinguish the species. In these circumstances it seems to me it is really an open question whether leaders would decide to retaliate or not.

Deterrence theory and its reliance on the balance of terror, then, cannot be relied upon to protect us against the holocaust.

Deterrence theory may not be as useful as conventional wisdom would have us believe, but Schell's argument is not sufficient to refute it. First, he assumes that the leaders accept extinction as a realistic probability rather than "the bottom line" of their scientific advisers. Zuckerman, for example, accepts the probability of human survival. A second problem is most easily appreciated by considering a set of actual leaders.

In a highly publicized speech this past spring Alexander Haig said that "deterrence depends on our capability, even after suffering a massive nuclear blow, to prevent the aggressor from securing a military advantage and prevailing in a conflict." Obviously the impossibility of "victory" is not accepted by this "leader." Consider Ronald Reagan. It is now accepted by friend and foe alike that he is an ideologue; again, by definition, a person in the grip of a few fixed ideas that are highly impervious to modification by exposure to reality. It is not hard to imagine Ronald Reagan saying, "Okay, so it may be the end of the species, but we can't let the bastards get away with it!" Can we expect more of Brezhnev and the Politburo?

A more basic defect of deterrence theory is, Schell says, that "the nuclear powers put a higher value on national sovereignty than they do on human survival . . . they are ultimately prepared to bring an end to mankind in their attempt to protect their own countries." The political problem of the nuclear era is the problem of national sovereignty, and avoiding extinction requires ridding ourselves of the "system of national sovereignty." The implied corollary is that only some form of world government will protect the species.

As an ideal, abolishing national sovereignty is worthy of respect. As a basis for political action its very ambition subverts whatever power it may have. Among other "awesome tasks" it will entail "the reorganization of political life," and Schell says that he has "left it to others" to work out the necessary steps to attain the goal. But it is unlikely that any one will be encouraged to act in face of the enormity of such tasks. Successful political action demands significant but realizable goals.

Zuckerman's work, which covers some of the same ground as Schell's, suggests some directions for action. He argues that no "further elaboration of nuclear weapons could significantly improve the military security or strength" of the two superpowers. The belief that there can be a "limited nuclear war" using tactical weapons like the neutron bomb, he contends, is sheer illusion: any use of nuclear weapons must escalate into a full-fledged nuclear war. Finally, the build-up of nuclear weapons could be halted by a comprehensive test ban treaty among the nuclear nations; if no testing is possible there can be no "uninterrupted elaboration and multiplication of warheads and their means of delivery."

An immediate objective of political action could be to work for a comprehensive test ban treaty. On another level, Zuckerman's analysis specifies the kinds of political programs and leaders we cannot afford. Those who believe in and advocate "limited wars" or who believe that we have an insufficiency of nuclear weapons do not deserve any political support and, indeed, must be vigorously opposed. Keeping such people out of office and supporting a test ban treaty are modest goals compared to the "awesome task" of doing away with national sovereignty. But they have at least one virtue: if achieved, they will increase the chances of the survival of human beings and their civilizations. Or, to put the matter with rather less solemnity than Schell and Zuckerman permit themselves, they will provide something politically useful to do until the Messiah comes. □

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Juan E. Corradi

Argentina: A Story Behind a War

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Ten years ago, the military ruled Argentina. They had seized power by overthrowing an elected government in 1966—as they had done in 1962, in 1955, in 1943, in 1930; as they would do again in 1976. But, as on all those occasions, things had not turned out well for them. They were seeking a way out.

Ten years ago, nearly 20 years after his ouster, Juan Perón became again leader of Argentina. During his long exile in Spain, he had presented himself as the ultimate arbiter of Argentine politics. He had taken both a hard and a soft line, played both the right and the left. The accumulated mistakes of successive authoritarian regimes had managed to unite disparate groups in a front against military rule. Peronists and anti-Peronists came together in a tactical alliance against the armed forces: they demanded free elections. The experience showed that the Argentine military found it much easier to seize power than to hold it with competence or leave it with grace.

Perón did not limit himself to demanding a return to electoral politics. He also endorsed the claims of several guerrilla groups that acted in his name, as a means of exerting pressure on the regime. Argentine notables were led to fear a convergence of popular discontent with guerrilla action and Peronist organizations. Such apprehension led them to believe that only Perón himself could contain those explosive forces. While Perón presented himself as the only man who could spare the country a social upheaval, the guerrillas in turn intended to provoke, with his return, a revolutionary wave. So the question was posed that would ominously hang over Argentine politics in the years to follow: who would use whom?

After protracted negotiations (Perón was allowed to return to Argentina but not to run in the elections; in exchange, the Peronist party was allowed to campaign and present a stand-in candidate), the military returned to the barracks and general elections were held in March 1973. Héctor Cámpora, the Peronist candidate, became president. Peronists and Radicals—the two traditional parties that the military had sought to suppress—received 70 percent of the vote. Altogether 82 percent of the voters backed candidates hostile to the armed forces. The hour of political revenge seemed imminent.

The new government followed a program based on a social pact between, on the one side, small and medium-sized industry, and, on the other, the powerful central labor organization. The program was moderate. More important than its substance was its style, based on populist mobilizations. It was this style that alarmed military officers, landowners, business executives, and many moderates in the middle class. These elements put Perón—who, after a brief visit, had gone back to Madrid—under pressure to deliver on his promise to pacify society. Perón returned, and already the welcoming ceremonies at the airport were marred by a deadly battle between radicals and the security forces. The crisis that ensued forced president Cámpora to resign and resulted in his temporary replacement by the Speaker of the House.

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Meanwhile, Perón was reinstated as a lieutenant general in the army, key government positions were filled with conservative Peronists, and new elections were called. Perón and his third wife, known as Isabelita, ran for president and vice-president, respectively. The ticket won by a landslide and on October 12, 1973, for the third time in his life, Perón became president of Argentina.

Perón's return to power took place in an atmosphere of increasing violence. Left-wing Peronists were swept from official posts. Guerrillas stepped up their attacks on right-wing Peronists. In return, radical militants were persecuted. Perón made use of extremists from the right to consolidate his power, just as he had made use of extremists from the left to acquire it. His maneuvers stemmed from an opportunistic conception, in which democratic methods contain nothing sacred in themselves and are but one item in a larger and less humane arsenal. On this score Perón was a quintessential modern Argentine, a symbol and symptom of the profound disarray that has afflicted the nation. In some countries social change has been brought about by relatively peaceful means; in others it has come about through violence. Argentines have, for their part, resorted to unscrupulous methods in pursuit of modest goals. The gap between the savage political form and the mild social content, between criminal means and conventional ends, gives a measure of the political anomie that has seized Argentina.

If the political style was violent, indeed fascistic, the government's social and economic program remained prudent, with some nationalistic overtones. The new program was similar to what Peronism had offered in the 1940s; but its meaning was quite different in the '70s. Peronism was no longer a coalition of immature classes around the early benefits of industrialization. It was considerably more difficult to balance the interests of labor with those of national and foreign capital at this later date, to house them all in harmony in the same political movement. But that difficulty did not make internecine war inevitable. Other societies have managed worse strains without the political cannibalism, the futile bloodshed of Argentina. Political arrangements are not the product of iron logic but the result of creative answers to challenges, or the lack of such answers. It is in this realm that we must seek an explanation for a central problem in modern Argentina, namely, the persistence of unprincipled public action.

The Cultural Malaise

NEARLY 40 PERCENT of the Argentine population belong to the middle class—a class reputed, since Aristotle, to be a source of political stability. Argentina, however, belies that notion. Whereas in many societies class conflicts have been deflected into a competition for middle-class status, in Argentina the visible recrudescence of social struggles stems from heightened tensions within the middle class, pitting faction against faction, generation against generation. The political episodes of the 1970s bring to mind Turgenev more than Marx.

In 1973 the Argentines opted for the wholesale rejection of the political pattern that had developed since the ouster of Perón in 1955: a cycle of proscription, chicanery, and dictatorship. They placed their hopes again in old Perón. The 1973 elections functioned like a plebiscite and discharged on the political arena a torrent of accumulated frustrations. New actors entered the scene then: radicalized groups of middle-class youth whose irruption set the tone of the second Peronist era. Behind the impressive victory of Perón stood not only his traditional supporters—the working class—but also large contingents of the middle class that had abandoned their former political loyalties to gather around the figure of Perón. The magnitude of this shift appears clearly when we recall that the majority of middle-class Argentines had been against Perón in the '50s.

In 1973 the children of those who had resisted Perón turned their backs on their parents and embraced the very cause that the latter once opposed. Whereas for the workers the return of Peronism signified the vindication of old political convictions, for the middle-class newcomers it was a gesture of political parricide. This dramatic shift of allegiances helped envelop Argentina in a wave of violence for which it was not prepared.

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The survival of Peronism among the workers was understandable: in the '40s Peronism had presided over the incorporation of labor in the political system. The experience left its imprint on the collective memory. Despite repeated attempts at coercion and co-optation, the different regimes that succeeded Perón's could not erase that primary loyalty. In fact, they confirmed it. But how to account for the new youth movement that sprang from the heart of middle-class Argentina and broke all ties with established political practices? The answer cannot be found in the *Zeitgeist*, even less in "foreign subversion," as the present masters of Argentina pretend, but rather in some basic social and cultural patterns of the 1950s and '60s.

In the '50s—the decade when this youth was born—Argentina underwent a wave of modernization that affected, among other institutions, education and the family. From 1943 to 1955, during the first Peronist era, Argentina had been culturally cloistered. Peronism extended the rights of citizenship to a recent proletariat; but the process bypassed the educational institutions of the middle class and, instead, passed through the state-sponsored unions and the welfare system. The end of Perón's regime [in 1955] led to regression for organized labor but to progress for other areas of social and cultural life. The middle class now eagerly embraced a culture that for long years it had been allowed to taste surreptitiously at best. The wish to catch up seized the universities and from there spread to the wider world of the middle class. To grow up in such a climate meant, for the middle-class children of the '50s and '60s, to face a wider set of choices, but also a more uncertain future, than any of their forebears. Like so many currents of reform in Argentine history, this modernization failed to encompass the whole society. Old and new patterns were thrown together in haste, geared for the dramatic confrontations that would rock the country later on.

Another process took place in the late 1950s and '60s: political discourse among the elites became inarticulate. Old words received new meanings; terms belonging to disparate universes of discourse were transposed and combined. A bizarre discursive *bricolage* accompanied a no less confusing act of political combinations. Nationalism went hand in hand with oil concessions, "liberation" was mixed with "dependency," until the perverse dialectic found an echo among those who advocated violence as a means of attaining peace. Almost any combination of ideological notes was admitted. From this confusion emerged, a few years later, that new style of the radicalized middle-class youth with its aptness for the macabre, as in the political terrorism with which it chose to express itself in the '70s.

These factors must be placed in the context of Argentine society, which is made up of many diverse ethnic groups and is characterized by the weakness of social loyalties on the one hand, and a protracted institutional crisis on the other. The rapid development of Argentina put side by side groups that failed to speak the same political idiom. Given such dissonance, a heavy premium was placed on the distribution of resources, on multiple payoffs. Where common values cannot cement the social order, only the delivery of goods keeps the whole fabric together. It was precisely this capacity of the country's institutions to satisfy a varied set of interests that faltered after 1955. Now political disorder and economic crisis played havoc with the demands of a young generation. Their elders were able to withdraw to old reflexes and acquired positions. But what rational strategy could the middle-class youth fall back on? The only option for many of them was a leap forward into the abyss. Frustration bred contempt and contempt utopia. Whence their mythical reappropriation of Peronist ideology at the very moment when the established political groups sought conciliation. Detached from existing interests and values, the new generation sought to impose its radical will, seriously misjudging the actual composition of the country's political forces. While older Peronists saw the possibility of negotiating some historic reparation, the Peronist youth treated them as traitors who lacked nerve. While organized labor was being accepted again as part of the political system, the young preached revolution in the name of outcasts. To proposals of conciliation they opposed rupture; to accommodation, struggle without concessions; to the pragmatic present a purified and redeeming past.

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Argentine society failed to find an adequate answer to their challenge. Politicians and intellectuals sat back, puzzled and paralyzed, watching in stupor the invasion of the stage by vigilantes whose only answer was retribution. An ordeal of insurgency and counterinsurgency was then added to the list of hardships that were plaguing an exhausted country. This may explain why, instead of assuming clear positions, so many Argentines were seized instead by a wish to forget, by a passion to ignore the outrages that were practiced in their midst.

The Political Conundrum

WITH THE RETURN of Peronism Argentines hoped to find a viable political formula. On the one hand, the two major political parties fraternized in Congress; on the other, business and labor arrived at a concerted incomes policy. Backed by a solid electoral majority, Perón stood, as president, at the center of this scheme—providing balance and flexibility. But the same balance and flexibility could not be expected from his own movement. It was not wholly committed to a political order that had curtailed its participation in the past. How then was Perón to press the need for compromise on those in whom proscription had bred an acute sense of difference? How was he to persuade labor, which had been victimized by previous economic policies, that its demands had to take into consideration the general well-being of the economy? How was Perón to obtain peace from those whose violence he had previously endorsed?

Perón's call for conciliation found more favorable reception among non-Peronists than among his own followers. There was a gap between the spirit of conviviality that animated Perón and the main parties, and the mood of popular mobilization that had carried him back into the government. Perón would use up all his reserves of charisma in order to bridge that gap. He also faced another obstacle. The decision to open up the political game had been taken in order to block the menace that the conflicts of civil society might swamp the state. The political institutions had been convened to contain the social struggles. But the summons had found them in a state of disarray: they had not withstood intact the punishment meted out to them by the military regime that had ruled the country from 1966 through 1972. Could the old parties retrieve the formidable amount of social energy that had accumulated outside their spheres during the years of dictatorship?

As president, Perón had, on the one hand, to channel the expectations of his followers and, on the other, to rebuild the political system. The paradox was this: the man who had skillfully sabotaged many a government from exile was now called upon to rescue a drifting polity. He had to defuse the forces that had brought him back to power. Yet the skills Perón had applied to defeat his adversaries proved insufficient to build a viable political alternative. He could not disentangle himself from the web of interests and passions that he had promoted. Everything came to rest on his shoulders. Old and ailing, he became a political system by himself. And now every group defined its position in terms of access to the presumed will of the leader. Perón's every act was interpreted in a million different ways. Political conflict became a fight over the appropriation of the same figure and the same language. This further confused the terms of political understanding. On the right and on the left priorities were twisted. Political life became a game of dissimulation, a masquerade in which the masks, though hiding contrary designs, oddly resembled one another, for they were all patterned after the effigy of Perón. Social and political conflicts exceeded Perón's capacity to manage them. In June 1974 Perón threatened to resign. A month later he was dead, and the countdown toward disaster began.

Perón's successors—his widow Isabel and her entourage—isolated themselves from a political society in which every man was for himself. Social compacts and political understandings were blown to smithereens, and people started to kill each other with depressing regularity. Against a backdrop of sordid battles between armed factions, the established social groups continued their bickering, neither joining the fight nor doing anything to stop it. The last-minute efforts to find a sensible way out failed because of the sectarianism of the Peronists and the civic retreat of the other political parties. In the end, there was nothing left for

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the majority of Argentines but wait for the return of the military.

The Social Patchwork

ARGENTINA, like other dependent societies, is characterized by social disarticulation, which in turn is the result of the historical accretion of disparate modes of development. The old and the new were juxtaposed in odd coexistence. Unlike in other dependent societies, however, in Argentina each of these modes has given rise to a dense network of interests that persist over time. Thus agrarian wealth at the turn of the century produced large fortunes, urban centers, and a big, though parasitic, middle class. The industrialization that took place during World War II gave birth to a strong labor movement, the backbone of Peronism. The technological reorganization of the 1950s and '60s favored local branches of transnational corporations and disfavored older sectors. Each group—the landed elite, the middle classes, the workers' unions, national and international business circles—busily promoted its projects, but no vision has arisen that is large enough to encompass the society. In this volatile conglomerate, alliances, like fireworks, are as varied as they are ephemeral. Political fragility is the other side of an activist but fragmented society. The negative pluralism that results poses a Hobbesian problem. There is a puzzle of passions that seek but cannot find an adequate political solution. Sometimes the state rises above the turmoil and seeks to assume command of political development. But each time it falters and then succumbs to the tug-of-war between pressure groups. Too weak to lead, each group is still strong enough to prevent others from doing so.

Hence, though intellectually brilliant and culturally creative, more "modern" than other Latin American societies, Argentina falls prey to political decay. Its political system functions like a wild market. There is no largeness of aims, no solid rule—only some partial answer to blockages and reciprocal vetoes. Each group clamors in a separate discourse. The landed elites speak the language of order; the workers, the language of participation; the industrialists, the language of growth. The loudness of the parts only increases the cacophony of the whole. The society then does not make sense to itself and cannot interpret its position in the concert of nations. Seen from the outside, Argentina does not seem to find a sure place in the changing international order, only illusions and disillusions. From within, it behaves fitfully and lacks focus, not because there is a vacuum of power, but because power is dispersed in explosive fragments throughout the social body.

Argentina exasperates those who expect a country seemingly modern and urbane to house a free, self-governing people. It will also disappoint those who think that an efficient despotism will bring remedy to license. And it will frustrate those who believe in a revolutionary outcome. No democracy appears—only disorder; no solid authoritarian state, but praetorian regimes in search of adventure and in fear of retribution; no revolution, but terrorism. A society once full of promise and still young has entered a fateful spiral of decay that sometimes seizes much older nations. But in the latter, the weight of traditions, the respect for weathered institutions, the commonality of beliefs makes decadence supportable. For Argentina, decadence is hell. Without the appropriate political, if not natural, resources to muddle through in an unsteady world, and lacking solid political mores on which to stand, the country declines in ugly ways, tormented by the image

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of a past for whose loss it finds no consolation. This premature vocation for nostalgia can trigger irredentist claims.

In this odd context, it is not odd that Argentina has gone to war with Great Britain in 1982 over an injustice done to it in 1833. This precocious Alexandria has challenged decrepit Albion to the deadliest of all games.

The Soldier's State

THE RECENT HISTORY of Argentina yields a picture of fragmented, discontinuous modernization. Economic, political, and social movements, which elsewhere made their way by gradual stages, here have been in simultaneous ferment. No stable political formula has emerged. Institutional crises, crises of legitimacy, crises of participation, crises of distribution, de facto governments, states of siege and martial law, attempts at totalitarian or joint rule, experiments in corporatism, terrorism of the left and of the right, terror condoned or practiced by the government—all have been detrimental not only to democratic values and to the rule of law, but to the very existence of the state as well. From such disarray some have concluded that only a supreme concentration of power could end the conflict of all against all. The officers who toppled the regime of Isabel Perón in 1976 expected to accomplish that task.

The new junta and its president, General Videla, proclaimed that their objective was not merely to terminate the disorder of the Peronist years, but to reorganize the very basis of Argentine society. The junta vowed to abolish terrorism, to revitalize the economy, and to transcend the social stalemate. Five years later, General Videla finished his mandate and conveyed power to another general, president-select Roberto Viola. Terrorism was abolished, but terror became part of the art of governing. The economy was not revitalized: it went bankrupt. The different sectors of society started to protest again. If Argentina had changed, it was only in the sense of wholesale diminution: today it has a smaller industrial base, a smaller working class, and a smaller middle class than it had ten years ago. Moreover, 2 million Argentines—including many of the better trained —have sought refuge abroad. Would this general impoverishment and permanent dictatorship be the price of escaping the old political vicious circle? The Administration of General Viola vacillated before that question, making gestures of détente toward the opposition. Personal and military rivalries aside, this was probably the reason why Viola was forced to resign and was replaced by General Leopoldo Galtieri, the army commander.

Punishment and Fear

THE MILITARY RULERS have reduced the complex mores of Argentina to a simple dichotomy: friend or foe. Their reasoning was oriented to the past and negative—a logic of remembrance and avoidance. They traded organized repression for past sins and diffuse violence. But how to distinguish between friend and foe? The citizens had to guess the rules that could separate a good from a bad Argentine. All they knew was that their safety and lives were at stake. The model of repression was simple. It included three actors: a source of punishment, a victim, and a target. The victim "disappeared," but the target reacted with some manner of submission. Depending on the whim of the authorities, the scheme remained simple or was complicated. Thus punishment could be ordered by the highest authorities or left to the judgment of autonomous paramilitary groups; the selection of victims could be random or according to specific categories; victims could be dispatched with variable rates of destruction.

The striking feature of Argentine terror is the duplicity with which it has been administered and suffered, ranging from the government's disavowal of responsibility to a split structure of consciousness and discourse among the population. Argentina has been governed by both a visible and an invisible government, by dignified military chiefs and by secret terroristic associations. Something resembling a dual state has existed in the country since 1976, a state in which two systems operate, one serving as a mask for the other, one under the remnants of the old constitution (to which a new body of repressive legislation has been attached), the other under arbitrary measures

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in which considerations of military security override all law. But a dual state of this sort is a state on the verge of decomposition, where the capacity to coordinate and integrate society in a universally binding fashion, by means of a rational legal structure or at least through a rational bureaucracy, is lost in the rivalry of warlords and their free-wheeling "special services." The latter do not settle their differences in a rational manner; at best they agree informally on certain policies.

Argentina will begin to emerge from the present morass only when compromise between different social groups can be put on a binding universal basis. So far, the opposite has occurred. Many significant groups have been disenfranchised. Among the few that rule, few common loyalties exist. The glue that binds them together is profit, power, and the fear of those below. It may come about that one group will absorb all the others, or that other compromise structures will arise, or that the present system will lapse into further anarchy. The lesson of these tragic years seems to be that it is as strenuous to develop the potentialities of Argentina on a dictatorial as on a democratic basis. In 1976 Argentines were tired of a nominally democratic system that delivered them to internal war. In 1981 they longed again for peace and freedom, and for deliverance from the executioner's method. In 1982, the regime has offered them external war as the bitter substitute for national consensus, but the war can only postpone the question: will Argentina achieve freedom without chaos, and order without fear?

The solution has been there all along—known to all, undramatic, but it has eluded Argentines as if it were a supreme task for which they are singularly inept: the acknowledgment of their social complexity, the commitment to democratic processes, and the acceptance of perhaps a modest but steady level of economic performance. Argentina has lived in the shadow of fear. The balance of the "dirty war" against "subversion" is known throughout the world. Different international organizations have documented some 6,000 cases of "disappearances." Serious analysts believe the total number is closer to 15,000. Some claim as many as 30,000 victims. Who will ever know? By 1982 one thing was clear: the military had won their dirty war but not the peace. They had achieved neither social consensus nor economic solvency. Their alarums over territorial sovereignty today camouflage the weakening of national sovereignty through disastrous policies.

Life on the Tight Rope

TWO YEARS AFTER the junta seized power, democracy had become a bad word. Perón had been dead for four years. Guerrillas were being decimated in a bloody campaign that claimed many innocent victims. The country had moved from terrorism to state terror. Mass silence reigned—except on one occasion. In the winter of 1978, Argentines were allowed to pour out on the streets again, to celebrate the world soccer championship, which the Argentine team had won. The event was studiously exploited by the regime to make citizens forget their ordeals. Soccer came to mean fellowship on the cheap. In the awesome stadiums the junta and the masses feigned working for a common cause. An illusory bond was established between a people whose enthusiasm could not find worthy political expression and a regime whose policies were anything but popular. Fear is not the enemy of enthusiasm. Together, they are formidable enemies of reason.

The farce of 1978 seems, with hindsight, to have been a prelude to the tragedy of 1982. It may therefore be fitting to dwell on the social-psychological dynamics of the last few years. The sportive-jingoistic fervor of 1978 was short-lived. Coming home from the stadiums, citizens had to face an everyday reality ridden by anxiety. The junta had promised to restore faith in work and progress through an iron-fist approach to political disorder. Political repression and economic discipline would put Argentina back on the right track. Economic policy was aimed at dismantling the arrangements that, in the past, had produced the collusion of inefficient industrialists with oversized labor unions—both under state protection. The cost would be austerity and recession. Nothing would shelter the national economy from international market forces. The results were very serious: while wages were rolled back and in-

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dustry contracted, primary exporters cashed in on record sales, and financial operators paid interest on deposits that outran the phenomenal inflation rate. Grain went to the Soviet Union; capital was channeled into speculative ventures; foreign goods flooded the local market; sophisticated weapons were bought.

Military security and economic speculation soon got out of hand. Both further sapped the public spirit. On the one hand, state terror confined citizens to looking after themselves. On the other hand, the people's strategies to cope with inflation turned them into speculators and moonlighters. Traditional social conventions gave way to a pervasive cynicism. Anxiety seized all alike—those who did poorly and those who did well, those touched by the terror and those graced by a paper boom.

In the circles close to power, however, the sense of an ideological war was strong. Moral crusades were launched against the specter of subversion. The values of the military are an amalgam of small-town morality, religion, and national security. These form the core of an alleged "Argentine style of life" that is the antithesis of "communism." The simplicity of official ideology—which does not exclude surrealistic overtones—is, however, paradoxical. The ideas of these moral crusaders are reactive and antimodern—yet Argentine culture is nothing but the product of modern enlightenment. In consequence, right-wing Argentina offers the spectacle of a young country defending mythical old values, a modern melting pot worshipping traditions it never had, conservatives with little to conserve. The ideology of the officers is a universe plagued with demons, ill-digested values, and a sense of intellectual siege. On this level, Argentina is not merely a "dependent culture," since it has, after all, autonomously developed its own madness. Many Argentines have become critical of Western culture in the name of a myth of that same culture—a myth that harried authoritarians have construed in solitude and resentment, feeling besieged by countless and abstract enemies, and betrayed by friends. It is hard to see how this mentality can produce anything but internal and external catastrophes.

Dangerous Fictions, Sobering Facts

THE CENTRAL Argentine problem is not economic, not strategic, but political. Argentina has developed into a complex society, but it has not achieved the political sophistication and self-restraint that could make participation and freedom compatible. It has repeatedly denied itself what it has needed most: a properly functioning "bourgeois-democratic" system. Because of this lack, economic policies have been inconsistent and economic crises, in turn, have been rapidly translated into wild social tensions and political disruptions. In comparison with most developing countries, Argentina's basic predicament has never been too grave. Per-capita product and income have traditionally been the highest in Latin America. The economy has had a sluggish rate of growth, but the population has also grown at a very modest rate. Moreover, Argentina continues to produce attractive surpluses of foodstuffs and is self-sufficient in energy. But social disarticulation, political fragmentation, and galloping expectations have outpaced the capacity of the economy to please everybody. This frustration has led to attempts to "salvage" the economy, whenever political circumstances have allowed it. Those circumstances have been periods of lowest ebb in politics, coming generally as the result of previous failures.

And so the economic remedies have come to depend on political dictatorship. In general, they last as long as authoritarian rule is able to keep civil society on a short leash. In every cycle of this spiral, dictatorship has become more savage and the economic medicine more bitter; but instead of approaching a definitive solution, both have only increased the danger of disintegration and explosion. In the end, one is left with the unequivocal impression that what Argentina needs is a solid team of political craftsmen, not an assortment of stuffy officers—mostly murderous—and economic wizards—mostly fake.

On the eve of the Falklands/Malvinas war, the predicament of the present regime was tough. After years of abusing power, they pos-

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sessed all the cards in the deck but one: they had nobody left to blame if everything went bad. And everything has been going very badly in Argentina. The country is in the middle of a frightful economic crash. Unemployment has mushroomed, and inflation has gone back to three digits. The currency has been devalued several times. The complaints of labor, business, farmers, and parties have become loud. The right of the regime to stay in power has been challenged by the established groups. The junta has been faced with several unpleasant alternatives. If open elections are held, the Peronists are likely to return in force. If Peronists are excluded, only a weak government would inherit the present problems. If the officers remain in power, serious divisions within their ranks will explode. If, in that event, the harshest hawks prevail, another bloodbath might ensue. In April 1982 the military chose a classic and suicidal nonsolution: the flight forward into war. In the Falklands adventure, they have counted on the nationalist loyalty of the population. But, sooner or later, the people may come to see the war as both unnecessary and disastrous, and the hour of reckoning will come. A responsible collective process of democratic reconstruction will be then—as before—both the best and most fragile prospect. We cannot bet on it; but we can hope.

The question is posed once again: can Argentina succeed in achieving internal stability, in making use of its remarkable human and natural resources, in becoming a civil community? The conditions of success are partly political, partly economic, partly moral and social. But, in the present circumstances of Argentina, such maxims as "economics before politics" or "security before politics"—which in practice have meant a combination of a recklessly "open" economy and an intolerably closed polity—are less true than the converse. Until democratic order exists, economic progress will continue to be fitful and intermittent. Military security of the present kind will only breed insecurity. The first problem, therefore, is to create a system of government that can do justice to a complex society, not to evade it with an ersatz of jingoism and war. It is a problem to be attacked perhaps piecemeal, a process in which every class, political association, and institution must renew and criticize itself. This is not a panacea. The economic results will not be spectacular, but they will be steadier and in the end more just. Conflict will not cease, but it will be carried out in less destructive fashion, within the boundaries of law and around rational principles. If Argentina is to count anywhere, it must begin by counting at home, as an entity both livable and lovable that is more—and not, as hitherto, less—than the sum of its parts. And if the present rulers succeed in riding out the effects of this war, or if they are replaced by more of their kind, the last act of the Argentine drama is likely to be even more unpleasant. It will not, perhaps, be undeserved.

June 20, 1982 □

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Czeslaw Milosz

You Who Wronged

You who wronged a simple man
Bursting into laughter at the crime,
And kept a crowd of fools around you
Mixing good and evil, to blur the line,

Though everyone bowed down before you,
Saying virtue and wisdom lit your way,
Striking gold medals in your honor,
Glad to have survived another day,

Do not feel safe. The poet remembers.
You can slay one, but another is born.
The words are written down, the deed, the date.

And you'd have done better with a winter dawn,
A rope, and a branch bowed beneath your weight.

The Fate of a Poem

Czeslaw Milosz's poem "You Who Wronged" was written in 1950 in Washington, D.C., when he was still Polish cultural attaché to the United States. The poem was a product of his despair at the worsening situation at home, the increasing pressure of Stalinism, and the use of language to construct a new mental universe with good and evil so blurred that people would lose their moral orientation to life.

In 1950 Milosz broke with the Polish Communist government and went into exile in France. The passionate analysis of the new totalitarian mentality in his book *The Captive Mind* had been raging in him for some time but the decision to break with Stalinist Poland, when it came, "proceeded not from the functioning of the reasoning mind but from a revolt of the stomach." One step in that decision, one moment of that revulsion, "You Who

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Wronged," was published in Paris in 1953 in a book of Milosz's poetry entitled *The Light of Day*. The poem was printed in Polish in Paris, and then began to make its way to Poland where Milosz had become an "unperson." But it is precisely the "slightness" of a poem that allows it to slip through the net of the border control, for it can be conveniently carried in that secret compartment called memory.

Once in Poland, the poem entered the invisible world, the world denied by the official view, and it mixed with the rage, hope, and faith that would in time give birth to the Solidarity movement. It mixed so intimately with all those emotions and aspirations that when the shipyard workers in Gdansk, in 1980, erected a monument to their coworkers killed by the police in 1970, they chose to set three lines from this poem in stone at the base of the monument.

The process by which mental rhythms become poems is itself mysterious enough but the role poetry plays in Polish history is too complex an equation ever to be cracked. For to do so would mean to reproduce everything that bore Milosz's words across an ocean and 30 years of time to manifest in stone outside the Lenin shipyard. Some of the points along that way are, however, visible. Milosz's poems were always known to the intellectual elite. Adam Michnik, one of the founders of KOR, told Milosz that he knew many of his works by heart. In 1973, during a short-lived "thaw," 17 of Milosz's poems were published in an anthology in Poland, "You Who Wronged" among them. But it is a very long distance from the literary cafés of Warsaw to the workers' cafeterias in Gdansk, and so when I was in the shipyards in late November 1981 I could not help asking how they had chosen his poem, those lines.

One older worker told me that some of them had always known Milosz's work and the truth about his exile. He spoke with the quiet pride of a worker aware that he was the lawful heir of Poland's cultural traditions, once so thoroughly aristocratic. He was interrupted by a woman worker in her middle thirties who exclaimed: "And until Milosz won the prize, you know I had never even heard his name!" In the moment of silence that followed, the doubleness of her emotion could be felt—exhilaration at the freedom Solidarity had won, and a raging amazement at how great a darkness she had been kept in all those years.

The story of this poem is far from over. In time the authorities may decide that the monument cannot be allowed to stand because it is a source of too much spiritual energy and courage. On January 15, 1982, the *New York Times* carried an interview with a young worker from Gdansk who described the crackdown there:

> I went to the monument and offered a short prayer. At the shipyard the workers had put 40-ton trucks behind the gate to block it. A police radio car pulled up to the monument and people shouted: "Get out of here, this is a sacred place!"

The authorities may also confiscate the thousands of volumes printed by Poland's independent, "samizdat" publishers over the last years, and Milosz's books may again disappear from the shelves in libraries and bookstores. After a brief incarnation in stone his poem may be driven back into mind and memory. But two things are certain. The treatment of Milosz's work in post martial-law Poland will be one exact gauge of the intellectual freedom allowed by that new social mutation. And that woman in the shipyard, and hundreds of thousands of others like her, will forget neither the dark they had once been kept in nor the world they discovered in those 17 bright months of something like freedom. This poem was part of that discovery, and it appears here, in my translation, for the first time in English.

RICHARD LOURIE □

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Adam Michnik

All of Us Are Hostages

We have received a copy of an article written by Adam Michnik, one of the intellectual leaders in the struggle of Polish Solidarity. The text seems to have been written early this year. Here are a few crucial excerpts. — EDS.

The December putsch was certainly not aimed at implementing a Communist utopia. It was a classic antiworker counterrevolution, defending the conservative interests of the old regime. Contrary to the contentions of official propaganda, this was by no means a response to an attempt to seize political power. Solidarity had neither a shadow cabinet nor a program for a coup d'état.

The origins of the December chaos start with the fundamentally insoluble conflict between a social movement supported by millions and organized in Solidarity, and the totalitarian structures of a Communist state. The mere fact that an independent and self-administered institution supported by the people existed was in itself unacceptable.

Thus what was involved here was not just power but absolute power, meaning limits to the party nomenclatura; it was the style of exercising power, meaning the state of justice; it was the content of the compromise concluded between the ruling and the ruled, meaning pluralism in social life and the organization of self-management in the enterprises and on a territorial level.

The implementation of the reform program, which encompassed all these spheres of life, called into question the fundamental principle of the Communist domination of state and society. It was obvious that the apparatus would not voluntarily give up even a small amount of power and thus conflicts were inevitable. However, we believed that they would take a different course. We did not think that the power apparatus would try to solve social conflicts with military force by putting the argument of strength in the place of the strength of argument. . . .

Solidarity was able to strike, to be sure, but was unable to wait; it had full command of the technique of frontal attack but not of withdrawal; it had fundamental ideas but no program for gradual action. It was a colossus on steel legs, but with hands of clay; it was powerful in the factories, within the labor force, but it was helpless at the negotiating table. It faced an adversary who was incapable of telling the truth, keeping the economy going, or even living up to his own commitments, but who could only do one thing—smash social solidarity. This adversary had learned this skill to perfection in 37 years of power. . . .

THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM in Poland was a colossus with feet of clay but hands of steel. When the Solidarity functionaries demanded democratic elections for parliament and for the people's councils, they seemed to forget that such slogans were a cause for alarm to the rulers and signaled that their end was close.

Let me repeat: Solidarity never demanded that the Communists be expelled from the government and that the state be replaced by

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the trade union apparatus. Yet it is a problem that the ruling apparatchiks found such a program in the statements by Solidarity. It is unimportant now why this is so.

The ruling apparatchiks sensed the widespread urge to dissolve the party committees in the factories, they were frightened by the specter of elections to the people's councils, they had nightmares about a national referendum on the form of self-government, and they saw that drastic price hikes were due. Their answer to this was the coup of December, the last response they had.

Solidarity did not expect a military coup d'état and was taken by surprise. It is not the workers who are responsible for this but all those who (like the author himself), owing to their intellectual activities, were called upon to shape the political vision of the trade union. . . .

THE FUNDAMENTAL—although never exactly defined—quarrel within "Solidarity" pertained to the pace and extent of changes. In the beginning the advocates of compromise solutions held a majority, but as time went on it became evident that the power apparatus interpreted any inclination toward agreement as weakness. All concessions had to be enforced by strikes or threats to strike.

The continuous strikes, skillfully provoked by the power apparatus, wore down the society, which had already been exhausted by the difficulties of everyday life. The failure to bring about positive consequences in the form of tangible improvements in the quality of life led to a polarization and cast doubt on the sense of these tactics.

Some said: "No more strikes, this won't gain us anything." Others said: "No irrelevant strikes anymore; what we need is a general strike that will force the government to make basic concessions." It is hard to tell who outnumbered whom, although the latter definitely could be heard more distinctly.

These people, mostly young workers from large plants, demanded that the Solidarity leaders take radical action, and it became increasingly difficult to prevent such radical action (even though Walesa as well as Kuron tried to do this).

The power apparatus was held in increasing contempt and not taken seriously enough. Hardly anybody believed that it would be possible to use Polish soldiers to attack Polish workers; hardly anybody believed in the option of a military putsch.

The cause of this was naiveté and wishful thinking, as well as a long tradition in Poland's history. Considering this, any attempt to terrorize the Polish society with the help of the Polish army seemed hard to imagine. The preceding months had consolidated in the social mind a picture of the course of the conflicts between state and society in which there was no room for clear victories. The plans for gallows and proscription lists, on the other hand, existed solely in the minds of party notables. . . .

NOBODY IN POLAND EXPECTED help from the West, so that the strong reaction from the Western public and governments has been a rather pleasant surprise. This echo is encouraging and in the long run can contribute to containing the wave of repression.

The outrage of the world public has an important moral dimension because it stresses that democratic values are indivisible, that these values are defended throughout the world and do not cease to be values even if they are trampled on by soldiers' boots. For detained and persecuted people this is an injection of hope, a true light in the dark tunnel of Polish everyday life in this state of war. . . .

HERE, BEHIND BARS, every gesture of human solidarity is like a breath of fresh air. I express my cordial thanks for this on behalf of my colleagues and myself. Every good news helps us to live.

But there are also more difficult moments. For example, when a German Social Democrat says with reference to statements made by the vice-premier of the People's Republic of Poland that the situation of the internees is satisfactory, I remember with bitterness the fate of German Social Democrats 45 years ago and the assertions of various foreign statesmen that everything was okay in Germany and that the enemies of law and order were being treated humanely. . . .

A few words about the internees. We are prisoners without a prosecutor's warrant of

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arrest; each of us can be released at any time, if he is prepared to sign a statement of loyalty and play the role of a police confidant. The consideration of our guards is that a broken man is no longer capable of resistance. . . .

Like all the others we, too, have gotten into a new situation as a result of the "Polish war against Jaruzelski," as the Warsaw people call it. It is difficult today to come to a uniform formula of behavior. Every individual must answer the question before his own conscience as to how he is to resist evil. Everyone can only decide for himself how he will defend human dignity and how he will behave in this strange war that—and this must always be remembered—is a new embodiment of the struggle lasting for centuries between truth and lie, freedom and force, dignity and humiliation.

Let us reiterate, therefore, that there are no definite victories in this struggle, but also no definite defeats. This is a bit of optimism.

The belief in the latter has made me write down these reflections. It is my share of this war. I am sure, I will not be able to speak again very soon. Therefore, I wish my friends, above all those who are persecuted and fighting, much strength enabling them to pass through the darkness between despair and hope. And also much patience so that they may learn the difficult art of forgiving. □

Poland

Jan Kott

The Polish Diaspora

Last year I saw Tadeusz Kantor's famous production of the *Dead Class* in New York at La Mama. It had originated in Cracow, then toured all over the world. I would like to share with you the reflections of an emigré about this production. Kantor's imagination resurrected two different and forgotten "classes." In the first sat students about to matriculate from the Galician gymnasium of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy on the eve of the First World War. Mannequins representing these boys and girls were seated behind desks. A moment later the same desks were occupied by the returning dead. They were the other "class" in the production—the trampled "ethos" of that corner of the world where Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians once lived side by side. When from behind the stage a Jewish lullaby was briefly heard amidst the rising and falling of the Viennese waltz "Françoise," it struck me that several of the spectators in that small East Village theater had been sung to sleep by their mother or grandmother to that Yiddish lullaby.

ALMOST EVERY SPEAKER at this first free and independent Congress on Polish Culture has referred to the unity of Polish culture. Yet for 37 years, native and emigré culture have been divided. Only in rare periods of thaw has the quarantine been penetrated by books published by emigré presses. For years emigré writers, activists, and even many emigré scholars and scientists have been "nonpersons" in Poland.

This is the text of a speech delivered at the Congress on Polish Culture in Warsaw, December 12, 1981.

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"Only the dead can arise," wrote Stanislaw Jerzy Lec a quarter of a century ago, "it's much more difficult for the living." Almost without exception, the prerequisite for an emigré writer's resurrection in this country has been his physical death. Now, for the first time, emigré writers' books, and not just the works of the dead, are being published by Nowa, a censor-free publishing house. Students are discovering the achievements of Polish emigré thought and science at the Flying University, where the tradition of an independent academia, dating back to the old Russian partition, has been revived.

THE CENSOR AND THE POLICE have divided Polish culture. But apart from the damage that despotism and Communist arrogance have inflicted upon the living membrane, real differences and divisions remain. And if we are to insist upon the unity of Polish culture, we must defend the dialogue between the Country and its emigration—or, to be more precise, between the Country and its emigrations. When I speak of emigrations in the plural, I am referring not only to the successive war and postwar emigrations of refugees, who established pockets of Polonia in France and across the oceans in the U.S., Canada, and Australia, but also to the most recent post-March and post-Gierek emigrations of tens of thousands of young Polish men and women. And none of us knows whether that will be the last mass emigration.

IN 1979, TWO YEARS before Czeslaw Milosz, Isaac Bashevis Singer received the Nobel Prize for Literature. He was born in Warsaw's ghetto. In one of his stories he describes a long and lonely expedition, first on foot and then by carriage, to the Saxon Garden, which at the time was in the very center of Warsaw. The streets bordering its northern edge were inhabited primarily by Jews. Even so, the neighborhood was relatively wealthy. The real Jewish ghetto, with its poverty, began about 15 blocks further to the north. If I remember correctly, Singer was about ten or twelve years old when he made his journey, and to him the Saxon Garden was as distant and magnificent as Paris. Since my early childhood and through my student days at a Warsaw gymnasium, I lived with my grandparents on Senatorska Street, in a district that flanked the other, "Polish" side of the Saxon Garden. For years I took daily walks through the garden. Isaac Bashevis Singer is my senior by about ten years. After reading his story, I realized we could easily have met in the Saxon Garden.

Poles and many members of Poland's ethnic groups have left Poland. On the streets of Tel Aviv Polish is spoken. Today Poland is a country without Jews, Germans, Ukrainians, Belorussians, or Lithuanians. Poles are a nation in diaspora, with its peoples scattered throughout the world's continents. The ethnic and religious minorities that once populated the enormous plains north and east of the river Bug now also live in a diaspora, spread throughout the world. It would be worthwhile at this Congress to reflect upon the common fate of Poles, and of all refugees from Poland, both those who left freely and those who were driven out.

THE GREAT SUSTAINING RESOURCE of Polish culture, of all the cultures on Polish territory, has been Poland's multinational, multireligious, and multilingual composition. But now the neighborly coexistence of distinct cultures has been all but lost to Polish tradition. Its only remnants are found in the diaspora, beyond Poland's borders. A mere 25 years ago, Ukrainian and Polish vegetable and potato farms flourished field-by-field on Long Island, where I live. In Brooklyn, Chicago, and Buffalo, it is still not uncommon to find neighboring Polish and Ukrainian parishes on the periphery of the Jewish quarter. Yet until the most recent wave of emigration, the universality of our shared diaspora has not been acknowledged.

After World War II, all of Central and half of Western Europe were teeming with Displaced Persons—refugees, fugitives, liberated prisoners, and ex-soldiers—who were either returning to their countries or fleeing from them. And in the 1970s, the plight of refugees fleeing poverty, racial, religious, or class persecution became as universal throughout the world as it had been in Europe after the Second World War. And like the DPs of that war, the new emigrants pass through refugee camps.

Polish emigrants have learned one of the 20th century's most universal experiences the hard way. Their emigrant condition promises to have a universalizing effect upon Polish culture, which has always been threatened by

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nationalism and provincialism. For this reason, dialogue between the new emigration and the homeland is indispensable.

In my youth many of us had an uncle, an aunt, or some distant relative living in America. Today it is children, and especially the children of the intelligentsia, who are living abroad. I don't know how many have left. No statistics have been compiled or, at any rate, published. But my conservative estimate would be that, within the last decade, at least 20 percent of those graduating from the universities have moved to the West, some for a "temporary" stay.

The Polish diaspora is becoming younger, with increasingly higher professional qualifications. But there is another diaspora, not without significance for the future of Polish culture. I have lectured or participated in professional conferences at over a hundred American universities and at about a dozen European ones. From the largest and most renowned institutions to modest provincial colleges, I have invariably found Poles among the professors and lecturers. In the last decade the Polish diaspora has become a diaspora of Polish academics. Recently this exodus was described as a blood drain from the brain. Again, there are no reliable statistics, but a guarded assessment would number the Polish emigrants teaching at American and Canadian universities at 2,000, alongside several hundred first- or second-generation Polish Americans.

Three years ago I was invited to participate in the World Congress of Scholars and Scientists of Polish Descent. It was my first invitation to the homeland since my departure 13 years ago. I declined, replying it wasn't for me—I am not an American scholar of Polish descent, but a Polish scholar of Jewish descent. Reestablishment of contacts between the academics' diaspora and the Country is imperative, not only for Polish science and scholarship, but also for the depleted university system. But first, respect for the emigrant must be restored, and sundry manipulations serving immediate political ends must stop. Science is not furthered merely by the free flow of information. It requires the transmission of knowledge through the unhindered exchange between scholars and students across borders dividing nations and political systems. For the past two decades it has sometimes been easier to leave this country than to return, even if only for a short visit. The ban on reentry has been most consistently imposed on the post-1968 "Jewish" emigrés, who paid for their departure with renunciation of their citizenship. And it is these very people who swell the ranks of the academics' diaspora.

Poles, like the Jews, are a nation in diaspora. And so they will remain for decades, if not for centuries. The dialogue between the Country and the Polish diaspora will decide the future of our culture in the world. Alongside the living diaspora there is the diaspora of the dead. This country's most tragic "dead class" are Jews. Before the war, three-and-a-half million human beings belonged to this "class." Three million of them were murdered, and only a few thousand, most of whom are old, remain in Poland today. Our culture's continuity depends on the survival of the dead diaspora within the memory of the living.

POSTSCRIPT: *This speech was reconstructed from notes and memory. I delivered it on Saturday, December 12, 1981, at the morning session of the Congress on Polish Culture. That evening a television broadcast of the speech was interrupted mid-sentence, "I am not an American scholar of Polish descent, but. . . ." It was 11:15* PM, *and three-quarters of an hour later martial law was declared. Between 1:00 and 2:00* AM, *in Warsaw alone, 2,000 people were arrested. At least 20 Congress participants were among them; many of them are still in internment camps. The Congress's third and last session was to be held on Sunday, December 13. It was never convened. Soldiers were posted at the entrance to the Dramatic Theater, where the session was to take place. The Congress was officially postponed. For how many years?*

Translated by MICHAEL KOTT *and* ANN MURPHY □

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Jerry G. Watts

The Case of a Black Conservative

Thomas Sowell: Talent and Tragedy

Though blacks have felt they were under assault since July 4, 1776, they have also felt most of the time that progress, however slow and uneven, was inevitable. Next to Reconstruction, the period of greatest black optimism began with FDR's inauguration and ended with Nixon's. The highlight of this period was Lyndon Johnson's Great Society, for it was Johnson who decided that the federal government should play an active role in behalf of black interests.

The recent election of Ronald Reagan and the growing influence of conservatism have reinforced the feeling that black progress is a notion that has come and gone. The priorities of the Reagan's administration are such that concern for society's least well-off, white and black, is somewhere near the bottom of his list. The chaotic response of the traditional black political leadership is largely a result of never before having had to confront an Administration so "impartially" disinterested in the plight of blacks. Ironically, black leaders had assumed the permanence of the welfare state and as such were perhaps the truest adherents to the "End of Ideology" thesis.

A few blacks, however, have surfaced as defenders of Reagan's free-market capitalism. The most prominent is Thomas Sowell, a disciple of his former teacher, Milton Friedman, formerly of UCLA but now housed at the conservative think tank the Hoover Institute. Of the blacks around Reagan, Sowell is the most interesting. He is the author of two studies on the history of economic thought and of numerous studies on American ethnicity. Recently he has written an ambitious attempt at conservative social theorizing, *Knowledge and Decision*. The cause of Sowell's rise to prominence is not, however, to be found in his books.

Sowell is an opponent of school busing, Affirmative Action, the minimum wage, rent control, and numerous other social-welfare programs that, he argues, create barriers to black social mobility and induce blacks to think they cannot succeed on their own merits. Sowell believes that the path to a long-run solution to black America's ills depends on the ability of blacks to obtain private-sector jobs in a stable economy. This was, as Sowell argued in *Race and Economics*, the only way white immigrant ethnic groups ultimately succeeded. We are told, in effect, that those who were unable to compete with whites undermined black interests by establishing racial quotas that "guaranteed" equal rewards for lesser achievements—and in doing so were encouraged by well-intentioned white liberals who at heart didn't believe that blacks could compete with whites. Furthermore, quota programs make it increasingly difficult for those blacks who are capable of succeeding on their own to take wholehearted credit for their achievements; Affirmative Action has undermined the moral autonomy of black America.

More crucial to Sowell's argument than the psychological impact of Affirmative Action are its negative economic consequences. Sowell is the consummate free-market economist. Anything that does not allow the marketplace to function as it would "naturally," he views as detrimental to black people. Sowell assumes, much like Marx, that capitalists are governed by a single motive, the maximization of profit. Capitalists would be ready to hire anyone who is both productive and willing to work for the

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lowest possible wage. A self-interested capitalist, all things considered, will be indifferent to the race and sex of his employees. If blacks were willing to work for lower wages than whites, the true capitalist would have a factory full of black employees.

But the minimum wage, Sowell argues, eliminates the bargaining power of unemployed black workers by denying them the chance to work at lower wages than whites. Furthermore, it lowers the capitalists' profit margin, causing them to expand less and that, of course, results in fewer jobs. Who loses? The unemployed black! Sowell shows in *Race and Economics* that industries whose profit margins have been government-regulated, such as the telephone company, have a far worse record of hiring blacks even in unskilled areas (for instance, operators) than unregulated companies.

Rent control, according to Sowell, also works to the detriment of poor blacks. Rent control forces owners to rent at lower prices than they could demand if rents were left to "supply vs. demand." At lower prices, there is likely to be more demand for housing than can be supplied. Housing shortages for Sowell are, therefore, not shortages per se but shortages caused by an overload of demand at a certain price level. Had landlords been able to charge the market value for their housing, there would be no shortage. Why? Well, at the lower rents imposed by law, many people who normally would have lived with others rented their own apartments, many got apartments larger than they could have afforded otherwise, and many who no longer needed their large apartments had little economic incentive to give them up in order to save rent. Consequently there is not enough housing for the poor. The solution: the free market!

Busing, we are told, is another liberal policy that works to the detriment of poor blacks. Why not improve the schools in black communities? There is no intrinsic reason why black schools in black neighborhoods cannot be first-rate. In two articles in the *Public Interest*, entitled, "Black Excellence: The Case of Dunbar High School" and "Patterns of Black Excellence," Sowell offered examples of predominantly black high schools, private and public, that nurtured academic achievement. Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C. is recognized for its extraordinary role in developing many luminaries of the black intelligentsia. Further, Sowell argues, polls show that neither blacks nor whites want busing. Why then do we have it? Because of antidemocratic liberal courts, well-intentioned but racist white liberals who don't believe in black excellence, and black interest groups, particularly the NAACP. The solution? Give parents educational vouchers that can be used to pay for private schools and "public" ones. The ensuing competition between schools will increase the quality of all. Without such a voucher program, we are doomed to the continual decline of public education for the poor and the increased privatization of education for the middle classes.

The list of controversial positions enunciated by Sowell is seemingly endless. In many instances, however, all that is novel about Sowell is that *he has applied free-market analyses to issues that conservative economists have ignored*. Yet there is something peculiar about this black economist who, though less than original in thought, is willing, boldly and publicly, to violate ethnic positions.

The impact of racism on the lives of black Americans is far too complex to be addressed properly in this essay. Yet we can probably agree that its primary impact on black Americans has been to deny them access to crucial, material necessities. Growing up poor in the South and later in Harlem, Sowell confronted this fundamental meaning of American racism. However, a secondary impact of racism—but one of primary concern here—is the way in which it affects psychologically and culturally the black individual. Insofar as racism inhibits the fulfillment of talent and desire, it prevents blacks from fully participating in the modern world. Blacks have not been allowed to complete Tönnies's journey from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*. Consequently blacks are in many ways a less modern people than whites. My mother's generation intuitively understood this. They called it "our lack of exposure." Though many racist laws have been eradicated, the lack of money and jobs in a capitalist marketplace has prevented us from moderniz-

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ing further. Ironically, our inability to diversify has produced a cultural lag that views diversity as less than virtuous.

The typical black reaction to Thomas Sowell is a reflection of our premodern selves. Blacks cannot cope with him because his ideas lie outside our normal ethnic parameters. Since he is conservative, we want to question his "blackness." However, the fact that he grew up poor in Harlem and never finished high school only serves to confuse us, for we can't get rid of him by labeling him an "oreo" or "bourgeois." *But, I ask rhetorically, is there any rational ground for arguing that a person can't be both black and conservative?*

When the Reagan transition team leaked news that it was considering Sowell for a cabinet post, Thomas I. Atkins, general counsel of the NAACP, stated,

> We would view with considerable concern the appointment of Tom Sowell to HUD or, for that matter, to any other cabinet position .... He would play the same kind of role that historically the house niggers played for the plantation owners. He could mete out the straight discipline. No matter how inhumanely administered, it would be presumed more acceptable because the hands of the disciplinarian are black.

It is now clear that Reagan was so thoroughly unconcerned about the response of black America to his domestic cutbacks that he didn't even attempt to use a "house nigger." Nevertheless, Sowell did not back off from Atkins's attack. He responded,

> I think the NAACP are the classic house niggers. Their support comes from the white liberals ... and they are constantly taking positions the very opposite of the black community on crime, on quotas, on busing ...

Yet the reaction to Sowell was not surprising, for nowhere does our premodern attitude linger more than in our inability to grasp the complex interrelationship between a black intellectual and the broader ethnic group. Even the term intellectual is misunderstood in black America. Many blacks who are themselves intellectuals hesitate to use the term, for it carries connotations of elitism. The reasons for this are many, but most lead back to our old nemesis, *American racism.* Except for rare occasions, blacks have been forced to view education as a means to economic mobility. Neither the Enlightenment nor Matthew Arnold's notion of realizing our higher humanity have found much acceptance in educated black circles. The person who entertains ideas only for their practical utility is not an intellectual, for somewhere in intellectual minds there is a belief in the virtue of knowledge for knowledge's sake. Most blacks have, however, been forced to think of ideas in a utilitarian manner, for education had to be seen as a means to an end: survival.

There have been historical moments when clusters of blacks ventured into the intellectual realm. Witness those blacks we might call the "turn of the century" generation. This generation produced such figures as Carter G. Woodson, the father of black history; Allison Davis (co-author of *Deep South* and *Children of Bondage);* Horace Mann Bond *(Negro Education in Alabama: A Study in Cotton and Steel);* Charles Johnson *(Shadow of the Plantation* and *Growing Up in the Black Belt);* E. Franklin Frazier *(Negro Youth at the Crossroads* and *The Negro Family in the United States* and *The Black Bourgeoisie);* W. E. B. DuBois *(The Philadelphia Negro);* Rayford Logan and Charles Wesley (historians); Alain Locke, Arthur P. Davis, and Sterling Brown; Charles Drew, the discoverer of blood plasma; and Ralph Bunche *(The Political Status of the Negro in the Age of FDR).*

Except for a few like Allison Davis who taught at the University of Chicago, these black scholars spent virtually their entire academic lives relegated to black institutions. After having attended elite graduate schools, they were forced to teach at academically inferior black colleges while their white graduate-school peers enjoyed the prestige, intellectual status, and research facilities of elite white institutions. Yet some of these black scholars produced first-rate scholarship. In 1948, E. Franklin Frazier was elected president of the American Sociological Association, the profession's highest honor awarded for contributions to the discipline, by white sociologists who could not find room for him at their institutions. That many of this generation died in bitterness or spent their waning years as alco-

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holics is hardly surprising. Frazier, I've been told, had the unique ability to use humor as a buffer. If so, it was a cheap ticket to sanity.

It wouldn't be until late in their lives that some of these black intellectuals began to receive appointments at white universities: St. Clair Drake at Roosevelt University and later Stanford; J. Saunders Redding at George Washington and Cornell; John Hope Franklin at Brooklyn College and the University of Chicago; Kenneth B. Clark and John A. Davis at CCNY; Ira Reid at Haverford; L. D. Reddick at Temple. Several, like historian Benjamin Quarles of Morgan State College and the classicist Frank Snowden, were undoubtedly offered jobs at white institutions but chose to remain at black colleges. My hunch is that they felt that, "If you didn't want me then, I don't want you now."

Sowell came to intellectual maturity under the influence of this generation of black scholars. Few current black writers celebrate their achievements or refer to their works more often than he. What must have impressed him was their individual initiative and ultimate success in the face of far greater obstacles than confront blacks now. Perhaps he thought he would be part of a new generation that would continue this legacy. But then came the '60s and the era of black militancy.

The impact of this militancy must now be considered by even the most sympathetic observer as ambiguous. One obvious benefit can be seen in the increased presence of black students and faculty on white campuses. If pressure had not been placed on elite colleges, we cannot be sure that the exclusion of blacks from the academy would ever have ended. Yet the "instant" quantitative inclusion of blacks in white academia may well have undermined long-run qualitative performance.

Sowell was teaching at Cornell when *the event* occurred. In April 1969 protesting black students occupied a university building and subsequently armed themselves. On front pages all around the nation we saw the photographs of stern-faced young blacks leaving the occupied buildings with rifles held high and ammunition belts draped across their chests in the style of Pancho Villa. Harry Edwards, who was at Cornell at the time, later explained that the students armed themselves in fear of attack by armed white students. An unarmed group of white jocks had attacked the black students earlier and threatened to return armed. The explanation seems plausible.

Edwards, who later rose to prominence as an interpreter of black militancy, saw these events as a generally positive assertion of black consciousness. In a rather silly polemic, *Black Students,* he argued that there were basically five types of black students on white campuses: (1) the radical activist; (2) the militant; (3) the revolutionary; (4) the anomic activist; and (5) the conforming Negro.

Edwards claimed that "the conforming Negro" was the only student concerned with academic achievement. The "revolutionary" black student, we were told, didn't care about established educational criteria. "Graduation from college for him means little." This sort of romantic anti-intellectualism must be taken into account in considering Sowell's refusal to align himself with the black student movement.

Sowell himself was never predisposed to supporting black student militancy. But many black intellectuals who were sympathetic to the cause were unable to close ranks with a movement that denigrated intellectual values, even though numerous white leftist intellectuals rushed to endorse the cause. These white intellectuals were able to be politically chic while continuing their own scholarly pursuits. Years later these same white intellectuals would participate in the denial of tenure to black academic activists who had practiced, in the name of "the revolution," what the white left had preached—"the committed black intellectual was not to be found in the library, but in the streets." This capricious attitude of the white leftist intelligentsia toward the black intelligentsia generated a disdain for the white left that remains to this day.

As for Edwards's revolutionary black students, one can only guess what has become of these degreeless revolutionaries in the aftermath of a revolution that never left the printed page. The notion that intuition derived from oppression gave blacks a sufficient understand-

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ing of the nature of authority in the most advanced capitalist country was unforgivably ignorant. As with the Panthers, such ignorance would cost many their lives.

Edwards was but one of many who tinkered with this view, elevating the thoughtless act over the thoughtful pause. He worked himself into a professorship at Berkeley. I say this not to disparage him; for unlike Edwards I write with a ten-year hindsight. Furthermore, one doesn't play one-upmanship on issues "settled" through lives lost, jail sentences, and personal disorders. Yet mistakes that aren't confronted are bound to be repeated.

Sowell, on the other hand, was less concerned about the militancy of black Cornell students than with the response of the Cornell administration. He argued that Cornell valued campus tranquillity over everything else, and in yielding to the demands of black students essentially reneged on its responsibility to educate them. This was demonstrated in the establishment of special programs for black students—programs less rigorous than the regular curriculum. Sowell argued that if black students couldn't be expected to perform on the same level as their white peers, they shouldn't be admitted. Instead of going to Cornell, these students should be educated in state universities where they could compete more comfortably. It was, he argued, only reasonable to assume that racism had had some impact upon the precollege preparation of black students. What Edwards perceived as a growing commitment on the part of black students to the black community was interpreted by Sowell and his friend Martin Kilson of Harvard University as a cathartic cop-out from the anxieties of having to compete academically.

Sowell and Kilson were subsequently attacked for their defense of traditional (read, white) academic standards. They were called elitists and branded in many black circles as reactionary, though one doesn't quite know what a left/right dichotomy had to do with academic achievement.

If we truthfully analyze what it was that drew black students to elite white institutions, we would have to confess that they were attracted by rather orthodox perceptions of the utility of a Harvard or Yale degree. What these black students really wanted was the legitimacy that an Ivy League degree offered in the outside (read, white) world. Yes, they would be responsible elites but elites nevertheless. As time has shown, they have kept their allegiance to elitism but narrowed their definition of whom they are responsible to. Not only have former white radicals like Rennie Davis and Jerry Rubin discovered that the way to change America is through security stocks, but former black militants like Thomas Jones, who once headed the Black Liberation Front at Cornell, have found "a third way," venture capital. (*U.S. News and World Report,* 1/19/81).

One had to be on an Ivy League campus in the late '60s and early '70s to really be aware of how many black students thought of themselves as radical. Rites of initiation usually included nothing more than having read a little of Fanon, Richard Wright, James Baldwin, and all of Malcolm's autobiography. One had taped to one's dorm walls posters of Malcolm's pointed finger, Angela D's thin face and big Afro, Huey Newton sitting in a bamboo chair with a spear in his hand.

Most would listen to pop black music but rarely to the blues. Curiously, jazz, though popular, was rarely understood as the serious music it is. I would later discover a few who were conscientious students of jazz but wouldn't listen to Getz or Bill Evans for they had "taken our blues and gone." There were tolerated variations on these standards. Certain things, however, could not be tolerated, such as a head without an Afro or a non-Platonic relationship with "the oppressor or his woman."

Seale's *Seize The Time,* H. Rap Brown's *Die Nigger Die,* Cleaver's *Soul On Ice,* and the cultural nationalist writings of Ron Karenga and Amiri Baraka (Leroi Jones) were supposed to be to us what Lenin's *What Is To Be Done?* had been to earlier generations of American leftists. Coming on the heels of that generation of authentic social activists who had formed SNCC, etc., we had, true to our American selves, merely purchased, rather than earned, our revolutionary status.

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It is easy to sound self-righteous writing from Yale graduate school ten years later. As an undergraduate at Harvard I had been one of Edwards's "conforming Negro" students, insofar as I valued academic learning. Yet, I took the militancy of my black peers quite seriously, for though I did not participate in most of the black student militancy at Harvard, I too was subject to the feeling that something, somewhere, was about to occur. My problem now is that with increased learning my vision has become much more *radical* while those old college radicals, who should today be my allies, now ask me to meet them for dinner in restaurants I cannot afford.

Phony "radicalism" wasn't the only problematic aspect of black militancy on white campuses. As Edwards indicated, the movement elevated the activist over the scholar. Consequently one was apt to feel more guilt over being uninvolved in a big-brother program than over not receiving an A in macroeconomics. The prevailing argument was that we were on white campuses only because of those black people who died in the streets. Since activism brought us here, we certainly couldn't be nonactivists while we were here. To be a scholar was "bourgeois"; demonstrating was much more cathartic. Yet one of the most insistent demands echoed nationally by black students was for black studies departments, which were to be staffed by blacks who had been sufficiently bourgeois to have acquired the necessary academic credentials.

Again, as irony would have it, the black studies departments, which were seen by black students as a radical change, merely played into the hands of white academia's refusal to perceive the study of black life and art as legitimate. It was far easier for universities to establish Afro-American studies departments than to place blacks in traditional academic disciplines. Nor was this the only tragedy. Black studies departments in numerous instances facilitated the hiring of black faculty who would not have qualified for the job had their scholarly work been the primary criteria. Except for Sowell and Kilson, few people were willing to discuss this aspect of the black studies phenomenon. Whites feared being called racist and black faculty stood to benefit.

The attempt by black academicians to create black sociology, black psychology, black theology, etc., can be seen as a rather shrewd way of cornering an academic market for themselves by eliminating whites from job competition. Yet those who called for the "Death of White Sociology" never supplied an intellectual defense for their demand. In fact, one wonders if they understood the magnitude of the task. The creation of a black psychology, theology, or sociology necessitated more than merely asserting its existence or renaming established taxonomic classifications.

It is crucial to remember just how thoroughly anti-intellectual the black power movement and its spinoffs really were. Like previous political movements that attempted to politicize an intellectual and aesthetic realm, the black power movement spawned polemics in the name of social science, and propaganda in the name of the arts. There was a great deal of talk about challenging white America's interpretation of black life and history, but when it came to actually enduring the grind of scholarly research, it was Herbert Gutman who "refuted" Moynihan (and thus Frazier); Michel Fabre, a white French academic, and Irene Gendzier, a white American social scientist, wrote definitive biographies of Richard Wright and Frantz Fanon; and Piven and Cloward, white sociologists, substantiated the claim that welfare had been a means of "regulating the poor."

One may argue, justifiably, that in criticizing academically inferior black studies departments and their instructors, Sowell and Kilson presented an overly idealized conception of academic competence within white academia. Without a doubt, there are numerous white academic charlatans. But why, Sowell has asked, should we justify our norm on the basis of the lowest common denominator in white academia? Furthermore, I have often wondered, unlike Sowell, why it is that we defend mediocre black academicians when there is still discrimination against qualified blacks, as shown by the Berkeley English Department's denial of tenure to the gifted black writer Ishmael Reed. Finally, when Afro-American studies departments are taken seriously by universities, the students, and the black faculty

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themselves, there is no reason why these departments cannot be competent—as in the case of Afro-American studies at Yale University.

In assessing the response of liberal white academics to second-class black studies departments, it has often been suggested that they were expressing either guilt or racism. My hunch, however, is that their response can be read as a manifestation of a wider problem. The interaction between white liberal-leftists and black intellectuals has been such that the terms of acceptable discourse were dictated by blacks. Why? Because blacks have historically been able to monopolize the *status of victim* within liberal circles. Consequently, when blacks claimed that traditional standards of academic rigor did not apply to them, numerous white liberals acquiesced. There were exceptions, such as Irving Howe, Philip Rahv, Martin Duberman, Eugene Genovese, and Philip Rieff. However, the brunt of defending academic rigor for blacks fell on the shoulders of those blacks, like Kilson and Sowell, who were bold and responsible enough to accept this burden. Ralph Ellison and J. Saunders Redding, among others, played the same role in artistic circles.

Yet when Kilson and Sowell began to attack anti-intellectualism among blacks on white campuses, the liberal-left intellectual establishment did not come to their defense. Sowell must have thought that he would receive support from the white intellectual establishment in defending academic standards, but none was forthcoming. The liberal intellectual establishment decided that they would rather be popular than educate black students.

The only intellectual community that stood by Kilson and Sowell was that of the conservative intellectuals. Here Sowell had found allies. Though he had been an apostle of Milton Friedman since his days in graduate school, the issue of black students at elite white institutions would ultimately cause him to be politicized and place him in the camp of conservative politics. Kilson, on the other hand, had always been at least a liberal, and something more. Moreover, he could not fit in with the *Commentary* crowd for, unlike Sowell, he was a consistent opponent of ethnic parochialism, even when it concerned Jewish or other brands of ethnocentrism. Sowell was willing to ignore the white ethnic parochialism of a Michael Novak or Norman Podhoretz, provided they were willing to support his assaults on ethnic parochialism among blacks. Sowell's need for group support as opposed to Kilson's individualism doesn't, however, adequately explain their divergence. *Sowell, unlike Kilson, sought power.*

But Thomas Sowell is no "house nigger." That he and any other blacks who attempt critically to analyze intraethnic issues are subject to this charge reflects our inability to tolerate diversity. Furthermore, in a roundabout way, it is racist, for it assumes that blacks who think "differently" are not asserting their autonomy but merely acting as an intermediary for some white interest. In the case of Sowell, his conservatism predates his association with Reagan and is, in fact, more sophisticated than Reagan's. However, because of his ambitions, Sowell is willing to be associated with the intellectually disreputable conservatism of the Reagan presidency. Association with power is a heady tonic that can conceal intellectual ambivalence; nuances of thought become constrained by realizable policy alternatives. As Noam Chomsky pointed out in his critique of intellectuals who served in the Kennedy administration, once affiliated with power an intellectual inevitably abdicates his responsibility to "tell the truth." Yet as anyone who has been associated with power realizes, only those who don't enter the fray can stand back, criticize, and appear pure. Thus when all things are considered, I would rather have had an Arthur Schlesinger advising President Kennedy than some bureaucratic insider who felt no inner tension. And I would rather see Sowell advising Reagan than a member of the Moral Majority.

I don't have the access to the depths of Sowell's mind to tell me exactly what he thinks about the Reagan presidency. As far as I can tell, he is strongly concerned with the problems of those black Americans who are not, by any definition, "making it." He certainly spends enough time writing about free-market solutions to problems confronting the poor blacks.

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We may disagree with his prescriptions, but that he is *concerned* we cannot doubt.

I would suggest, moreover, that Sowell's rhetoric not be taken at face value. Much of it is hype used to legitimate himself. Sowell certainly realizes that as a black conservative he is somewhat of an anomaly. He realizes that American conservatism has often been awash in outright racism. Consequently, he must legitimate himself to conservatives while working in behalf of black interests and must legitimate himself among blacks while working in behalf of conservative interests. As a result, he has created a right-wing "populist" political style. There is no American conservative today who claims to speak in behalf of the black lower classes as energetically as Sowell. In addition, Sowell attacks the black middle classes, which are, ironically, the only strata among blacks who could remotely believe they would benefit from the policies Sowell advocates.

Insofar as blacks overwhelmingly supported Carter, Sowell must attempt to maneuver within an Administration that doesn't see itself as politically beholden to the black community. The task is certainly difficult and probably impossible. Nevertheless, the criticism showered upon Sowell by certain black leaders because of his affiliation with Reagan is somewhat specious. Need we ask the congressional Black Caucus, Andy Young, Pat Harris, and the NAACP why needy blacks indeed received so little from the Carter administration, when black people were so largely responsible for electing Carter? If they couldn't shape policies benefiting blacks within what they packaged as a sympathetic Administration, how can they attack those blacks who are linked to an Administration that owes its election to every American voting group except blacks?

At best, the Sowells in the Reagan camp could be innovative policy-makers around issues concerning black America. At worst, they could do nothing. My hunch is that they will fall decidedly closer to the latter. That is, they will, at best and only occasionally, minimize regression on policies benefiting the black lower class. The black middle class will also suffer insofar as Reagan cutbacks in federal outlays will hurt them disproportionately. The black middle class depends a great deal on public-sector jobs often located in civil-rights-enforcement bureaucracies vulnerable to "efficiency" cutbacks. The black upper middle class and business sector had previously thought that they would prosper under Reagan as they had under Nixon and Ford but to their horror, Reagan, unlike his Republican predecessors, eliminated their disproportionate (read, Affirmative Action) access to small government contracts. Given his own anti-Affirmative Action stance, Sowell could only endorse this change in policy, and so brought about a split within the black Reaganite camp that has yet to be mended.

If Reagan had wanted to legitimate himself in the black community, indeed, the last person he would have called on is Thomas Sowell. Sowell has a tendency to flaunt his ego. When he is attacked by blacks, he lashes back in the most emotive way. Shortly after Reagan's inauguration, Sowell instigated the most politically mindless attack on black middle-class leaders since the tirades of the late George Schuyler. In a two-part piece in the *Washington Post* entitled "Blacker Than Thou" (2/13/81 and 2/14), Sowell, for reasons that have baffled even his black GOP peers, attacked Andy Young and other prominent blacks for being light-skinned haters of their dark-skinned brothers and sisters. They were, he argued, part of a long tradition that held that light-skinned blacks had more in common with whites than with darker members of their ethnic group. Second, Sowell argued that because he and his friend Walter Williams (another black free-market conservative economist in Reagan's camp) had grown up in the ghettos, they were more authentic spokesmen for blacks than such people as Pat Harris, who had grown up middle-class.

One can only wonder why Sowell would write such things. He should certainly have realized that the task of implementing his policies could only be enhanced by the support of the traditional black political leadership, even though it is heavily Democratic. His interest and theirs coincide more often than they conflict. So why this foolishness? My guess is that Sowell suffers from a love-hate relationship with the black middle class. He wants to

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be accepted into their ranks and celebrated, but feels angry because he has not yet been.

Like any intellectual grasping for power, Sowell is not unwilling to shape his arguments to fit the moment's political needs. In attacking light-skinned blacks for what he claims is their superiority complex, Sowell has shown that he is in many ways out of touch with black people. Intraethnic color hatred is not one of black America's main problems today, for reasons that have much to do with the black nationalist movements of the '60s. Sowell writes as if this were 1944. In addition, whenever Sowell attacks light-skinned DuBois *et al.*, he conveniently forgets that these are the same people he previously celebrated as scholarly achievers. And the pre-1954 (Brown decision) Dunbar High School in Washington, D.C., the prime example of Sowell's "Black Excellence" thesis, was overwhelmingly composed of students from stable middle- and working-class families. Thus Dunbar has little value in attempting to pose alternatives to ghetto education today.

Sowell's advocacy of an educational voucher system as a possible cure to the problems of inner-city black education is somewhat pathetic. In this system, the government would place a predetermined amount of money in the hands of any American parent who chose to send a child to a private school, and would thereby save an equal amount by not having to educate these children in the public school system. Numerous private schools, established to lure away students, would compete with the public schools. The competition, according to Sowell, would raise the quality of education. Innovative teachers with their own educational ideas would sprout everywhere.

The scenario appears attractive until one perceives the hidden ramifications. Sowell's free-market ideas don't allow him to advocate a price ceiling on the tuition that these new private schools could charge black parents with vouchers. Consequently the best private schools would continue to remain beyond the financial reach of the urban poor. A hierarchy of private schools would come into existence based on the financial status of the parents. And existing private schools would have an incentive to raise their tuitions by the exact amount of the government-distributed voucher. Sowell seems to forget that much of the reason behind the flight of middle-class kids from the public schools was to get away from the poor, undereducated black child. Certainly we are not naïve enough to believe that these kids will be allowed into predominantly middle-class private schools simply because they could now afford the tuition. The task of educating the poor, inner-city black child will still remain with the public school system, only now he will "contaminate" fewer others, and there will be even less money for the job.

Sowell's concern with economic efficiency allows him to justify his lack of empathy for those black children who, for whatever reason, would remain in the public schools once the educational voucher system was instituted. We are to assume that their parents would simply not be concerned about their education. Their children are headed for jail anyway. Why then concern ourselves with their education? The shrewdness of the voucher system is that it would partially subsidize the private-school education of the middle classes, for which now they receive nothing. Any proposed solution to the problem of educationally deprived children that pretends to bypass the need to spend disproportionately in their behalf is a sham.

Busing, Sowell tells us, should be abolished since polls show that neither blacks nor whites want it. The notion that blacks support it has been created by black interest groups like the NAACP. Sowell argues that the court's intervention in this issue is evidence of how liberals have distorted the role of the courts in a democratic society. This antibusing argument is so contrived that even Sowell's most sympathetic readers must question his integrity. Since when does a conservative like Sowell, with his commitment to a political and economic elite, want to imply that polls should control or seriously influence the formulation of policy? Sowell certainly wouldn't turn to the polls to determine whether Exxon should be nationalized. Can it be that Sowell does not realize that had the Supreme Court not intervened in 1954, he too might still be riding in the back of the bus? Most deplorable is Sowell's unwillingness to mention cases, as in Boston, where the court

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ordered busing only because the Irish-American judge found discriminatory practices in the operation of the Irish-American controlled Boston School Committee. The notion that the judge merely intervened to seat sandy-haired Sue next to big Bo Willie in order to insure the melting pot is beyond credence.

Sowell's argument about the free market as a cure to racism hardly merits serious attention. If Sowell were right, how could we explain the existence of racism in private industry? Furthermore, the federal government, the most regulated entity in America, has been the best hirer of blacks. Herein lies a problem that ultimately makes much of what Sowell says about ethnicity overly simple-minded. Sowell, an economist by training, does not grasp the social-psychological aspects of culture, particularly American culture. His books about ethnicity are essentially compilations of raw economic data, one-dimensionally posed in behalf of an economic theory that works only on the printed page. Thus Sowell is all too baffled in attempting to explain the racism of capitalists, given the fact that racism often hurts their profit margins. Sowell's arguments would seem more valid if people ceased to be human.

Sowell's arguments about lowering the minimum wage and ending rent control show the lack of a humane vision in regard to the least advantaged. Sophisticated free-market economists are at least willing to admit that rent control and the minimum wage address real problems caused by the workings of the free-market economy. But Sowell is unwilling even to admit the existence of the problems. The minimum wage gives some measure of security, however small, to the most exploitable and exploited sectors of society. If one cannot subsist on wages earned at the workplace, why continue to work? As for rent control, Sowell's concern about the flooding of the housing market because of the "artificially induced" prices sidesteps the more crucial discussion of the quality of the housing offered. He tells us that there is no housing shortage. So what? There is a shortage of good housing for people with modest incomes.

Unfortunately Sowell is too blinded by economic dogma to realize that social-welfare measures were not altruistic liberal inventions but responses pressed on the government by the populace. In effect, the populace was responding to structural constrictions of the prewelfare-state, free-market economy. Ironically, if American society had evolved according to Sowell's free-market vision, we might have heard Marx's footsteps. Sowell's free-market dogmas are grounded in a 19th-century economic theory that if actualized would necessitate a 20th-century authoritarianism. In the absence of an economically satisfied working class living under some measure of government-insured social security (such as unemployment compensation, welfare), how will national stability be maintained in periods of economic troubles? *What Sowell refuses to tell us is that, in the absence of an economically interventionist state, we will have an interventionist state politically.*

The market, for Sowell, assumes implicit moral authority over the distribution of goods in the society: the people who don't make it become those who shouldn't. It's a neo-Social Darwinist vision. Any economist who operates under the vision that Sowell entertains cannot honestly claim that the system, once implemented, will benefit the poor. Regardless of how it works in practice, which will be less ideal than the theory asserts, the poor are not the beneficiaries in the theory itself. It's alright for Sowell to be a conservative economist but, please, no more of this nonsense about helping the black poor. One should, however, recognize that Social Darwinists do offer a solution to the problem of poverty. Their solution is an exercise in triage: let poor people die out.

Sowell's arguments concerning the reaction of blacks to Affirmative Action are also misinformed, though not dishonest. As far as I know, blacks who have been aided by Affirmative Action don't feel any less proud of their achievements than anyone else. I was admitted into Harvard College under what was certainly an Affirmative Action program. I neither lose sleep over it nor gaze upon my diploma with any embarrassment. Regardless of how I got in, I had to pass the same courses as everyone else in order to get out. Yet as I approach the academic job market, I must confess that my

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less-than-stellar graduate-school transcript has me worried that I might get a job that I would not have gotten had I been white. Does Sowell think that thousands of Irish-Americans feel less respectful about their social mobility in an urban America where the Irish-dominated political machines have disproportionately placed them on city payrolls? Do WASPS in firms that don't hire Jews, and Jews in firms that don't hire Italian-Americans, and all of these in firms that don't hire blacks feel less secure about their achievements? We are not a meritocratic people and don't pretend to be, that is, until we want to block someone else's access to our status.

Perhaps the most fascinating of all of Sowell's arguments is the one claiming that he is, in fact, the true black because he grew up in Harlem amid rats and with unsoled shoes, while those blacks who grew up in middle-class Washington, D.C. are mere pretenders. Sounds familiar? This argument is a carbon copy of a '60s argument and reflects now what it did then, an inability of blacks to cope with inner diversity. Sowell is as guilty of this effort to reinstitute tribalism as any black writing today. This isn't surprising, for though Sowell appears to possess a complex identity by virtue of his deviant stance, he is in fact the quintessential parochial American intellectual.

Within the conservative intellectual community, he has been offered and willingly accepted the monopoly on discourse pertaining to blacks. This community grants Sowell the right to claim a peculiar access (denied to whites by birthright) to hidden ethnic truths. Consequently, when debating white liberals on Milton Friedman's television show, Sowell often assumes a "what can you, a white person, tell me, a black, about blacks" posture. Besides the fact that the posture is premodern in its defense of ascriptive insights, and thoroughly anti-intellectual, a simliar stance taken by black nationalists in the '60s was vehemently attacked by the same conservatives who now endorse it in Sowell. Clearly they need a black to broaden their appeal.

With the rise of the neoconservatives, Jews finally obtained prominence within the ranks of the politicized conservative intellectual community. In many cases these Jewish converts, like Irving Kristol, relinquished their scholarly ambitions in order to pursue the writing of pop-market polemics. In so doing they helped to make conservative inroads into a segment of society that had historically viewed conservatism as less than sensitive to their concerns, if not outright anti-Semitic. Blacks, therefore, became the last beachhead in the new pluralism. Yet Sowell's main function does not lie in the conversion of blacks. *Sowell increases the attractiveness of conservatism to moderate whites who heretofore may have deemed it too insensitive to black concerns.*

Why does Sowell allow himself to be "used" in this manner? The notion that he is being used or even its reverse notion, that he is using conservatives, both derive from an assumption that Sowell's belief in conservative ideals is less than authentic. We cannot make that assumption. Those who do are in most cases parochial blacks or white liberal intellectuals unwilling to grant autonomy to a black intellectual. This does not, however, prevent us from discussing the benefits that have accrued to Sowell as a result of his ties to the conservative community. Sowell has stumbled upon the ultimate black mechanism for personal socioeconomic mobility. He has become the "*anti-Affirmative Action*" *Affirmative Action black.*

Shrewd blacks have always know that the way to diffuse white skepticism about their qualifications in this era of Affirmative Action is to assume a posture of righteous indignation to what they claim is Affirmative Action's insult to their character and intelligence. Having done so, whites will offer prominence to these anti-Affirmative Action blacks in the hope that they will function as antidotes for the pro-Affirmative Action black crowd. They become, in effect, Affirmative Action cases within the anti-Affirmative Action lobby. It is the only variant of Affirmative Action free of negative stigma: Sowell has played this hand magnificently.

There have always been numerous critics of Sowell within the black intellectual community, but they have neither the intellectual status nor the necessary access to the media to effectively confront him. Many black intellec-

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tuals, stunned by this Reagan-in-blackface, are able only to muster intellectualized primal screams. Still others are wondering how they too might corner a piece of the market Sowell has so deftly tapped. In only one instance have I seen a conservative white intellectual scornfully raise the issue of Sowell's preferential treatment. In a review of Sowell's book *Ethnic America* in *Psychology Today* (9/81), sociologist Andrew Greeley, a supporter of many of Sowell's controversial policy positions, concluded:

> I doubt that Basic Books would have published such a sloppy work if Sowell were not a prominent black conservative. The same book would have been rejected out of hand if a white author had presented it. Thomas Sowell is being patronized by the same double standards that he so categorically rejects.

Greeley's attack on Sowell is instructive on several counts. First, it is not true that *Ethnic America* would not have been published had it been written by a white author, provided, that is, the white author commanded the attention of the book-buying market to the degree Sowell does. Second, Sowell's *Ethnic America* is no more intellectually vacant than much of the nonsense Greeley has had published (for instance, *Why Can't They Be Like Us?*). It seems rather clear that Greeley is upset not by Sowell's kind of scholarship but by the fact that Sowell has moved him out of the pop-white ethnic-studies market. Sowell has taken over the fiefdom previously ruled by Greeley and Michael Novak (*The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics*).

The hilarious aspect of this is that Sowell has done so by writing books that celebrate the achievements of white ethnics to an extent unrivaled by anyone, including Greeley and Novak. Thus in his review of Sowell's book Greeley, of all people, finds it necessary to inform Sowell that the Irish immigrants had some problems and failures in coping with their new existence in America. In offering a counterpoint to black failure, Sowell constructs white ethnic success stories that sometimes evade fact. Such works may not succeed in making Sowell respected within the scholarly community, but they have succeeded admirably outside it.

The tragedy of Thomas Sowell is, in many respects, the tragedy of Afro-American intellectuals. Like most black intellectuals, he has been unable to creatively cope with the historic context in which he finds himself, that of being both black and American. However, to consciously accept this duality is an immense burden. The path is a lonely one, for it demands that one live on the boundary between one's particularistic self and one's universal self. It requires critical distance from black ethnicity without succumbing to assimilation. One must critically confront Western culture, and white America in particular, without falling into a romantic celebration of "blackness." Most black intellectuals are able critically to analyze white America and the West but are unable to confront black pathologies. Blacks become the angelic oppressed, and in the process are removed from any responsibility for their failures. Sowell has ventured along a less traveled path. He dissects black issues without ever casting a critical eye upon the limitations of white society. White America for Sowell becomes a given, a goal to be emulated. The two camps attack each other viciously. Both are equally limited.

Exept for its creative potential, the inducements to live a "dual-consciousness" life are slim. By definition they displace a comfortable relation with any intellectual or political group except perhaps with those that are also trying to live an ethnically marginal existence. Few are able to do so successfully.

Though W. E. B. DuBois eloquently wrote about the duality of consciousness within ethnic pariahs in his *Souls of Black Folk*, he was unable to live it. Witness the vacillations displayed in his inability to emotionally confront the fact that the two "free" black nations of his time, Liberia and Haiti, were among the most repressive in the world. When DuBois did obtain a critical, less emotional perspective on blacks, he did so from the most intellectually uncritical position offered by the white intellectual community, the post-Stalin Communist party. That he was unable ever to acquire a stable intellectual outlook that would have allowed him to critically venture into both worlds is perhaps the one failure of his intellectual life.

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Religions, sacred or secular, elitist or mass-based, Marxist or free-market, are more often than not the opiate of the mind. The truly innovative thinkers are usually found among the "homeless." Celebrity status and mass-media popularity are usually not enjoyed by these rare individuals. Neither is conducive to the life of the mind. Nor is the thirst for power.

As a self-professed Christian socialist, I disagree with most of the policies that Sowell advocates. If it were true that Reagan's policies would help the black poor, I would still be opposed to Ronnie, for my universal self would shudder at his visions for Latin America, Africa, and Europe. Unlike Sowell, I won't allow my ethnicity to compartmentalize my mind ethically.

To many of the problems confronting black America I have no answers. Those that I do have seem unlikely soon to be implemented. Unlike some of my leftist peers, I can't yield to an apocalyptic belief that a socialist revolution, whatever that is, would solve all, or even most, problems. It was Sowell's inability to accept the political limitations of the intellectual life that led him into active politics. This journey is all too common among intellectual members of "oppressed" ethnic groups. In the last two decades the perceived need to be immediately relevant politically has devastated the black intellectual class. If it is true that there is an inverse correlation between the pop-market political appeal of one's work and its profundity, Sowell might as well write fairy tales. Political "relevance" has inspired propaganda.

In the meantime, and it may be forever, I must endure the anxieties, false hopes, and real despairs of our problematic existence as blacks in America and as humans in the world. Sowell, I choose to believe, should do likewise. Leave home, Tom. Both of me need you. . . . □

I am very grateful to Randall Kennedy, Adolf Reed, Traci West, and Robert Watts for their assistance.

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Sara Bershtel and Allen Graubard

The Jewish Revival: A New Saving Remnant?

Whenever David, a successful young television reporter, talks about getting married he insists that he will marry only a Jewish woman. Since he left his New Jersey home many years ago, he has had no relation to Jewish life nor is he planning to get involved in it in any way. He can offer no explanation for this contradiction: "It's just something I've come to feel strongly about over the last few years."

- In the 1960s, Marion lived in a commune. Now she works as a lawyer. She has just signed up for an elementary Yiddish class. Her parents never spoke Yiddish when she was growing up in the suburbs of Indianapolis. Neither did her grandparents. Still, she says, Yiddish "feels like home."
- Sheila and Josh, a professional couple in their thirties, are planning a *Pidyon ha-Ben* for their new-born son. They never go to the synagogue nor do they keep a Jewish home. But they find something intriguing in this archaic Jewish ritual for a first-born son. They don't know how to do it, exactly. They'll look it up.

Such sentiments and activities on the part of young American Jews mark a striking and unexpected phenomenon: a Jewish revival. The revival, though limited in numbers, is hard to miss. Strollers on New York's Fifth Avenue are accosted by the aggressive proselytizing Hassidim of Chabad. "You Jewish?" they ask, offering inspirational literature and invitations to pray in their "Mitzva-Mobile." A subway advertisement suggests the indefinable benefits of observing the Sabbath candle-lighting ceremony. "Do something Jewish today!" exhorts a poster on a California college campus. To judge from the enormous popularity of the three editions of the *Jewish Catalogue* (how-to manuals of practical Judaism with sales of over 400,000), the appearance of Judaica sections in bookstores, and the unabated popular interest in the Holocaust, more and more people are continuing to discover a religious or, at least, an ethnic impulse within themselves. Jewish day-school attendance has risen sharply over the last decade. New Jewish journals and media organizations *(Response, Moment, Sh'ma, Genesis 2, Network)* have appeared, dedicated to serious intellectual debate and controversy. Hassidic-style countercultural groups like the "Aquarian Minyan" proclaim the "joys of Jewishing" at vegetarian (Passover) Seder celebrations and in workshops on "Judaism and Yoga," "*Davening* [Hebrew prayer] and Meditation."

Ethnic therapy groups and workshops on Jewish liberation address specifically "Jewish" syndromes of psychic oppression and images of physical inferiority. There are New Left radical Jewish collectives, Jewish feminist organizations, women's prayer groups, gay congregations, communal religious living groups, Jewish Defense League chapters. Even the long defunct socialist Youth Bund is active again. The diversity of revival activities is impressive, the quest for a way of being Jewish inflected by the whole range of cultural options, from radical secular humanist and countercultural tendencies to orthodox religious and chauvinistic nationalist feelings.

Nor is the movement without literary testimonials. In her recent book, *Generation Without Memory: A Jewish Journey in Christian America,* novelist Anne Roiphe offers an intimate chronicle of her personal search for a

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path of return to Judaism. That this very same Anne Roiphe, just a few years back, achieved a measure of notoriety with a piece in the *New York Times* celebrating the joys of Christmas in her Jewish home dramatizes the more general shift in sensibility. Ellen Willis, a cultural reporter known for her feminism and rock criticism, shares with readers of *Rolling Stone* her anguished confrontation with the Orthodox Judaism adopted by her brother in a Jerusalem Yeshiva (a Talmudic academy). Radical political journalist Paul Cowan, another intellectual who discovered Judaism in mid-life, frequently writes articles in the *Village Voice* that reveal a constantly deepening Jewish identity.

This surprising flowering of unorthodox Judaism must be seen against the backdrop of the highly successful integration of Jews into American life and in reaction to a perceived decline of Jewish commitment. The degree of cultural assimilation can approach the bizarre. In a front-page human-interest feature, the *New York Times* described a Miami Bar Mitzva held in the Orange Bowl, complete with waitresses dressed as pom-pom girls and a 64-piece band from a local high school playing football marches and *Happy Birthday.* The story concludes with an observation about continuity of tradition even in a football stadium:

> Robert Cohen, the grandfather, watched family and friends lift Harvey to their shoulders in celebration as the band played the *hora.* He told the guests that his own father had been held aloft in such a manner a long time ago in a Polish ghetto, as he himself had been embraced and serenaded in a crowded tenement flat near Avenue C, on the Lower East Side, far from football fields and pom-pom girls.

Robert Cohen takes his story to demonstrate the consummate ability of Jews to survive as Jews while being regular Americans. Such an interpretation would certainly be in line with the popular accounts of the Jewish experience in America, those reassuring narratives of a long-suffering people who finally find a free society and reach unprecedented heights of acceptance and success without having to relinquish religion, ethnic culture, or identity. Max Dimont, a sprightly cheerleader in the Harry Golden mold, ends his latest tale of Jewish wonderfulness, *The Jews in America,* with a paean to Jewish history ("There is no history in the world to compare to it in nerve, energy, and grandeur"), and achievement. ("Who else has dared give the world God, Abraham, Moses, Isaiah, Job, Jesus, Spinoza, Marx, Freud, Einstein?") Special mention and citations for bravery go to the American Jews for their role in this "greatest cultural and moral adventure story in the history of man":

> This is the story, culture, and heritage which has been entrusted to the American Jews by a manifest destiny . . . . History has chosen well in selecting the American Jews for the task of preserving and perpetuating the Jewish *paideia.*

The Jews have managed to retain their integrity as a people within the larger American society. For no other group is the discussion of their life as a people a constant and historically rooted issue. Other groups have melted more readily into the general pot, have not maintained the complex net of community and religious organizations, have not experienced world-historical events like the Holocaust and the establishment of Israel. Only the Jews, of all the European minorities, have both assimilated and kept up a self-conscious community debate over assimilation.

Yet the Jewish *paideia* is hardly alive and well in America. The number of even nominal Jews is declining: birthrates are alarmingly low, lower even than the national norm for middle-class families; intermarriage, a threat 20 years ago when it was under 10 percent, is now well above 30 percent and will keep on rising. Some demographic projections, admittedly highly speculative, predict a Jewish community of under a million (or even less) in three generations. Jews are in fact assimilating, and the culture is losing content rapidly as America takes the Jews to its heart.

Observations of the decline of Jewish identification under the steady assaults of secular modernity lead to conclusions strikingly different from the kind of bright optimism characteristic of such books as Dimont's. Jewish life in the Diaspora is doomed: this is the somber thesis of Hillel Halkin's *Letters to an American Jewish Friend,* a work full of vigorous argu-

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ment and brilliant analysis. Halkin's Zionist argument is simple and direct. The decline of religious orthodoxy, the natural process of assimilation for people whose Jewish identification has no serious cultural force, the pressure of anti-Semitism—these will erode what is left of Diaspora Jewish life. In the United States, in the only significant Jewish community outside Israel relevant to the question of Jewish survival, it is quite obvious that assimilation is proceeding rapidly. Even now, Halkin notes, the number of American Jews for whom Jewishness is more than a peripheral concern is almost certainly less than a million. "Where else indeed," Halkin asks, "has there been another Jewish community so well-organized with so little substance to its life?"

To Halkin, the equation of "substance" with the idea of some uniquely Jewish contribution to modern culture, as Max Dimont articulated it, is a seductive but ultimately spurious idea and an ineffectual basis for community. To see, as Dimont and others do, ideals such as "justice" or "knowledge" as attributes of the Jewish people as a whole, or any people as a whole, seems quite unfounded. As Halkin points out, these are modern secular ideals that assimilating Jews transmuted into "Jewish" ideals through a complex process. One needn't feel that important universal values depend on the continued existence of a Jewish community in America.

Halkin is an American Jew now settled in Israel, a scholar of Hebrew literature. Though raised in an Orthodox home, he is not religious. For him, an autonomous Jewish political and linguistic community is the prerequisite for the development of the authentic secular culture that holds out the only hope for a continuation of Jewish historical existence.

The only significant Jewish future therefore is in Israel, though even there, as Halkin eloquently demonstrates, the future is uncertain. The dangers of physical destruction are obvious; more subtle is the possibility that the culture that is developing will be "Israeli," something other than truly Jewish. The demand Halkin makes, because of these dangers, is that American Jews who are *committed* Jews take seriously the question—in his view, the moral necessity—of going to live in Israel.

Halkin's book is written in the form of letters to an American friend, a secular but committed Jew who is active in Jewish life and visits Israel but has no intention of moving there. We don't hear much from the imaginary friend, but his basic position is clear enough. He accepts or is brought to admit the general truth of Halkin's analysis of the modern course of Jewish history. He grants the emptiness of the official American Jewish community and its organizations. He sees in the much-touted marriage of America and the Jews the co-optation of a sadly declining community sorely in need of reanimation. He understands why more and more of the most intelligent and sensitive Jewish youth have fled or drifted away from any serious participation in such a community.

But he is not convinced that there is no hope for change. He justifies his cautious optimism by describing the Sabbath service at a commune in the country, a self-created ceremony constructed by Jews from his own secular, intellectual milieu—eclectic, somewhat countercultural, without any official sanction from rabbis or organized Jewish institutions. He finds hope for the continued vitality of Jewish life in the movement of "new Jews" and he articulates their aspirations.

Do these activities really hold out hope for the revitalization of Judaism, as Halkin's American Jewish friend argues? Can they provide a counterweight to assimilation and dissolution? The new Jews would have it so. It is our sense, however, that the richness of the revival gives a misleading basis for hopes of glowing reconstruction, and that the resurgence of interest in practical Judaism is a problematic phenomenon, expressive of the very forces of dissolution it seeks to combat.

A look at the Jewish revival in the context of the dissolving Jewish cultural existence reveals its true significance. Take this account in a recent Fifteenth Reunion report of a Harvard class. Among the usual stories of brilliant medical careers, academic success, families and divorces, we read about the surprising decision of an alumnus who chose Judaism. After recounting his successful career as a physical chemist and Ivy League professor, author of

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several books, and recipient of major scientific awards, he describes his current situation:

> I am now a full-time student of Talmud at Yeshiva—in Brooklyn . . . . I am also the unpaid and under-utilized Secretary-Treasurer of my wife's store, "New York's Top Designers in Women's Fashions at Brooklyn's Bottom Prices." The store and my Yeshiva are less than a mile from our home. We walk back and forth together and often share lunch. We have now managed to arrange the integrated whole life which we value.

Although we can detect a distinctly modern note in the quest for "the integrated whole life," the form of return is classic for a *baal tshuve* (returnee). One leaves the non-Jewish ways and renounces modern aspirations for the sake of total immersion in Orthodox Jewish ritual, practice, and text.

Much more characteristic, however, of today's revival is inclusion, not renunciation. Alvin Golder is a former academic, Rimbaud scholar, and radical political journalist. Janet Golder is a Radcliffe graduate, art historian, active feminist. They have two children. Very much part of a literary and political international culture, with typically slight Jewish backgrounds, they have decided to celebrate the traditional Sabbath eve meal with their own version of the ceremony. They have no intention of joining a synagogue or other organized group. They add this piece of Jewishness to their otherwise unchanged contemporary lives.

Beyond this sort of "personal" Judaism, there are more collective expressions of the spirit of inclusiveness. The hope is that one need give up nothing, that nothing truly human is alien to Judaism, that one can be anything and be Jewish too. There is almost no constraint on innovation in ritual and ceremony. Each group recreates liturgies to encompass all of its concerns, secular and spiritual. So the leader of the week at one of the informal rabbiless prayer groups *(Havurot)*, which helped spark the revival in the mid-'60s, chooses a D. H. Lawrence poem to replace the Torah portion reading as a means of capturing the spirit. Feminist values require the elimination of all patriarchal language, and the addition of prayers in a feminist manner. A Sabbath group of left-wing Jews recites a Marxist essay on the meaning of Sabbath written by a member in traditional prayer form. During the Yom Kippur service a California "new age" Jewish collective, at the point in the day when the traditional list of sins is enumerated and confessed, the leader asks the participants to formulate their own "sins." "Not having done enough to fight nuclear power," says one participant. "Not having allowed myself all the pleasures I could have," adds another. At the Purim celebration in New York's gay synagogue, the Queen Esther of the traditional Purim play is *freilach* (Yiddish for "gay") in both the old and new ways. He happily asserts that one can be gay and Jewish and proud of both—despite the traditional strictures against homosexuality.

It is easy enough to accuse these often amusing, sometimes absurd efforts to be omnivorously inclusive of violating all sorts of norms, those of traditional religion as well as notions of conceptual coherence. But significantly the modern hope to "have it all" is not confined to self-consciously innovative groups. Its traces may be found even in the unexpected resurgence of modern Orthodoxy. The attractive and well-dressed young professionals who pack New York's Lincoln Square Synagogue have little in common with the physical chemist turned Talmudic scholar. Their understanding of Orthodox commitment does not require a renunciation of modern aspirations, neither career nor sexual freedom nor even, with the advent of kosher restaurants like Moshe Peking and La Différence, Chinese and French cuisine. As one troubled Orthodox professor said to a recent graduating class of his Orthodox high school: "Today you can do anything wearing a *yarmulke* [skullcap]."

The new Jews in all their variety present a fascinating and spirited attempt to confront the peculiarly modern problem of cultural and ethnic dispersion armed with the dwindling resources of that ancient and disturbing strand of Western history—the continuing survival of a Jewish people and religion. Yet what seems to underlie the many modes of affiliation is not primarily a commitment to revitalize Judaism,

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or to reestablish the primary communal bonds frayed and attenuated by historical and cultural forces—the traditional image of a religious revival or cultural "revitalization movement." This revival is expressive of dilemmas of modernity rather than of Judaism, of questions and discontents, yearnings and confusions that characterize thoughtful individuals today, whatever their cultural, religious, ethnic, or political allegiance. The various forms of new Jewish activity suggest origins traceable to ideals of social justice, to assertions of ethnic pride, to the questions evoked by family and parenthood, to the healing function of ritual in giving fragmented lives a longed-for sense of ceremony and significance, to that most contemporary desire to feel better, more existentially at ease. (There is much talk, for example, about the *therapeutic* value of "keeping the Sabbath.") The revival is a sign of vague but deep dissatisfactions with the quality of personal and social life today. It is a self-conscious recreation, a typically modern willing of the meaning of tradition, theology, and ritual by individuals for themselves, in response to contemporary values, anxieties, and aspirations.

The willing of meaning by individuals who believe that such commitments must be *chosen* is the distinguishing mark of this revival. In general the new Jews do not stake their survival on the idea of a specifically Jewish contribution to modern culture, or on a sense of an impending assault of anti-Semitism or on a religious impulse, or on the foundation of a land or a language—but rather on will. This is the true innovation of today's revival, its experimental essence.

This emphasis on individual choice accounts for the revival's fragility. The concern with a personal quest for meaning, shadowed by the murky notion of authenticity, means that analysis and predictions of the long-term historical and sociological significance of personal actions should not *in principle* be given weight. If the form of Jewish commitment one has chosen at present does not satisfy one's emotional or spiritual needs next year, then one must move on—perhaps to a universalist politics or to a new version of Eastern mysticism or whatever. The basic elements of cultural identity—community, doctrine, ritual—are no longer given in America, even among the Jews. One can choose anything, whatever one was last year, or yesterday.

New Jews think about how to give their children a sense of the Jewishness they have recently discovered or rediscovered or created. But they generally freely grant the right of the children to reject active Judaism and to choose other paths of meaning when they reach the proper age. So we find families in which the parents decide to keep kosher but the children do not. The parents firmly believe that one should not impose ritual or observance on one's children. They certainly do not feel that the children, by deciding not to follow particular ritual observances, have betrayed either the true Jewish faith, or the Jewish people, or Jewish history.

The same fragility undermines the force of Halkin's Zionist argument even for the committed Jews who are the elite of the current revival. Such individuals may go to live in Israel because they become convinced that there they will be most authentically fulfilled personally. But it is doubtful that they will emigrate to Israel because they become intellectually convinced that the long-term survival of the Jewish people would have a finitely increased probability should they take this action.

The modern reliance on will and choice finally denies the revival the assurances of continuity that a living tradition confers. Will and choice stand in opposition to law and tradition. This revival, even if it seeks to establish itself as the continuation of a great tradition, was created in response to a perceived loss of tradition and continuity, and clearly bespeaks the fact that for most young Jews the tradition itself has become alien and ambiguous. The success of this thoroughly modern and radical experiment in the possibilities of historical continuity is not guaranteed by the assumption of old forms or proclaimed ties to the past.

The effort to use the pieces of a weakening Jewish cultural existence to create a form of community more satisfying than what is normally available in contemporary society is ap-

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pealing. The desire to do this while participating fully in the wider secular culture is understandable. But what are the ultimate chances for the success of this balancing act? Historical experience suggests that authentic religious and ethnic life depends on faith and organic ties to community and tradition. In the absence of this spiritual and social context people may certainly undergo conversions and take on commitments as individuals. Some true religious conversions may occur. But the bits and pieces of revival seem fatally vulnerable to the originating motivation—the self-conscious willing by modern, basically secular people in search of solutions to contemporary dilemmas of individualism and fragmentation.

To underline the fragility of this self-conscious revival-by-will, to question its long-term prospects for revitalizing the American Jewish community is not to say that one should not participate, or to imply that there are better forms, there for the willing, in our current condition. It may be that there are no more effective palliatives available for the pains of alienation, and that those who can bring about some kind of revival, at least for themselves, are lucky. But in the intense desire to slake the thirst for tradition, ritual, roots, wholeness, and community, there are temptations—temptations to exaggerate, to avoid examining the limits of the enterprise, to deny the dangers of isolation and false hopes. Above all there is the danger of substituting positive thinking and self-congratulation for a lucid appraisal of the contradictions and tensions that permeate the project of reconstructing Judaism. □

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John Kurt Jacobsen

Stalemate in Northern Ireland

"Their orders are to dominate us, y'know," a Crossmaglen man said softly as we watched a British army patrol edge nervously down a street of this tiny Catholic border town in Northern Ireland. "They'll never dominate us."

Crossmaglen nestles in the scenic countryside of South Armagh—two miles from the Irish Republic—in the midst of a notorious area known to British forces as "bandit country" or, more starkly, the "murderers' triangle." A sentry tower in the center of the bleak town scans the wilderness (and, incidentally, overlooks a defiant and frequently defaced statue erected to honor those "who have died for Irish freedom"). Behind the tower sprawls a tin-can House of Usher construction where the troops reside—Paras, Scots Guards, Royal Marines, and other regiments, in rotation. Helicopters must supply the outpost since the roads are lethal. Occasionally a soldier is shot dead in a Provisional IRA (Provo) ambush. Occasionally a Saracen armored car straying too far into the outskirts is blown to bits by a Provo land mine. Occasionally an army helicopter is hit by M-60 machine-gun fire. These occasions add up. Despite the military presence, the Provisional IRA literally calls the shots in this classic guerrilla terrain. Snipe and fade away; snipe and fade away again and again. (Townspeople claim that the Provo attacks are, more or less, proportional to the degree of Army harassment.)

Traditionally proud of "living by their wits," the people of Crossmaglen have withstood a decade of sophisticated surveillance, primitive interrogations, "detentions," and a multitude of minor indignities and harassments, which make up their daily contact with an army that is allegedly there to protect them from terrorists. No Northern Irish community could recite more reasons for wanting the "Brits Out!"—though people do sympathize with the plight of (most) ordinary soldiers who thrash around in a political conflict that cannot be solved militarily. The Colonel Blimp mentality of the Officer Corps is universally scorned. (A pub-keeper's son, while attending and graduating from Oxford, perplexes British officers who prefer their Irish Catholics in tidy lower-class categories.) No Northern Irish town would appear more likely to endorse the Provisional IRA's campaign to hurtle the predominantly Protestant province into what doubtless would be a gruesome kind of unification with the Republic. (Protestant paramilitary groups would wage their own war across an Ireland into which they were forcibly inserted.) But stereotypes fail under scrutiny. The people of Crossmaglen are an independent and critical lot, hardly Provo parrots. One memorable evening I listened as they rued partition, particularly for the historical loss of the secularizing and "normalizing" influence that the 1 million largely industrial Protestant workers might well have exercised upon the politics and the culture(s) of a united Ireland since the 1920s. In that perceptive regret lies the tragedy and the thin hope of bloody Ulster.

The partition of Ireland was not simply a wicked British plot. The Protestant economic elite of Ulster agitated for separation of the six counties (which contained most of the industry and half the industrial workers of Ireland) to perpetuate its own rule and profits. The agricultural Southern state and the Northern Irish province—which last boasted economic self-sufficiency in 1931—each initially believed that partition would scuttle the other. Instead, the island divided into a harsh sectarian state

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above and a theocratic state below; in both, political ideologies were disfigured and economic issues obscured by the fact of partition. Employing clerical fire-breathers and scattering concessions to avert the scare of a nonsectarian working-class movement in the early 1930s, the Northern ruling elite ensured many decades of political hegemony through the Unionist party and the Orange Order. Although the Protestant working class undeniably benefited from the "Prods first" policies, a stroll down both the Catholic Falls Road and the Protestant Shankill Road in Belfast will reveal that the living-standard gap is one between Catholic poverty and Protestant austerity—the maintenance of "different levels of suffering" as Geoffrey Bell tellingly writes. (Poverty-level Protestants overall outnumber the Catholic poor.) In the South, both major parties evolved—if that's the word—from a civil war over the disputed treaty that concluded the Anglo-Irish War of 1919–21 and affirmed the separate status of British Ulster. Since potential dissidents marched up the gangplanks of emigration boats to Liverpool (and became Labour party members) and to New York and Boston (and joined the Democratic party), a deeply conservative political pattern embedded itself in the South, so that even today the Irish Labour party and related independents account for less than 20 of the 166 parliamentary seats. Plunging headlong into industrialization in the early 1960s, the Southern state adopted a "softly, softly" approach to the North in the hope that converging economic conditions would pave the way to unity along a yellow brick road of industrial prosperity.

After a sporadic border campaign was canceled for lack of interest in 1962, the IRA "went Marxist," sold off its arsenal, and abandoned military adventures to focus instead on social grievances and political agitation, North and South. Buoyed by the diffusion of postwar British welfare-state measures (opposed fiercely and unsuccessfully by the Ulster upper class), many Northern Catholics began to look askance on the stifling culture and stagnating economy southward and so—unity consigned to a distant day—concentrated on reforming the Northern regime. (Although half the wealth of Northern Ireland is owned by the top 5 percent, the ownership of two-thirds of the wealth by the top 5 percent in the Irish Republic does not speak well for the fate of visionary republican ideals there.) The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association was formed in the late 1960s to struggle against discrimination in housing and employment, for local government reforms and the right of free speech and assembly, with brutal results—images of the B-Specials and the Burntollet Bridge—televised around the world. The Crossmaglen man quoted above was a prominent member of NICRA.

The Unionist party ruptured when most Protestant workers broke to the right to preserve their "petty privileges." Aside from ingrained bigotry, substantial fears were aroused in a "zero-sum society" in which the decline of the traditional ship-building, textile, and engineering industries was only slowly countered by fresh, job-creating investment. Northern unemployment rates fluctuated between 6 and 10 percent over the 1945–74 period while wage scales were, even in the late '70s, 25 percent below those of the United Kingdom. Catholics, of course, bore the brunt; but the niggardly economic performance overall did not inspire among Protestants enthusiasm for or confidence in a nondiscriminatory society. Responding to Protestant extremist assaults upon Catholic ghettos, the IRA revived and rearmed as a purely defensive force concerned more with sheer survival than ancient crusades to unify the island.

Ostensibly a buffer between bellicose Protestants and imperiled Catholics, British troops intruded in August 1969 "in aid of the civil power"—which aligned them with a faltering regime regarded increasingly by Catholics as unreformable and illegitimate. Clashes occured and the intensifying army repression culminated in an internment sweep on August 9, 1971, which netted 342 Catholics and nary a Protestant. The Bloody Sunday killings of 13 unarmed Catholic demonstrators in Derry five months later punctuated the point. The Provisional IRA, which the British see as the root of all Ulster evils, was unequivocally a symptom

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rather than a cause. Disdaining the Marxism of the "Official" IRA, the Provos split off to undertake an all-out campaign for unification. The "Officials" called their own cease-fire in 1972 and ever since have bitterly criticized the Provos—to the point of exchanging gunfire—for waging a war that is reactionary and divisive (of the working class).

The British pried reforms out of the Stormont regime only to ignite a ferocious outbreak of sectarian killings by the Protestant paramilitary organizations. Imposing direct rule in 1972, Westminster cast about for a workable political formula. The power-sharing Executive, devised at the 1973 Sunningdale conference, was wrecked in May 1974 by the Ulster Workers' Council strike—more accurately, a lockout—abetted by the uncharacteristic timidity of the British army.

After the collapse of two more mildly mannered initiatives and of the informal 1975 Provo negotiations (amidst escalated spates of sectarian killings by unproscribed Protestant paramilitaries), the U.K. Labour government retreated into direct rule of the province. "Direct rule" blended benign bureaucratic reforms with the Army's directive to sally forth and wipe out the Catholic paramilitaries. Then Northern Ireland Secretary of State Roy Mason rashly announced the imminent defeat of the Provisional IRA in October 1977, only to be answered by 70 bomb blasts in January and, later, by the publicized killings of Airey Neave, Lord Mountbatten, and 18 soldiers at Warrenpoint. An Army document authored by Brigadier Jim Glover estimated that the Provos could continue the war a minimum of five more years and, by the way, acknowledged them as a disciplined, politically motivated force. (The Provos captured the document.) In a more benign manner, Britain opened and expanded the public sector so that between 1972 and 1978 employment rose by 33 percent in the middle-class areas of health, education, and public administration, thus diminishing majority fears that each Catholic job was a Protestant loss and effectively encouraging Catholics to rally around Northern Ireland's moderate Social Democratic and Labour party (SDLP).

Nonetheless, the carrot and the stick dueled one another. Unskilled Catholic workers in West Belfast where unemployment is 50 percent were, for example, rather more familiar with the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary than with the interiors of public-sector offices and steady paychecks. Moreover, moderate Catholic and Protestant politicians floundered impotently in a political wilderness devoid of fresh British institutional initiatives. Paisleyites and Provos flourished. Then yet another zealot, Margaret Thatcher, burst upon the scene and devoured the carrot.

Despite an annual U.K. subvention of $3 billion, Northern Ireland had the highest rate of unemployment, lowest standard of living, and the highest cost of living in the United Kingdom. In the course of shutting the entire U.K. into her economic Iron Maiden, Thatcher's government skyrocketed Ulster unemployment levels up to 20 percent this year with, of course, Catholics and *all* Ulster youth suffering most—creating a choice recruiting pool for extremists and bigots. Thatcher also beat a fast retreat from her brief and reluctant flirtation with an "Irish dimension"—the skewed "special relationship" that proved so costly for Charles Haughey, the Irish Republic's former prime minister—to the thumping of lambeg drums and other ominous noises made by Paisleyites who want a return of the good old days. Hence political inertia went on breeding physical inertia, that is to say, corpses.

Bobby Sand's election to Parliament (as well as the election of two more H-block hunger strikers in the South) was by no means an endorsement of the Provisional IRA's war. Foremost, the election repudiated policies that combined malign neglect with complacent repression. It also demolished many years' work by British propagandists who portrayed Ulster exclusively as a "security problem." The hunger strikers crystallized in their plight every sin of omission and commission ever committed in Ireland by British authorities. *Carte blanche* for Provos? Most Catholics certainly want the troops out, but the vast majority support the SDLP while one poll indicated that half preferred at present to stay in the U.K. under, of course, a new and fair governing structure. Statistically anyway, Ulster's living standard still surpasses the South by 16.6 percent. The Irish Republic can't *afford* Ulster, and even

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the most nationalist of Southern politicians believe that *immediate* unification would generate a horror show. Stringent security policies testify to the wish of the South to remain a "safe haven" *from,* not *for,* paramilitaries.

Despite the October 3rd collapse, the H-block hunger strike has generated enormous international pressure upon the British to introduce and enact a fresh and fundamental political initiative. However, the feeble Consultative Assembly proposed by Humphrey Atkins, Northern Ireland's former secretary of state, had not been a promising start; nor was the adamant incomprehension with which Margaret Thatcher views the rioting in, so to speak, her own cities an encouraging sign. A Brave New Initiative probably will await a Labour government (*pace* an SDP-Liberal alliance). 62 percent of Labour's members support Tony Benn's "Troops Out" position. They now witness such mainstream luminaries as Merlyn Rees, former N.I. secretary, who questioned the self-sabotaging guarantee to the Protestant majority that Britain would not impose a solution without their full consent, and heard James Callaghan, Britain's former prime minister, call for a "broadly independent Ulster"—whatever that may be. Beyond the "Troops Out" sentiment, the British Labour party's program for weaning Ulster is as yet undefined. What could be done now?

It was after all Edward Heath, a Tory prime minister, who cleared the decks for the ambitious power-sharing Executive and 78-seat Assembly devised at Sunningdale in December 1973. When British troops (under the succeeding Labour government) failed to oppose the bully-boy tactics of Protestant paramilitaries in the streets and at workplaces the following spring, the Ulster Worker's Council strike gathered momentum, and so the Executive fell in May 1974. But a lesson evidently was learned. When Paisley tried to repeat the stoppage in May 1977, the strike quickly fizzled as the authorities stepped firmly in, enabling the trade unions to resist intimidation by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force as well as an assortment of other Orange heavies. Afterward the UDA forsook Rev. Ian and proclaimed its own proposals for an "independent Ulster," with safeguards for Catholics and power-sharing for all. (But no cuddling with the Irish Republic allowed!)

A February 1978 Ulster TV poll showed that 51 percent of Protestants and 63 percent of the entire population polled favored another go at power-sharing. Another opinion poll carried out for *Fortnight* magazine last year claimed that 77 percent of the Ulster population were willing to give power-sharing "a try" and would "try hard to make it work." (The sample was admittedly small.) If a British government forcefully revived a credible power-sharing arrangement together with antidiscriminatory measures, a Bill of Rights, and a loosening of the purse strings, a genuine light might flicker and beckon at the end of the proverbial tunnel. Whether an "Irish dimension" (the prospect of unification) is omitted or placed in tactful abeyance is politically a matter of the subtlest semantics, but Catholic and Protestant demands are not altogether incompatible. The stances of Paisley's Democratic Unionist party on issues of economic policy and social welfare are remarkably similar to those of the Social Democratic and Labour parties. Contrary to the albeit self-promoted media image, Paisley is no nut; he is a very astute politician who responds to the felt needs of his working-class constituency and knows how to shape their opinions. He is a tough and amibitious realist who has been permitted to reinforce much of the reality he perceives.

If forthcoming, the prospect of economic aid from the European Economic Community would ease the zero-sum dilemma. But forget Jimmy Carter's 1977 speech offering U.S. aid to a reasonably pacific Ulster. (The Irish ancestry of our current president is no more likely to move him to repeat the offer than his advanced years stimulate any empathy for the elderly dependents on social security here.) After a dozen years of carnage and ruin, the times are as "ripe" as they ever will be for the installation of a power-sharing framework. As for the Provisional IRA and the split-off Irish National Liberation Army, support for the military campaign would dry up (eventually) if Catholics perceived and participated in a stable and fair power-sharing scheme. The recent restructur-

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ing of the Provos into tiny four- to six-man "Active Service Units" may have improved their military capability at the expense of isolation from much of the Catholic community. The political wing of the Provos is moving leftward. Gerry Adams, a self-described "socialist republican" and Provisional Sinn Fein vice-president, said at that organization's 1980 annual convention, "There can be no military victory." To retain their Green grass roots, the Provisionals must struggle on "many fronts." However phased, a British commitment to withdraw the troops would remove the hardliners' *raison d'être* and perhaps accelerate the shift to those other "fronts."

This heroic scenario presupposes that Margaret Thatcher is compelled to revert to a venerable tradition of Tory pragmatism, which, so far, is conspicuous by its absence. Nonetheless, Northern Ireland's newly appointed Secretary of State James Prior not only refrained from gloating at the hunger strike collapse but granted several of the prisoners' demands. Prior also announced his intention to restore "political life to the North" with a "degree of prosperity." At the Tory party conference in Blackpool last October, Prior spoke of developing a plan to establish a new elected assembly, along power-sharing lines and with substantial powers, as well as an interparliamentary link between Westminster, Dublin, and the proposed Ulster assembly. In spite of Paisley's bombast, Thatcher met Irish Premier Garret Fitzgerald a month later at a London Summit where she agreed to set up an "Anglo-Irish Council" to consider the "totality of relationships within these islands."

Thatcher's steely determination is precisely what is needed to see a new power-sharing venture through. It would indeed be risky—the bloodbath specter—but the alternative to date is bloodstained immobilization. Power-sharing may hasten the day when Irish men and women collectively attack the socioeconomic defects and inequities of the entire island instead of each other. A long overdue day, as the Crossmaglen man remarked.

SINCE A STRANGER in Crossmaglen stands out like a carnival clown in Ian Paisley's congregation, I was stopped for identification by a British army patrol—no—a Royal Marine patrol, as the leader proudly and curtly corrected me. Determining that I was a harmless if foolhardy tourist, the young patrol leader relaxed and chatted about his visit to North America. (Townspeople rarely speak to soldiers unless spoken to.) Finally he said, "Y'know, I bin 'ere six months now and I still don't understand these people, d'you?" A trick question?

I shrugged. "I think they just want to be left alone."

He pondered a moment. "I can understand that," he smiled, and moved off with the patrol to resume its duties. □

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Jack Metzgar

Public Policy and Steel

Steel in the United States is a "mature" industry, and our political-economic discourse, like other aspects of American culture, is particularly ill-equipped to deal with maturity and aging.

Steel's best years are behind it. It has not been "profitable" by American standards for more than 20 years and can no longer earn or attract the capital it needs to maintain itself. It has no prospects for growth. Yet it remains a basic industry, basic to the economic health of an advanced industrial society. It employs hundreds of thousands of people and is at the heart of many regional economies. It cannot be left to die, but it is not clear how it can survive.

During the Carter administration, the federal government made a first attempt to address this problem. Some 70,000 steel jobs were permanently eliminated from 1977 to 1980, putting severe strains on local economies in Ohio, Pennsylvania, New York, and elsewhere. When 200 members of Congress organized themselves into the Congressional Steel Caucus, an extensive study of the industry was undertaken by government agencies. The Steel Tripartite Committee was formed, which included representatives from the steel companies, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA), and from branches of government.

The proposals made by this committee were virtually the same as those of the American Iron & Steel Institute (AISI) in its 1980 report, "Steel at the Crossroads." Though the original impetus for study was concern about the consequences of job losses, the final policy was centered on increasing profits. The industry, through its association (AISI), dominated the formation of policy because it had the only coherent analysis. But more: the other participants, including the USWA and several independent analysts, shared the illusion that steel can be a profitable business in the contemporary world.

Several new policies were implemented during the Carter administration, but they had no apparent effect on the industry's basic situation. A major point in the industry's program—accelerated depreciation allowance—was installed last summer, part of the Reagan administration's corporate tax relief program. There is not much chance that it will reverse the industry's decline.

While there is some disagreement over causes, everyone who has studied the American steel industry agrees on the nature of the problem: its technology and plant are considerably less modern than those of its competitors in Japan, Europe, and the Third World. Unless it installs more modern equipment, it will not be able to produce steel at a cost that allows it to be competitive with steel made abroad. But any modernization plan requires considerably more money than the steel companies have or can borrow. And the industry is increasingly caught in a vicious circle—the less money it has to modernize, the less competitive it becomes and, again, the less money it has to modernize.

The steel industry cannot issue new stock because no one would want to buy it. It cannot borrow what it needs because the companies are already heavily in debt (with 50 percent debt/equity ratios in an economy that considers 35 percent acceptable). Apart from direct government subsidies (which no one has suggested and the industry emphatically does not want), the only way the industry can get the money it needs is to increase profits. The entire policy debate over the past four years has centered on how government can help the companies do this.

The steel companies believe that the govern-

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ment has treated them unfairly and that all that's needed is some "fair treatment" and they will once again become profitable. Specifically, the companies have wanted:

- freedom from government harassment when steel price increases are announced;
- "flexibility" in administering environmental, health, and safety regulations;
- protection from unfair trade practices by other countries' steel industries;
- a general reduction in corporate taxes, especially a more generous depreciation allowance for investment in new plant and equipment.

All this the companies now have been granted. The Reagan administration is proving even more "flexible" with EPA/OSHA requirements than the industry originally requested. Although some companies are now dissatisfied with the trade protection they are getting through the complicated "trigger price" mechanism originally installed by the Carter administration, this was very much part of the program they had lobbied for. The capital recovery program passed last summer by the Reagan administration included some extra goodies, but its basic thrust is exactly what the industry wanted: it allows corporations to depreciate their plant and equipment as much as five times faster than under the previous tax law.

In formulating its program, the American Iron & Steel Institute (AISI) carefully counted up the amount of money the industry needs to modernize: $7 billion a year over a 10-year period. At best, said AISI, the industry could expect to have only about $4.7 billion available for investment, leaving a $2.3 billion annual shortfall. Government analysts contested these figures. The industry surely exaggerated its capital needs, but it also appears to have overestimated its potential cash flow. The actual shortfall over the past four years has been pretty close to what AISI had predicted: $2.2 billion.

Close analysis of these figures is instructive, because when corporations cry "capital shortage," the left is properly skeptical. But in the case of steel, there is strong evidence that the corporations not only do not have the capital they need to modernize, but that they also lack the ability to raise this capital without massive assistance from the government. (U.S. Steel's purchase of Marathon Oil for $6.4 billion may seem to contradict this; but USS is borrowing some $5.7 billion to pay for this merger and it would not have been able to secure loans of this magnitude for investment in steel. Marathon is a "cash cow," expected to yield an annual cash flow of $2.1 billion by 1986.)

The industry's proposals were designed to provide this assistance by reducing the companies' taxes and regulatory costs and by permitting them to raise their prices—all of which should increase their profits. But while the policy was being "debated," no one figured out how much money the industry's program would actually produce. In January 1981 the General Accounting Office (GAO) gave detailed estimates showing that the total program could be expected to yield about $350 million a year—a drop in the bucket considering the industry's needs.

It became clear that the steel industry had come up with a plan that would decrease government tax revenues, increase government administrative costs and the price of steel. Therefore steel will add to inflation and generally decrease the health and wealth of the citizenry—all in order to provide for less than one-sixth of the capital it needs to modernize! The woeful inadequacy of this policy was understood *before* its final elements were put into place last summer. But no one proposed any other policy, and the steel companies kept insisting that profitability was just around the corner.

How, one wonders, could the companies and the government (and the USWA) be so blind to the inadequacies of the policy they agreed to? To be fair, the GAO deserves some credit for being able to count. But by and large the government's and the union's understanding of the problem has been so thoroughly shaped by the industry that their blindness is but an effect of the companies' unshakable self-confidence.

On the one hand, the companies must present themselves as sufficiently needy to justify special government assistance. On the other hand, they cannot allow so bleak a picture to

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emerge that it will completely discourage what's left of their investors or suggest the need for more radical measures. Therefore the industry's managers are not inclined to express self-doubt publicly. But beyond that, its program suggests that its own understanding is thoroughly bewitched by a sincere commitment to free-enterprise ideology.

The key premises of all participants have been: first, that if the industry is to survive, it must become "profitable"; second, that with "just a little help" it *can* become "profitable." Both premises are false, and false in somewhat mysterious ways. The fact is that the American steel industry is virtually the only "profitable" steel industry in the world, and yet there is absolutely no reason to think that it can ever become truly "profitable."

This is not as strange as it sounds; but the contortions necessary to avoid the simultaneous perception of these facts are a wonder. The industry's case is that it has not been profitable *enough* to achieve the level of investment necessary to keep up with the modernization of steel in other countries. To prove this, the industry compares its profit rates over the last 24 years with those of "all manufacturing." Except for the mid-1950s, the steel industry's rate of profit has been substantially below that of all manufacturing—since 1960, around 7 or 8 percent of stockholder's equity as compared with from 12 to 15 percent for all manufacturing. What is more, over the past 20 years the rate for all manufacturing has been increasing while the rate for steel has declined. Steel simply cannot achieve profit rates that compare with the rest of the economy. Since 1958, the annual rate for all manufacturing has dipped below 10 percent only once (in 1961), while during the same period steel's profit rate has been above 10 percent only once (1974).

How one can look at this record and conclude that, without some radical change, the steel industry can ever be profitable *by American standards* (now about 15 percent in manufacturing) is a mystery. When we consider the industry's other disadvantages—its high percentage of obsolete plant and its relatively higher costs for labor and raw materials—it seems reasonable to conclude that steel is just no longer a "profitable" enterprise in the United States. And that, of course, is exactly what most purchasers of corporate stocks and bonds concluded long ago.

Yet no other steel industry in the world (with the exception of Canada) makes anything near the profit rate of the American industry, and none is profitable by the standard of American private investors. Japan, with its superefficient wonder mills and its cooperative labor relations, makes less than one-third the profit of the American industry (an average of 1.7 percent from 1969 to 1977). West Germany does somewhat better—it is nearly half as profitable (2.9 percent) as the American industry. And these are the U.S. industry's major competitors; English and French steel consistently lose money. Almost all other nations have therefore concluded that a steel industry can no longer be run on a profit-making basis.

To admit that the industry cannot be expected to make an American-sized profit would be to raise questions about whether we really need a steel industry and if so, how one can be provided if the "free market" won't do it. These indeed are precisely the questions that should be asked.

Other nations view steel as a key sector in their industrial policies. If the price of steel can be kept at a reasonable level, the cost of capital goods can be lower, productive investment in equipment is encouraged, manufacturing stimulated, and consumer prices are restrained. Besides preserving jobs, the ability to produce enough steel for one's home market at a reasonable price is the key to a healthy manufacturing sector that can expand and provide more jobs. To be dependent on foreign steel is like being dependent on foreign oil—uncontrolled price increases reverberate throughout the economy, having simultaneously inflationary and depressive effects. Thus many governments have ensured that sufficient money is invested in steel so that costs are lowered and prices restrained. With the exception of Japan, nations have done this through substantial government ownership of steel industries—"nationalization" in one form or another—from around 10 percent government ownership in West Germany and Canada to some 60 to 70 percent in most of Europe. Through public ownership and other forms of control, the de-

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velopment of these steel industries is *planned* in relation to an economy-wide industrial policy. The industry's fate is not left to the narrow rationality of private investors but is made a matter of public policy and thus (at least, potentially) of political debate.

As the Congressional Office of Technological Assessment says: "The U.S. steel industry may never achieve international competitiveness unless Federal policies become more comparable to the policies of other countries toward their steel industries." But the U.S. industry will, of course, have none of this.

Over the past four years, then, while the formation of policy has been completely dominated by the industry, the government has taken formal responsibility for the nurturance of this economic sector. In the process, government agencies have established a point of view not precisely synonomous with the industry's. The minor differences between industry and government would not be significant if the industry-shaped policy had a prayer of successfully revitalizing U.S. steelmaking. Since there is no such hope, our government will inevitably become more deeply entangled with the industry and its problems.

The basic thrust of the present Administration's economic program is unlikely to survive for long. Though small and big business are enthusiastic about improving the "business climate," corporate capital is politely but deeply skeptical of the Reagan program's chances for killing inflation without also eliminating the potential for economic growth that is essential for business opportunities.

Opinion leaders within the corporate community have begun to shape an alternative program. Most prominently articulated by Felix Rohatyn and in *Business Week*'s special issue on "Reindustrialization," this program has a much firmer relationship to historical experience and to present reality. What is needed, this view holds, is what other advanced—and many "nonadvanced"—capitalist countries already have: a government *industrial policy* with component *sectoral* and *regional* policies, ensuring that capital is invested for the benefit not only of individual investors but of the economy as a whole. This means a quantum leap of government involvement in the economy—it means, if it is to be effective, systematic centralized economic planning and government powers to enforce such plans. Some form of nationalization of the steel industry is not only compatible with such a policy direction, it is probably inevitable.

Now it is important to note that in the Rohatyn and *Business Week* versions of this policy, a government-shaped reindustrialization program would deepen corporate control of American life. Yet most of the corporate community is hesitant to embrace such a program. For beyond an often genuine commitment to free-enterprise ideology, corporations have justified fears about such a policy. Granting additional powers to government will inevitably mean reducing the powers of *specific* corporations, even if it were to enhance overall corporate power. But despite the clean technocratic line of Rohatyn's and *Business Week*'s scripts, the initiation of centralized government planning runs the risk of further politicizing the economy.

Public debate over this new role for the state has barely begun, but unless Reagan can turn frogs into princes, it is likely to assume greater prominence in the years ahead. The AFL–CIO has already endorsed a policy similar to Rohatyn's. And though such an expansion of the state is not without dangers, it also provides opportunities for establishing some democratic control over corporate investment and production decisions.

An exchange between the GAO and President Carter's chief economic adviser, Charles Schultze, reveals the mischief possible—especially in the American context—in shifting from free enterprise to state-capitalist solutions for our economic problems. The GAO study showed that ad hoc solutions to the steel industry's problems would be woefully inadequate and that government policy was shapeless because it failed to articulate a clear set of "performance objectives" for the industry. Without using these words, what the GAO was essentially recommending was "indicative planning"—a mild form of central planning amounting to little more than government suggestions that an industry achieve certain levels

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of production consistent with the government's overall economic plan. The GAO, in other words, was arguing for a mild form of the kind of state-capitalist planning that is common elsewhere. This caused considerable consternation among various government agencies in the Carter administration. The Carter Justice Department found such an approach incompatible with "this nation's economic philosophy." But it was left to Charles Schultze to articulate the reasons why such an approach should not be undertaken:

> If [economic] goal-setting [for the industry] is the route to follow, why not establish as goals other criteria which explicitly reflect the interests of consumers, steel users, industry employees, or numerous other constituencies with a legitimate stake in steel industry policy?

Such an eventuality was enough to rule out any experimentation with state-capitalist policies, at least this time around. But this sort of approach is coming, and steelworkers and steel communities might be ready to take up Prof. Schultze's challenge.

The problems of the steel industry could be central in shaping a new political economic discourse, because it is a sector of the economy that fairly screams to be nationalized if only we could see through the ideological mists created by "this nation's economic philosophy." Nationalization in itself, however, is no panacea for steel, as the European experience clearly shows; but it is the only way a modern nation can have a steel industry that supports its manufacturing sector. And there surely is no reason why we must repeat all the errors of the European experience with nationalization. The U.S. industry, for example, is in considerably better shape than the British steel industry was when first nationalized. In a refashioned political setting, an American nationalization program could avoid turning the industry over to elite bankers and might even fashion a self-management program that would use government money to establish worker-community control of the companies upon which they depend for their livelihood.

Such a "scenario" may seem unlikely now, but the social and economic wreckage the Reagan administration has initiated may activate community and labor forces that have been relatively dormant for decades. Reaganomics, besides the misery it is causing, may also destroy, once and for all, the American faith in "the free market." If that happens, the American ruling class may yet regret having shaped a political discourse that equates state-capitalist planning with socialism. With an aroused citizenry and labor movement, we could get some of the real thing. □

(Continued from Second Cover)

AMONG OUR CONTRIBUTORS

RAND SMITH, who teaches politics at Lake Forest College, has spent the past academic year as Fulbright lecturer at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques in Grenoble, while completing a study on the evolution of the French labor movement since 1968.

BORIS SOUVARINE was one of the founders of the French CP. After breaking with communism, he became a distinguished historian and wrote his pioneering biography of Stalin. In the Summer 1981 issue we carried his "Last Conversations with Isaac Babel."

ERIC TERZUOLO, has been teaching European history at Mount St. Mary's College, Maryland.

JERRY G. WATTS, a political scientist, is completing his graduate education at Yale University. He is at work on a book of essays tentatively entitled "Outside the Margin: Reflections on a Pariah People."

JAMES P. YOUNG, who teaches political theory at the State University of New York, Binghamton, is engaged in a study of liberal political economy and its critics.

GABRIEL ZAID, a distinguished Mexican writer, contributed his remarkable article "Enemy Colleagues: A Reading of the Salvadoran Tragedy" to our Winter 1982 issue. Another article by Zaid, entitled "The Promise of Progress: Notes on Peasant Economy in Latin America," appears in the new FSISI pamphlet, *Democracy and Dictatorship in Latin America.* □

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David Bensman

Minding Its Own Business

A Local Trade Union in Action

Whether labor unions are good for America is now controversial. A decade ago John Kenneth Galbraith's analysis that unions were a necessary "countervailing power" was widely accepted, but recently corporate America has legitimated a new paternalism. Today liberals, radicals, conservatives, and reactionaries disagree about labor's role in society. But they agree on a related issue, the nature of the labor movement: the new unions of the 1930s have responded to the challenges thrown up by the ever larger corporations by becoming bureaucratic institutions. Labor and management reached an accommodation after the Taft-Hartley bill was passed, and the collective-bargaining system was collectivized. As contracts became long-term, grievance procedures developed, benefits proliferated, and employment-security agreements became common, national union officers gained greater control over union policy and the locals' actions. Consequently labor's grass-roots, the local unions, withered.

Some analysts decried this development—one thinks of Sidney Lens and C. Wright Mills; others, such as Clark Kerr and John Dunlap, applauded. But all agreed that loss of rank-and-file vitality was the price labor paid for a stable relationship with management. Now that this stability is threatened by plant closings and corporate union-busting, everyone is turning to labor's grass roots, to see whether they managed to survive the long, cold winter.

• Driving east on the Long Island Expressway one wintry morning, I pondered my assignment: to describe how local unions influence their members' lives. In Appalachia, where I'd traveled, that was no problem. To miners in the bleak mountains of West Virginia, unions clearly made a difference. But on Long Island? Driving past the new office buildings, shopping malls, and industrial plants now lining the Expressway where forests had grown a few years before, I told myself, *this* is industrial America today. Postwar growth has been suburban; factories have moved and so has the "working class."

The only story I could imagine writing was the one told by the American Celebrationists: unions now are business unions, interested only in sharing their firms' prosperity, integrated into the military-industrial complex, bureaucratic at the top, moribund at their roots. But I didn't want to write that story.

• At first glance, Republic Lodge 1987 of the International Association of Machinists (which has 800,000 members and belongs to the AFL–CIO) represents business unionism perfectly. Its glass- and steel-facaded headquarters, neighboring the European-American Bank and Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith's offices on Route 110 in Suffolk County's com-

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Our special series "Work and Workers in the 1980s" is edited by William Kornblum and David Bensman.

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mercial heartland, seems to symbolize unionism's absorption into the mainstream.

Every morning at 11:00 AM, hundreds of women flock to the Lodge for bingo. Newlyweds, matrons, and grandmothers, suburban housewives black and white meet and gossip at games sponsored by chapters of the Knights of Columbus, Temple Beth Torah, and the American Cancer Society.

To the right of the bingo hall is a reception area where women sitting at switchboards and typewriters buzz visitors into union headquarters. Past the reception area, down a narrow corridor, behind a secretary's office, in a carpeted room with windows on two walls, behind an executive desk Gene Laferlita, Republic Lodge's president and business manager, conducts union affairs.

Dressed neatly and conservatively, Mr. Laferlita is a fitting representative of his well-paid membership. (Republic Lodge members—all working at Fairchild Republic, a merger they still call Republic—earn, on average, $10.50 per hour and, with overtime plentiful, make nearly $25,000 per year, have two- to five-week paid vacations, medical and dental coverage, and a pension plan.) But he is not only a businessman. When he came to Republic Aviation in 1953 after completing his war service, he took a temporary job as an assembler-riveter in the booming war-plant industry. But he was bitten by the union bug. He stayed in the plant, working at ever more skilled electrical jobs, took night classes at City College, and made his way up the union hierarchy. Though his job requires him to administer an organization with over 3,000 members from his modern headquarters, Mr. Laferlita knows that the heart of the small world that is Republic Lodge is in the plant, where stewards represent workers in the daily confrontations with management.

Work on the "Cycle"

AT FIRST GLANCE, Fairchild Republic's factory in Farmingdale does not seem a stressful environment. The plant is so huge and its ceilings are so high that workers, machines, and even the skeletons of jet fighter planes, the A–10s, look like toys, and everything moves in slow motion. When you walk through the plant, past young men riveting metal sheets together, past women threading colored wires, past older craftsmen operating lathes and drill rigs, the factory looks like a gigantic workshop where thousands of artisans work at their own pace. But appearances deceive. More than half the work at Republic is done on a "cycle," according to a plan and a rhythm formulated by time-study engineers. Foremen carry charts on their clipboards, filling in boxes whenever a worker completes an assignment.

Workers complain that work on the "cycle" is miserable. When a foreman falls behind he walks around the shop, telling his people to pick up the pace, dammit, they're not working fast enough. But you're always behind. Sometimes too little time has been allotted, or there's a shortage of parts, or a problem with tools. Whatever the reasons, workers feel constantly harassed.

Foremen feel the same, for failure to complete their charts subjects them to ridicule, chastisement, even dismissal. It's not hard to understand why a worker's request that a light bulb be replaced or a pool of oil mopped up often goes unheeded. And for many foremen, the temptation to speed things up by issuing orders that violate the contract is irresistible.

During the union's first 12 years such pressures created havoc. Each time a foreman violated the contract, a steward would write a grievance. Institutional politics compounded the problem. Stewards felt pressured to prove their militancy; company supervisors felt pressured to be tough. Union and company committees had to meet two full days every week to resolve grievances; nevertheless, the backlog reached 2,000 by 1962. Disputes festered for months until their origin was forgotten, and arbitrators grew rich on fees paid by the company and union.

Because the members found these long delays demoralizing, the Lodge's earlier president, Justin Ostro, proposed radical alterations of the labor relations system in 1962. Negotiators adopted the "Harvester Plan," a system of grievance-handling pioneered by International Harvester and the United Automobile Workers. Under the plan, whenever a problem arose, the worker was to summon his steward.

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On the floor, before the workers in the shop, company and union representatives would try to resolve the problem. The plan's informal approach worked. As supervisors and stewards learned to handle open negotiations, fewer disputes passed on to upper levels. Very few impasses reached arbitrators.

Nevertheless, peace does not prevail at Republic. Indeed, one corporate official told me that he could not cooperate with me; if he informed me of what the union did and I described it publicly, other managers would be so angered by the Lodge's power that they would demand scrapping the Plan. And this in turn could bring on a strike.

Stewards—the Heart of the Union

REPUBLIC MANAGERS resent the stewards' power. There are 60 stewards at Republic, elected by their shopmates to three-year terms. Each is a company employee, assigned to a specific job. But stewards are not ordinary workers. They don't work on the cycle, and are last in their shop to be laid off or transferred, second in getting a crack at overtime.

The rub is that stewards are free to interrupt their work for union business at any time. Whenever a problem arises between supervisors and workers, the steward can leave his workpost in order to take it up. (Most stewards and most of Republic's workers are men; the plant and the union are still male-dominated.) Stewards are supposed to inform their supervisors when leaving their work, but many of them ignore this rule. Managers at Republic believe that the Harvester Plan allows stewards to abuse their freedom and to use union business to avoid work. But a company official told me that management's aggravation was exaggerated, and that many foremen, in order to justify their inability to keep up with the work charts, claim their stewards spend more time on union affairs than is the case. When corporate officers read the inflated figures, their anger mushrooms. But management's resentment is not caused primarily by stewards' occasional abuses or foremen's exaggerations. It is rooted in the inherent conflict between the company's drive for production and the workers' determination to maintain their dignity. And the stewards stand at the center of that conflict.

Sal Bancheri, who has worked at Republic for 27 years, through four layoffs and two strikes, described his typical day as steward in a machine shop. In the morning, on his way to his post as set-up man, Sal notices an oil spill on the floor; he takes out a box of "Speedidry" and spreads some on the floor. Before Sal reaches his post, a worker walks up, complaining that the doors leading to the loading docks don't close, and the shop is too damn cold. Sal has complained to management about this before but has received no response. He thinks it's because those who are responsible have things to do they consider more important than some cold machinists. Today Sal fills out an official form requesting that a wall be put up to keep out the cold. (Eventually the company puts up a screen, a response Sal considers inadequate.)

Salaam Aziz, a young black steward in the stock room, describes a different problem. At 9:30 AM, 45 minutes after work begins, Salaam's supervisor tells him, "James seems to have a problem. Why don't you talk to him." James is sitting on his bench, hunched over. He's not working, not even pretending to work. Salaam asks him, "What's the problem, man? You sick or something?" James is angry. "That damn foreman. He's always on me. I ain't taking that shit from him! Damn. I know my job, ain't no one gonna tell me what to do." Sometimes Salaam will ask, "Well, what did that foreman say to you?" Soon the foreman apologizes, and James returns to work. But today Salaam encourages James to talk about the fight he had with his wife last night, or his child's bout with the mumps. After a man gets his problems off his chest, it's back to work.

Salaam believes James's problem is simple: he finds it unbearably boring and demeaning to load and unload boxes and carry tools all day long. James has gone to college for a year; he expects more out of life than a well-paying job unloading boxes.

Toward day's end, Sal and Salaam tour their shops, finding out who has been asked to work overtime, and who has agreed. Most stewards keep a chart, for the contract specifies that overtime must be offered to workers on an

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equal basis. Foremen are not supposed to reward "good" workers, although many foremen "try to get away with it."

At Republic, unlike in most American factories, a worker is not required to stay late, as long as management can find someone else to do it. Some workers prefer to go home early, or take Saturdays off, while others, with big families, or a motorboat to pay for, take as much overtime as they can get. Nevertheless, the union considers regulation of overtime important, because it deprives foremen of a tool for manipulating their workers. Equal treatment is a union principle.

What is Equality?

EQUALITY, HOWEVER, is not easy to define in practice. Management likes to define it as the equal opportunity that rewards for working well—according to company criteria. At Grumman Aerospace Corporation, Republic's nonunion competitor and neighbor, foremen have wide discretion to reward or punish workers in many ways. Two men working next to each other may once have been high school buddies. The one whom the foreman considers the better worker may earn 30 percent more than his colleague, though neither may know for sure; pay scales are kept secret at Grumman. The favored riveter also will get as much overtime as he wants, and when there is unpleasant work, sealing doors for example, he will rarely have to do it.

Grumman officials argue that incentives are necessary to maintain good work attitudes and profits. But the unionists of Republic Lodge—like unionists throughout America—believe that if the company has the right to reward "good" workers and punish "bad" ones, it is able to speed up work, push down wage rates, turn workers against one another, and weaken the union. Consequently, Republic Lodge has fought for and won the right to regulate how the company deploys its work force. Most important here is the matter of seniority.

At first glance, seniority seems a simple thing. The years you spend working at your job—not your merit rating—give you priority for promotions and protect you from layoffs, demotions, or transfers to "dirty" jobs or the night shift. For example, if plant manager Vinnie Ambrico decides it's necessary to finish assembling a plane right away but there aren't enough grade 25 structural assemblers to do it, the grade 23 assembler with most seniority in the shop under that foreman's jurisdiction will get the job, provided he can do it. Conversely, if two "sealers" suddenly quit and management cannot replace them right away, the two junior men in the shop in the grade just above "sealer" will be ordered to fill in.

Although the matter of seniority seems simple, its workings are complicated. In such a large, technologically sophisticated plant as Fairchild Republic, workers do hundreds of tasks requiring varied talents, training, and experience. Clearly, to work as a "structural assembler" does not prepare one to operate a milling machine. Consequently union and company agree that seniority only gives a worker claim to his own and related jobs, not to every job in the plant. Fair enough. But how are "jobs" defined? And who defines them?

In 1942, long before unionism came to Farmingdale, Republic Aviation officials began to classify and rate all the jobs in the plant. Each worker was assigned a job with a work description, skill rating, and wage range. The plan proved an umbrella in the wind. No matter how company officials modified classifications, they couldn't adequately categorize what employees did. Whenever a crisis developed in production, foremen shifted workers from task to task and job to job.

In the campaign to organize Republic Lodge in 1950, union leaders made job classification a major issue. Later, in 1962, after a dozen years of building up the union, they tackled two key problems. First, since management identified 1,500 jobs in a work force of 10,000, seniority meant little, for in many jobs the senior worker had precedence over practically no one. Second, there was the "51–49" rule under which workers could be ordered to work outside their normal assignment up to 49 percent of the time. High-skill people charged that the company assigned some of their work to lower-paid employees in order to cut costs. To solve these problems, Lodge officials demanded that the number of job classifications be reduced and the 51–49 rule be eliminated.

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To Wayne Bates, a company personnel man, the union demands were unthinkable. "You can't run an aircraft factory without assigning people to work outside their classification," he told Mundy Peale, the long-time president of Republic Aviation Co.

The two sides locked horns. For two months Lodge members picketed while company and union waged public-relations campaigns in the press. Finally, after Defense Secretary Robert McNamara warned that the strike was endangering American battle readiness in Southeast Asia, President Kennedy invoked Taft-Hartley, and federal courts imposed an 80-day "cooling-off period." Then, 60 days later, Mundy Peale fired Bates and signed a contract with Republic Lodge. The settlement was a tremendous victory for the union. Today the contract only allows the company to assign an employee to work outside his job in emergencies and for limited periods. Union and corporate officials now have developed an understanding of what various jobs entail.

Nevertheless, the job-classification issue still produces headaches. Supervisors often order people to work outside their qualification. Sometimes "James" will agree to mop up oil, although that's a janitor's job; he won't tell Salaam, fearing that his supervisor will punish him for raising an alarm. But over the years, as the union's power has grown, such fears have diminished. It is now common for the foreman or the worker to inform the steward that "out of classification" work is needed. Often the steward can get management to pay extra for such work. Keeping an eye open for company attempts to assign "out of classification" work remains one of the steward's key jobs.

Discipline

THE UNION has less clout when it comes to matters of discipline. Under the code worked out by management and union officials, the company "reserves the right to discipline or discharge any employee for just cause." The code covers a multitude of sins. "Gambling, lottery or bookmaking on company premises; possession or use of intoxicating liquors, drugs, or narcotics (including marijuana) on company premises; or reporting to work under the influence of intoxicants, drugs, or narcotics" are cause for discharge. "Indecent remarks," the first time, are cause for reprimand, the second time for three days off without pay, and cause for discharge the third time. But this is not an easy charge to prove; under the code's due process clause, a worker can be disciplined only if the evidence against him is corroborated, and workers almost never testify against each other.

Attendance and the Generation Gap

ABSENTEEISM and tardiness are the biggest problems. Pete Gentile, a young, bearded and baby-faced union activist who came to Republic right from a local high school, estimates that a third of Republic's employees have work-attendance problems. In this matter the union is relatively powerless. Workers are subject to "reprimand and final notice" if they are tardy five times within a 30-day period or absent three working days per month for three consecutive months. If a worker is absent or tardy after receiving final notice, discharge follows.

The reason the code is so tough, Pete explains, is that many people hate the pressure they work under. Young men in particular have discipline problems, Pete told me, because they're "a new breed," unwilling to put up with the company's authority. And since many live at home with their parents, they can afford to stay out when the job gets to them. Pete Elliot, another young steward, disagrees. He believes the young men enjoy their jobs at first; after years of school they're ready to work, enjoy making good money. But the more time they put in the more they hate the "push," and so they find ways to rebel.

Aside from the younger workers' proneness to absenteeism, there is clearly a "generation gap" at Republic Lodge. The older men entered the work force during the Korean War, when the union was new. They fought with police in 1956 on the picket line, and struck again in 1962. That generation—Joe, Geno, Sal and their fellow workers, the commuters from Brooklyn as well as the potato farmers from Long Island—built up a strong institution from scratch. They were born in the 1930s,

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when workers saw unions as their protectors. (Many Lodge leaders came from families where the father or an uncle was a labor activist.) Their daily experience had taught them the need for a union.

Sal Bancheri has seen significant improvements during his 27 years with Republic; supervisors no longer harass men so much; wages have risen from average to good. Sal has a pension, dental and medical plans, and severance pay; his seniority protects him from layoffs and transfers.

But Pete Gentile's peers are less clear about unionism. These youngsters from Long Island's working-class suburbs entered the plant after Republic had won the A–10 contract; they don't understand that their wages and benefits were produced by union struggles. And since they find it's onerous to work on the "cycle," they find it hard to believe things used to be worse.

The generation gap threatens to leave the Lodge with a leadership vacuum when the old-timers retire. Experience in union politics, in dealing with foremen, providing services, cannot easily be replaced. Geno Laferlita, who hopes still to be president of the local when the new breed takes over, is aware of the problem. With the help of Chief Steward Joe D'Anna, Secretary-Treasurer George Bose, and Business Agent Walter Stursberg, Geno cultivates potential leaders. Thus when management tried to punish Pete Gentile for alleged insubordination by shifting him to nights, the union appointed Pete to the labor relations committee, blocking his transfer. This in itself was a small act, but in the world of Republic Lodge it was important; it symbolized the union's commitment to the young workers. The older union leaders reinforce this lesson by seeking out younger workers, conferring with them, advising them. This amounts to an effort by Republic Lodge to pass down its traditions, to socialize a new generation into a culture quite different from that of the hostile world outside.

When I realized what the leadership is up to I was impressed, not only with the enormity of the task, but with the resources the union men bring to it. On their own, they've developed skills in administering, negotiating, in handling grievances and arbitration, in educating and training the younger members. They've also learned a lot about their company and industry. In another union, say the UAW, a local like Republic would get help from regional and national headquarters; but the Lodge has a strong sense of independence, preferring to run its own affairs. In Sweden or Germany, such local union leaders would spend time with officials and staff experts of their labor confederation and party, and so socialist ideology could provide a common bond connecting plant workers with each other and with the wider world.

Somehow Republic Lodge manages without such help. For years its political involvements have been limited; there's been no ideology to reinforce the value of local electoral action. IAM President Wimpisinger's efforts to mobilize the Machinists in a progressive struggle met with initial suspicion, and his attacks on defense spending with skepticism and some hostility.

Is Republic Lodge a model union? Of course not. But it is effective, struggling daily to protect its members. While President Reagan charges that union leaders have lost touch with the rank-and-file, liberal academicians describe the absorption of the working class into a suburban majority, and academic radicals decry the integration of unions into the corporate liberal state, the unionists of Republic Lodge carry on their steady work. Steady and unnoticed. Policing job classifications and overtime assignments gets no ink in the national press, nor air time on the networks, and certainly no mention in high-school textbooks. Unions make news only when they strike, use violence, or are charged with corruption. When unions do their job, their story goes untold. This makes them convenient targets for such politicians as Ronald Reagan, Edward Koch, and Adlai Stevenson III.

The give-back campaigns of corporate management are taking their toll; overseas investment and new technology pose real threats. Still, there is great talent and strength in the unions. Don't count them out. □

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Karl Friedrich Mueller-Reissmann

The Weight of Megastructure

Does It Destroy Our Social Adaptability?

A new issue has been raised in the current debate about nuclear energy. Along with the more tangible and familiar criteria—of safety, economy, ecological and social compatibility—there now is discussion of the industrial nuclear structure's capacity for change and adaptability. The concern here is a need for flexibility in planning and for open-ended options, a variety of sources and supplies—motivated by the worry that dangerous developments might be forced upon us by the very character of nuclear energy.

Nuclear plants, their critics argue, entail inflexibly, tied-down capital investment, and rigid plant construction. Whereas oil-based plants might be converted to coal use in a relatively short time, nuclear plants do not yield to such conversion, cannot be shifted to serve in other, "soft" energy systems—and so are potential "investment ruins." Indeed, nuclear energy systems seem to lead, inevitably, to the development of breeder reactors and plutonium energy.

The focus of this debate is not on whether nuclear energy benefits or harms human life but, very specifically, on these issues: Could we free ourselves, and at what price, of a commitment to nuclear energy systems if they should turn out to be failures? And could we then, quickly enough, find and shift to other energy-supply systems?

This debate tails in with on-going discussions in the field of cybernetics. In (bio)cybernetic terms, "changeability" or "adaptability" imply, as Karl Deutsch has put it, "the capacity for fundamental reform and reorganization of the inner structure and, with it, for fundamental change of outward behavior." And this "changeability" or "adaptability" is part of the basic conditions for survival, for the individual organism as well as for whole societies, in a changeable environment. And when we speak here of the "environment" of our industrial system, we mean to include *both* the sociopolitical and the natural world. We have long failed to realize that our capacity for adaptability and change might be endangered. For we have been shielded by two myths to which we have clung tenaciously: (1) that we humans can master and rule the natural world, and (2) that our own system is superior to all others. Now that these myths are losing credibility, with our various experiences of unexpected reverses, the concept of *the need for adaptability* is taking hold in the general consciousness.

The debate about nuclear energy has sparked an examination of even more fundamental problems and has led some of our contemporaries to air their deep doubts about the viability of our industrial civilization and its concept of constant progress through megatechnology. And here we come to the fundamental question that is the theme of this essay: does not this predominant trend toward an ever-expanding megatechnology itself endanger our society's capacity for adaptability and change? Is it not this unhalting, constant megatechnological growth, producing ever more cumbersome and immovable structures, that

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undermines, almost systematically, the prerequisites for our survival?

This question becomes ever more urgent as we watch the industrial societies' constant megatechnological expansion sparking in turn our rising consumption of natural resources, and so interfering ever more with both the rhythms of the natural and the human sociopolitical worlds. Thus our environment is thrown into conditions of constant change, entailing dangerous instabilities. For no one can doubt any longer that the exhaustion of raw materials, and the limits of the load we can force upon the natural world, will one fine day force us to change our course. Nor can we count any longer on the exploited nations' ever-lasting tolerance of the industrial countries' greed.

In the last decades, we have heard many complaints about the spreading secrecy and opacity in most areas of public life—from areas of administration to those of politics, science, and economy. Democratic citizens everywhere are demanding more openness in all these spheres as the logical precondition for the exercise of their right to share in decision-making. Many experts, however, defend their privilege of secrecy, asking why they should have to inform, and explain to, the general public the complex systems that serve it.

The Megasystem Is Secretive & Uncontrollable

OUR SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS' COMPLEXITY and secretiveness reflects the system's growing uncontrollability, in the cybernetic sense of its "steering ability." Indeed, cyberneticians define our present social system as a "turbulent field." To put the matter simply: as the system grows ever more cumbersome, so grows the difficulty of controlling it. Since we cannot assume that human intelligence will increase with the ever-more complex tasks it must face, we may expect that at some point we will no longer be able to solve our ever-more complex "steering problems." By now it seems that large areas of our industrial society are coming dangerously close to this point. The resulting call for more effective "intelligence amplifiers," in the form of information technology, cannot bring about a fundamental solution—it rather exacerbates the problem. And the experts' use of computers in the handling of complex structures tends to magnify rather than minimize the complexity and cumbersomeness of the tasks at hand.

How can we extricate ourselves from this vicious circle? Only if we stop accepting the constant expansion of our society's complexity as our inevitable, "natural" fate. For this fate is by no means inevitable, and it is quite in the range of human capacity to yearn for and *make* changes. Let us look in this regard to the realm of nature, where we see the larger systems subdivided into smaller (partial) subsystems—subsystems with the ability to prevail and survive. The internal structure of these subsystems may show a high degree of internal interrelation, but their connection to other subsystems outside (within the larger system of which they are a part) are relatively limited. And so, in the natural world, we see partially autonomous substructures (biotopes), which so are relatively shielded against disturbances in other substructures of the total system. Malfunctions, even catastrophes, in one biotope usually do not (and if they do, only moderately) imperil the stability of the system as a whole.

We human beings, with our endowment of intelligence, can overcome or bypass natural barriers. And so, in order to increase our efficiency, we have created megastructures with far-flung, *interdependent* networks of substructures. The basic principle guiding these structures is one of differentiation or specialization (division of labor). This differentiation entails the performance of specialized (sub)tasks and capabilities, which are extricated and isolated from the original unified connection. In our human industrial society, such substructures are organized in new spatial units that remain strongly dependent upon one another; for only together can they fulfill the integral function of the whole system. The more highly developed the various substructures' functional differentiation and specialization, the closer will be their connections to other substructures—in their common "structural communities of fate." These "structural communities of fate" are constantly expanding, encompassing more and more *dependent* subsystems. Consequently the

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ultimate stage of this development would be a worldwide maxistructure, in which the functioning of each substructure depends upon the functioning of all the others. Thus the failure of one substructure would affect (almost) all others—and indeed the whole worldwide maxistructure. It is questionable that the system will ever reach this level of "perfection"—but we are moving far in this direction (under the motto: international division of labor).

The structures thus created by our industrial society's system of division of labor mirror in some way the structures that exist in the natural world. But there are crucial differences: while the substructures in the natural world are characterized by *loose* external relations to other substructures and highly complex interrelations within their internal parts, the opposite holds true for our human, industrial societal system, with its specialization and division of labor. Thus we are experiencing a clear structural shift toward a preponderance of long-distance connections, to the detriment of local connections and interrelations. This shift now is prevalent in almost all realms of our societal life.

Let us take, for example, our traffic system. Local streets, in the past, were above all thought of and planned as the communal space, connecting homes and families with each other and serving the neighborhood. To the people of the past, their local street's function in facilitating transit was of secondary importance. Today, surely, we plan our streets most of all to accommodate and fit in with the larger road and traffic system. Our streets, foremost, are means of getting to where we have to go—to work, school, shopping areas, to the larger road system. So our new streets often inhibit rather than foster neighborhood life. And this fragmentation of our cities, this breakup of our neighborhoods is the darker side of our planned, efficient traffic net. Another obvious example that fosters this process is our communications system—and much has been said on the subject in recent years. At the expense of time allotted for local subjects (about which we might be able to do something and in which we might be intimately involved), we get lengthy reports about distant places, news we usually take in passively and are unable to affect. And all this news comes to us in our homes over our TV sets, often blotting out family conversation and neighborhood interaction.

Despite mounting criticism these trends continue—leading us toward our society's ever larger, more complex, and centralized organization. By now the ever-growing mass of our system's interdependent substructures has become too cumbersome for radical change. And so, fearing that change might set off uncontrollable instability, responsible political leaders continue to favor the status quo—even if they are convinced of the need for substantial change.

We might be spurred on to maintain, or regain, our adaptability by upholding "the principle of small, autonomous circuits and finely meshed structures." Thus motivated, we might reorder our system by giving, even on the lowest hierarchical level, maximum autonomy to each subsystem in our society. Thus the larger, superior "megasystem" organs would act merely as guides in relation to the subsystems, aiding them where needed in the performance of their tasks. This principle already finds political expression in the call for decentralization that now issues from the ecological movement.

The System's Rigidity: Materials & Means Are Not Transferable

"STRUCTURALIZATION" here means: to set various materials or informational elements into a particular relation to each other, and so to tie these elements into a newly created structure. The formation of such new structures is possible only as long as there are still unattached elements available to form them—or if there are elements that are capable of becoming detached and freed from older, existing structures and thus can be brought into a new relation to other free elements. But the more specialized the task an element performs within a given structure, the more inextricably it is tied into it.

Similar conditions prevail in the natural, biological realm: the more specialized a species, and the more it is dependent on very specific living conditions and tasks, the less its chances for adaptability and survival.

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We humans, with our ability to use tools and materials, are less closely tied to our natural environment and, in principle, can extend specialization further than other species. Yet in general, in times of upheaval, persons with a good, many-sided, all-around education have a better chance of adapting to new situations than those who are highly specialized. The same holds true for the nonhuman, material, or informational elements or substructures in an industrial megastructural system. Whereas simple tools, for instance, can be used in many different ways, specialized machinery can only serve one single purpose: as, for example, some huge pieces of machinery whose single use is the production of certain parts of the automobile.

Within this framework of ever-increasing unadaptable specialization, a number of our society's subsystems (or functions) have reached extremes rendering them especially detrimental to the whole society's adaptability. Foremost among these are the functions (or subsystems) of coordination (administration), of transportation (and traffic control), and of protection (surveillance to insure safety and control). Although in principle these functions need not be unadaptive, because of today's conditions they balk adaptivity to other purposes. Many highways, for example, with the changing transportation patterns and dwindling fuel supplies, might end up as useless, lost "investment ruins." The same holds true for the super-formalized and -specialized instruments of "applied knowledge"—the computer systems serving in our administrative subsystems. At present, ever more human intelligence is drafted into such potential dead-end channels, away from its proper function: creativity. Indeed, the systems themselves present organizing problems of such enormity that technical improvements are usually viewed as interference. Therefore, in order to keep the megasystem working, it has become essential to put a brake on all technical innovation. Indeed, the administrators of our megatechnological system find it difficult to absorb even the psychological irritation caused by such, capitalwise puny, efforts. We can see that these huge concentrations of capital and information, required to feed the megatechnological system, leave little room for the relatively modest investments needed to pursue small and medium-sized alternative projects. Here, as in other areas, our pluralist society is not quite so pluralist. Speaking of pluralism, our all-encompassing systems of transportation and communications guarantee that life even in remote corners proceeds according to our industrial society's uniform patterns. (In contrast, natural systems aim for diversity and "to spread the risk" throughout a wide range of variants; one of nature's methods, after all, to secure genetic variety is sexual propagation.)

This ever-increasing leveling of life styles in the course of industrialization ought to provoke our concern. For, in order to preserve our long-range capacity for change and adaptability, we must choose a path of progress that not only tolerates but *encourages* diversity of values and life styles.

Society's Adaptability

ALL THIS POINTS to a basic question: is it right to apply here principles of the biological, ecological, "natural" realm as criteria for human societal structures? Let me stress that there can be no question of elevating nature, as a whole, to the model for human societies. Nature knows neither compassion nor solidarity, and—in human terms—conducts the process of adaptivity and survival with pitiless cruelty: unless they find an "ecological niche," the less adaptable fall by the wayside.

The question, however, that society must face is whether it can continue to violate without repercussions those rules that govern the natural systems' ability to adapt. In the long run, it seems to me, human societal systems must stay in line and harmony with the basic laws that guide other (self-organizing) living systems. To put it more cautiously (and leaving room for human and humane adjustments), our society cannot blatantly flout nature's guidelines.

To speak more concretely: human societies will always orient individuals and groups to perform tasks within the framework of larger, societal tasks and goals, upholding the principle of functional differentiation (the division of labor) and thereby raising the level of effi-

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ciency. But efficiency and specialization cannot be extended indefinitely. The survival of a human societal system, like that of any living system in the realm of nature, entails multidimensional tasks. A one-sided orientation that ignores the *limits* of efficiency's value endangers the whole system's adaptability, and so also efficiency itself. (The huge megasystem, for example, will be prone to "loss of friction" and to accidents.)

Human societies, therefore, must be concerned not only with the whole system's capacity to survive but equally with that of the individual. And so the society's increased productivity, brought about by division of labor, must benefit both society as a whole and the individual within it, assuming, at least, a halfway fair distribution of wealth. But the concept of the larger human community, which is inherent in the division of labor, and that of an interdependence of individual and society are in themselves humane values worth defending. The human being as *zoon politicon* finds fulfillment not as a lone wolf but as co-actor, co-worker, co-citizen, and as a member in the human community as a whole. And if we take this anthropological rule seriously we simply must stop extending specialization and the division of labor indefinitely, must stop degrading individuals to a point where they feel like cogs in a bewildering megamachine. There is indeed a causal connection between the increasing meaninglessness of work and the individual's lack of identification with the community. It surfaces as aggression against society in the form of criminal behavior, or as resigned flight from society into alcohol, drugs, and suicide. Men and women will act as responsible members of their community only as long as they feel they have an integral part in it. To avoid disintegration, we must take care to divert society's course, away from the present one-dimensional efficiency-oriented megastructural development. We must steer a new course, not toward islands of primitive forms of production and life styles, but under the aegis of balanced and moderate guidelines, welcoming diversity, and taking into account both efficiency and adaptability.

DECISIONS—be they political, economic, or technological—are rarely made in a neutral, clean-slate, unprejudiced atmosphere but usually against a background of earlier already enacted decisions. Consequently, decision-makers are biased against new alternatives and fundamental revisions. So this bias protects the status quo. It springs from a universal human mechanism of psychic inertia, which affects our megatechnological system most gravely, for two reasons. First, because of the far-reaching goals and large means at stake in today's major decisions, decision-makers are compelled to uphold earlier decisions. Second, the long-range time frame (often a decade) needed to execute today's major projects must in turn extend the time frame in which decisions, and the bias in their favor, retain effect. There is yet another psychological mechanism that affects our system's decision-makers: the pressure to conform to their social group, and the sanctions that might result from bucking it and making nonconformist decisions (loss of professional prestige, of chances for advancement, even of the job). Few people are prepared to take such risks. The more highly specialized a person's professional group, the stronger is the pressure to conform. (What are the professional chances, for instance, of today's nuclear physicist who falls out of favor in his nuclear field?)

Consequently, it is the "outsider"—with loose connections within the system—in whom we might place our best hope. Let's not underestimate the outsiders' potential: they can more readily experiment with structural elements and rearrange them in new patterns, and they are freer to propose and champion a new course.

Pseudoadaptability—Via Use of Power & Violence

MOST DISQUIETING perhaps is the realization that the waning of our society's adaptability proceeds largely unnoticed, behind a smoke screen of apparently constant structural changes. Are we not suffering now, because of structural change, of "structural" unemployment? And is our time not concerned with "dynamism," "pluralism," "mobility," and "flexibility"? But today's harsh adjustments are imposed only upon individuals and minor

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structures on too low a level to affect the whole system's adaptability. Yet it is the system as a whole that must undergo radical restructuring in order to adapt to the worldwide ecological and sociopolitical changes. We might indeed say that these adjustments imposed on individuals and substructures are *shielding* the total megasystem from the needed radical structural change! Paradoxically, the preservation of the system's huge rigidity requires these constant "little" efforts of adaptation at the bottom.

The megasystem copes with minor difficulties by adding further substructures and "structural frills." Indeed, its cumbersome complexity is self-perpetuating. This constant flight into ever greater complexity is the megasystem's attempt at pseudoadaptability. So far, it's a cheap substitute for real adaptation. Our present political scene provides vivid examples. Why risk surgery when the consequences are incalculable? And so we're muddling through.

But a society like our own can compensate for its dwindling adaptability in still another way. It can exert ever more violence and power in dealing with the natural and the sociopolitical world. In regard to the natural environment, this has been the traditional course all along in the modern era. Today, finally, people are beginning to see that this exploitation means the depletion and destruction of systems upon whose survival indeed depends our own. The use of power and violence, in the long run, can neither prevent the drying up of the by now already limited supply of raw materials, nor can it assure the stability of supplier countries. Yet despite all rational counterarguments, the more power a society thinks it has, the greater its temptation to make use of it.

A Ray of Hope . . .

TO SUMMARIZE our thesis: the process set in motion by the industrial societies' system of megastructures creates ominous environmental dislocations. It also undermines, systematically, the society's ability to cope with these conditions by way of the needed structural change. This, in turn, poses the question whether our recognition of such need for change and its concrete political feasibility will come in time to be able to halt the process. It is doubtful that the ecological movement will gain sufficient momentum and influence fast enough to bring about the necessary radical change of direction, before it's too late.

But there are some signs that might give us hope. There are the various attempts, by a variety of groups, to break away from the megastructural form and to try out new paths. We now see groups that are exploring alternatives in life styles, technology, agriculture. Perhaps all these various pioneers will form the nuclei around which a new ecological society can crystallize.

Translated from the German by GEORGE ECKSTEIN *and* SARAH HERZFELD □

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Boris Souvarine

Panaït Istrati — Portrait of a Rebel

One mid-October evening in 1927, three friends were dining at the Casenave Restaurant in the Rue Boissy-d'Anglas in Paris. They were Christian Rakovsky, the Soviet ambassador to France, Panaït Istrati, the Rumanian who wrote in French and had been a house painter, hobo, and wandering photographer before turning storyteller and winning fame with his first novel, *Kyra Kyralina*, and myself. In the following pages I want to set down my memories of these vanished friends, and tell the unknown story behind Istrati's three volumes about Soviet communism: the first, *Vers l'autre flamme: après seize mois dans l'URSS*; the second, *Soviets 1929*; the third, *La Russie nue* (all Paris, Editions Rieder, 1929).

The two Rumanians—for Rakovsky (later a Soviet citizen of the Ukraine) was also a Rumanian national though a Bulgarian by birth—were to leave for Moscow the following day. The ambassador was recalled by his government because or under the pretext of having sparked a furious campaign against himself in the Paris press. Istrati, as a well-known writer and proclaimed Communist sympathizer, had been invited to the Soviet Union to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the October Revolution.

Enviously I listened as my two friends talked about their forthcoming trip. I had been excluded from the Communist party and the Third International in 1925, a year after Lenin's death, on charges of nonconformism and failure to observe party discipline. And I had been given to understand that I should give up all hope of ever returning to Russia, a land that I love and whose fate has always deeply concerned me. Rakovsky, usually a brilliant conversationalist, soon grew pensive, silent, at times wholly distracted. He seemed engrossed in thoughts he couldn't share with us, and only seldom did he abandon them to join our conversation.

Istrati, generally voluble, was positively euphoric, even exalted at the thought of his long-desired pilgrimage to the Mecca of communism; he fairly brimmed with enthusiasm for the revolution's radiant future. Though not a party member, he shared certain then popular notions about "the light from the East" simply because he detested bourgeois society—its inherent evils, its loss of moral credibility, its responsibility for the horrors and consequences of the First World War.

Istrati had scarcely any knowledge of Marxism nor any concern about his ignorance, for his feelings responded to the purpose of the doctrine and his instincts put him on the side of the poor, the exploited, the rebellious. His personal ideology was really a humanistic anarchism, devoid of theoretical underpinnings. He knew nothing of the Soviet regime but its hostility to capitalism. Though he'd never have been able to join any sort of collectivity, and it would have been impossible for such an independent mind to survive Soviet regimentation, he then even hoped to emigrate to Russia. I didn't try to dissuade him, for I knew that people learn only by experience.

Lost in the joy of his imminent departure, Istrati seemed unaware of the contrast between him and his traveling companion. He knew nothing of the political drama in which Rakovsky was engaged, a drama already large with

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historic tragedy, in which the recall of a Soviet ambassador from France was an almost insignificant detail.

Lenin's death had created a momentary power vacuum in Moscow, and the two major factions within the party leadership were wrangling for supremacy and the state's absolute power over an enormous passive population. For the first time and close to the centers of power, a large, legitimate opposition had developed that was criticizing the oligarchy grouped around Stalin, with Leon Trotsky its foremost spokesman. Naturally, the name of Trotsky's old friend Rakovsky appeared on all the manifestoes, critiques, and proposals set forth by this tendency. Thus Rakovsky found himself implicated in a struggle that the general party membership did not understand, and of which the Soviet people as a whole knew even less—it was a conflict intelligible only to the initiated, of which Istrati had only a vague and indifferent notion.

It was plain to me, the outcome of this power struggle was what obsessed Rakovsky on that last evening we spent together. The ambassador, a disciplined party militant, strictly followed the injunction not to divulge any "family secrets" to one who was not a party member, even if he was a proclaimed Communist. I followed his example, for though excommunicated and vilified, I was still considered a comrade by the factions of the Communist opposition. Neither Rakovsky nor I then were about to chill a neophyte's enthusiasm by revealing any bitter truths about a regime of which he had formed only a cursory, exalted, and optimistic notion. Besides, the Trotskyite opposition was still in solidarity with the regime and its principles; it merely deplored certain abuses and proposed certain reforms. I no longer shared their simplistic and impoverished pseudo-Marxism in which the letter kills the spirit, but this in no way diminished my personal friendship with certain Trotskyites nor, later, my sense of solidarity with their misfortune.

Rakovsky and Istrati left together the following day—October 15—and their paths, like their destinies, diverged shortly after their arrival in Moscow, where clamorous preparations for the commemoration of "The Great October" were in full swing. Not a soul from the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs awaited the ambassador at the railway station. Rakovsky understood; Istrati was dumfounded. Somebody hailed a taxi going downtown. The next day Istrati was taken under the wing of the Voks (Society for Foreign Cultural Exchange), which was in fact one of the many subsidiaries of the GPU or secret police. Thus he was snatched up by the state propaganda apparatus—was officially welcomed, feted, flattered and spoiled, and dragged to endless receptions and meetings. Meanwhile the forsaken Rakovsky had rejoined his comrades of the opposition faction that called itself "Bolshevik-Leninist"—already a harassed minority engaged in an uncertain and soon hopeless struggle.

On his return to France in 1929, Istrati was to tell—in his wonderfully lively way, almost panting, and often interspersing his story with exclamations and reflections naïve or shrewd, frequently contradictory and sometimes ambiguous—of his 16-month sojourn in the Soviet Union and his trek into every corner of that land (his travel book has refreshed my memory of his oral account). No other visitor, to my knowledge, has followed so extensive an itinerary and seen so much, or inquired so earnestly into what he saw. He did not travel alone, but was escorted all the while by zealous party hacks, sly interpreters, "tails," police spies, and informers of every kind.

I'd given him a letter of introduction to my friend Pierre Pascal who'd been living in Russia for some ten years and was the finest observer of Russian life one might wish for—the best informed and the most competent in matters Soviet; which is not meant to suggest that he tried to "win over" anybody who showed up, for he knew by experience that everyone must discover the truth for himself. At Pascal's home Istrati met several members of the Roussakov family, whose eldest daughter had married Victor Serge, and whose youngest would one day marry Pascal. Soon after his arrival Istrati had also made friends with another noted guest in Moscow, Nikos Kazantzakis, who had been invited as a pro-

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claimed Communist sympathizer and "friend of the U.S.S.R." The two Balkan writers hit it off and became inseparable traveling companions. Joining a small official safari, they were duly escorted by ingenuous interpreters and hardened police spies across the Ukraine and the Caucasus.

Thanks to advance billing the two were everywhere received with great aplomb: meetings and speechifying in their honor, exaltations of Soviet *dostizhenya* (achievements), exchanges of pledges of eternal friendship and solidarity. Istrati's eulogistic powers never failed, and he praised his hosts, whose largesse is proverbial, to the skies.

Toward the end of December 1927, Istrati and Kazantzakis, eager to visit Greece for a while, wrote Stalin a letter: "We are going to Greece to proclaim our enthusiasm about what we have seen in the U.S.S.R." In Athens, however, their subversive declarations excited a hostile reaction. Istrati came back to Russia in March of 1928; Kazantzakis rejoined him in April. Soon they returned to their exploration of the vast Russian lands, from Murmansk to Archangel; they even managed to visit the Solovki Islands, which had been converted into a political detention camp, without noticing anything unusual. Thence Istrati went on to the Crimea where he hoped to relax a while.

Back in Moscow in May 1928, he met and exchanged platitudes with Maxim Gorky. On August 1 he left for Moldavia, the pseudo-autonomous Rumanian-speaking republic. By the end of the month he went north again to Nizhni-Novgorod (now Gorky), then made a spellbinding trip down the Volga in a luxury steamer, visited Kazan, Samara, Saratov, and Stalingrad.

And then, on September 18, Istrati arrived at Astrakhan where the unhappy Rakovsky, exiled, ill, and in utter disgrace, was vegetating in a cabin in a pestilential swamp infested with mosquitoes and malaria. This fortuitous meeting between an unblemished neophyte and a decorated veteran of communism is most revealing: the two friends seemed to vie as much in doctrinal squabbles as in mutual incomprehension. But perhaps the incomprehension was not really so symmetrical, for one of the two was no dupe.

Rakovsky had kept on toeing the orthodox line, unfazed even by his exclusion from the party, and did not care to speak truthfully to an amateur Communist who continued to persist in the illusions and clichés of the official ideology, precisely as if he'd seen nothing in the 11 months he had spent in the U.S.S.R. Indeed, every time since their departure from Paris that Istrati had put a penetrating and hence indiscreet question to Rakovsky, the former Soviet bigwig had dodged it with a joke or a red herring. And while Istrati was sitting among the upstarts of the Bolshevik oligarchy and their complaisant guests in Red Square watching the grandiose anniversary parade, Rakovsky and some of his comrades of the opposition were being abused and manhandled as they tried to bear witness to the presence of dissident opinion in the crowd; for Stalin had marshaled against them a goon squad in the classic style. It was a rehearsal for the exclusion of the opposition from the forthcoming Fifteenth Party Congress—for what Trotsky was to call a "new Thermidor."

In December 1927, while the wildly euphoric Istrati was returning from the Caucasus, this congress was in session in Moscow, the unanimity of its 1,669 delegates guaranteed in advance, for Stalin, who had handpicked and trained them to accept, acclaim, and obey him. Mounting the podium Rakovsky was snubbed like a gate-crasher amid jeers and insults, heckled at each sentence and then at each word, and finally hustled away. It was as if, motivated by some obscure temerity, he had willingly locked himself in a pillory. In the end his opposition faction reaffirmed its loyalty to the party, admitted its failure of discipline, and affirmed that it "had no disagreement with the party on any matter of principle." And so at Astrakhan, where the two friends ran into each other by coincidence, Rakovsky persisted in his stereotypical conformism, denying any vexatious evidence that he might be other than totally loyal to an all-powerful, all-knowing party. Is it surprising then that the politically virginal Istrati went on pinning his hopes on fairy tales? Nobody had opened his eyes (despite his freedom to speak privately, and in their language, with Rumanian and Greek workers).

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Astrakhan, "the putrid city. Mosquitoes everywhere. Plague, malaria, cholera," writes Istrati. In the best hotel the beds are crawling with lice, and Istrati shrilly protests. Out of nowhere appears Rakovsky, "oddly enlarged, swollen, spongy"—stricken with malaria and some other disease that cannot be cured in Astrakhan. He denies the presence of lice: "No, no, there are virtually no lice here," he insists; for lice don't figure in the party dogma. He praises the public works being undertaken in the region, the same region that Istrati, in his notebook, describes as "a pestilential sewer." Though regarded as a dissident, Rakovsky still toes the line, now the "left" line, as his faction desires. Nothing is more important than his friendship for Trotsky and his solidarity with Trotsky's people.

Having traveled through the Transcaucasus and made friends not only with all sorts of local notables but also, albeit in secret, with simple people who received him with their proverbial hospitality, Istrati returned to southern Russia via the Black Sea. In December 1928 he spent three weeks in Kiev, where one of his books was being turned into a movie. By the end of the year he was back in Moscow, dead tired and beset by a host of contradictory feelings.

He had seen, heard, and thought much, yet still he clung to his loyalty to "the Soviet experiment." Though continuing to bask in abstract principles that ignored the palpable realities, he had experienced so much that was contrary to the reigning theories that his mind was sorely troubled. He believed in telling the truth, both to combat the depravity of the party-state apparatus and to hasten the triumph of justice.

For the fact was that during his long sojourn that was now coming to a close, hundreds of humble working people had drawn him aside to reveal some bitter truth when they sensed that no one was watching. Istrati knew little Russian, but many Rumanians and Greeks had approached him in the southern Ukraine, where they are numerous. He also had gathered many confidential personal accounts in the Moldavian Republic and in Odessa, whose most populous quarter is the Rumanian-speaking Moldavanka. Many of his wretched informants, attracted by his fame, wished primarily to mooch cash off him, and he willingly helped them, for since Stalin had seized power, foreign "fellow travelers" received large royalties on the Russian translations of their works. Then, too, after their return from Athens, Istrati and Kazantzakis had no longer been perpetually escorted by the GPU; left to themselves, they could more easily contact ordinary people.

As Istrati's malaise of disenchantment increased, Kazantzakis persevered in his panegyrics of the Stalinist order—precisely as ten years later he would celebrate the Franco dictatorship in Spain. Granted, in 1927–28 the Soviet regime was not yet what it was to become in the 1930s. Istrati's Soviet stay preceded by several years the horrors of farm collectivization and the attendant cruelties of Stalin's five-year plans. Our travelers could still meet sincere Communists who gave them grounds not to despair. This sort of person was soon to be a vanishing species, but then Stalin's drastic purge of Lenin's party had only just begun. At this early date there were still some party members who revealed their misgivings to Istrati, and their belief that Trotsky and his followers were the promise of a better era.

In brief, our Panaït, drawn in different directions, faithful to his old convictions yet inspired by the duty to bear witness, still thought it possible to reconcile these two needs. In his desire to make a clean breast of the matter he was simple enough to write two successive letters to the GPU in which he repledged his loyalty to the Soviet revolution, while also requesting permission to tell the truth about the evils of the regime, with the aim of promoting its reform along the broad lines of Marxism-Leninism. He went so far as to enjoin the GPU to stop persecuting Trotsky and his cohorts, and to allow secret balloting in party and trade-union elections. One can picture the contemptuous hilarity these letters must have inspired at GPU headquarters.

In late December Istrati went to Leningrad to spend some time with his friends the Roussakovs—as he thought, for the last time. Roussakov was an elderly laborer and father of six. The family lived in one of those capacious

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apartments of old St. Petersburg, but nine family members were crammed into four rooms, the other six rooms being occupied by other members of the lodging cooperative. Just as he was about to leave Moscow in February Istrati heard some distressing news. An aggressive party woman had been underhandedly trying to secure a room in the apartment; trying to force her way in, she had gone so far as to make a scene there, and to slap Papa Liubov Roussakov, one of the sweetest, kindest, and most charming persons in the world. *Pravda* then ran an article by her, a tissue of lies in which she demanded the arrest of Papa Roussakov, whom she slandered in terms strong enough to suggest he deserved the death penalty.

Istrati left no stone unturned in his attempt to save this family from destruction. At last he understood that such a case was neither local nor episodic, but rather a microcosm revealing an implacable bureaucracy ready and able to chew up innocent people. He tried to intervene in person, by phone, by telegraph, by letter; he shouted as loud as he could, went to every competent authority, even to Kalinin, the president of the Republic, to demand justice. One must read the chapter he wrote on "The Roussakov Affair" to judge, as he at last came to judge, the regime that still dared call itself "Soviet."

Istrati grew disillusioned and disappointed. At last he gave up thinking in bogus formulas about the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Yet his shallow political grounding, essentially that of a roving autodidact, did not allow him to see through the clichés that the Trotskyite opposition had inculcated in him, clichés about the "class struggle" (in the absence of genuine classes or of a genuine class struggle in the U.S.S.R.), clichés about the harmfulness of the bureaucracy while the Party *über alles* is in fact the very essence of any actual Soviet state.

Istrati returned to Paris on February 15, 1929, exhausted, ill, disoriented, no longer knowing to whom or to what to devote himself: he could neither speak nor keep his silence, neither write nor abstain from writing. The day after his return he came to see me, and began to relate his story.

Fifty years later I cannot recall Panaït's rather disconnected narrative word for word—always sincere, often told in images, not always coherent, at times contradictory. His interspersed exclamations and rages betrayed his hatred of injustice and his compassion for its victims. All this is recorded in his book *Vers l'autre flamme*, and in his later writings. At this early stage he really was at loose ends. He had borne brilliant witness in favor of the pseudosocialist regime, and now in anguish he was wondering if he could take it all back and still be understood by his audience. In the end he was to explain what had befallen him in a very convincing way, in an interview with a comrade, Magdeleine Marx, published in a Parisian socialist periodical (*Contre le courant*, no. 23) under the title "Panaït Istrati Speaks." There he offered an excellent explanation of his initial motivation and subsequent about-face: "It was only during the last three months of my stay . . . that the spell was broken, that the veil was rent, that the real situation, plain to any man of good faith, was revealed to me in all its cruelty."

Istrati's dismay reached its keenest pitch when he received an incredible letter from Romain Rolland enjoining him not to publish the two letters he had written to the GPU. Fifty years later I cannot reread this letter without stupefaction: Rolland found Istrati's two pathetically naïve letters "magnificent," but added that "you should not seek to have them published right now, and certainly not by Boris's or Serge's friends." And he added, "These pages are sacred. They ought to be preserved in the annals of the eternal Revolution, in its visitors' book [sic]. We love you the more for having written them. But don't publish them!" And on and on it went.

In other words: don't tell the truth, the public needs to be fooled, the people need a religion, the proletariat's noggin has to be stuffed with the right ideas. Istrati went to pieces. It had been Rolland who, after his attempted suicide in 1921, had saved him from despair and by his protection and encouragement had made him a writer, and a famous one into the bargain. How then to defy so categori-

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cal a prohibition? I then witnessed what Victor Hugo called "a tempest in a cranium."

In those days we lived quite near each other, each in a long alley off the Avenue des Ternes. Panaït had rented a large and nearly empty studio, in which he paced up and down making great expressive gestures. We saw each other almost every day and spoke of nothing but his Soviet experience, of the book he was supposed to write but wasn't writing. "I can't, I just can't!" he would cry. "I can't go against Romain Rolland's advice." And he would stride about in all directions, waving his arms like a windmill. I understood his distress and did not seek to influence him, contrary to Rolland's apprehensions. Everyone must make his own way according to his own lights. But our endless conversations all turned upon the same subject; and as at that time I was carefully monitoring the Soviet press, I could always soothe him by citing facts that showed the real condition of the workers under the pretended "dictatorship of the proletariat." Despite all that he already knew, Istrati was appalled over and over again, while I for my part was unaware of the effect produced on his mind by my eloquent newspaper clippings.

One fine day he said, "Know what? I asked Victor [Serge] to put together a clipping file for me with a lot of varied information that he's mentioned to me and that I'd like to study. He's compiled all the material now, I've paid him, and since I've got a contract with Rieder but can't write myself, I'm going to publish this dossier under my own name. It'll be called *Soviets 1929*."

"You're crazy," I replied. "That's the most cockeyed idea I've ever heard of. The public wants *your* version of the events, it recognizes your style, your verve, it doesn't want some dry dossier."

He stuck to his guns and we quarreled cordially, each harping on the same themes. The following day the argument started over.

Poor Panaït had turned into a broken record, and so had I. Fortunately he had a way of digressing, or suddenly laughing aloud; then he would fall back into melancholy and begin to pity the oppressed and damn their oppressors. Often, all at once, he would be reminded of something in his past, perhaps in his childhood, and the temptation to tell a good anecdote or joke was always irresistible. . . . But when he spoke of his social and political experiences he was serious to the point of anguish.

At that time, as I've said, I attentively followed the Soviet press: not only *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, whose last page occasionally furnished important information to which diplomats and non-Soviet journalists didn't pay the slightest heed, but also *Trud*, the *Pravda* for youth; I read *Vetehernaya Moskva, Rabotehaya Gazyeta, Byednota, Krasnaya Gazyeta, Zarya Vostoka,* the Kharkov *Proletarian*, and at times still other newspapers. From these papers I culled rich and various documentation that answered precisely to Panaït's needs. He listened eagerly to my news summaries. One day he suddenly jumped up, paced with great strides for a few moments back and forth, stopped short in front of me, and fixed me with a commanding look. "Know what?" he said. "*You're* going to write that book!"

"You're batty," I replied as I recovered from my astonishment. . . . Day after day now each of us merely repeated this old refrain. Soon summer was in the air, and our friends were packing to leave town. Panaït grew restless, he too wanted to go off somewhere. One day he said to me point-blank, "I've had enough of your clowning. Here's some money, go to the Riviera and write the book!" I said, "You're an idiot." He said, "You're a clown," and the squabble would have begun afresh if I hadn't had the bright idea of saying, "I've nothing to wear anyway down there but my heavy Moscow suit." Panaït of course was ready. "There's a summer suit waiting at the tailor's. After you pick it up you'll go down to the Riviera and write the book. Six months after publication date I'll announce that you're the author."

He was sure he had me; and in truth I felt a bit giddy. I knew of a cheap, quiet inn at Carqueiranne, in the Var, beside the sea. And I *did* have so much material. Shouldn't I put it to use?

Yet in the end I refused. Panaït was furious, we quarreled pointlessly some more, and finally I said, "Listen, I'll compile another dossier for you like the one you got from Victor.

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But on one condition, Panaït: that you write the damnable thing yourself with your very own ink. . . ." Istrati was not one to give in easily, and the quarrel went on. One morning I looked in on him and he seemed calm, radiant. "I've got the answer," he said. "Three books! Mine, yours, and Victor's clipping file. I'll publish all three. Well?"

"You really do have a taste for the far-fetched, don't you?" I replied. "Three books, of which two will be nothing more than dry-as-dust compilations. . . . But compilations aren't books. The whole idea's preposterous." At this Panaït grew red in the face. "I don't give a damn what you think!" he thundered. "I've got a contract with Rieder and they'll publish whatever I write! I'm going to write to Robert-france now telling him I'll do my book with two collaborators, and I'll explain why I need them. Okay?"

Still I demurred, pointing out how makeshift such a work would seem. Yet in the end I yielded, sensible of Panaït's surrender to my main point, namely that he write his own book as the extraordinary personal story of a Communist who had lost his illusions. I also expected him to realize with time that though he might comb through our clipping-files to great advantage, he could scarcely publish them raw. Now all the years I had devoted to monitoring the Soviet press could be put to use. Besides, I was broke and out of a job. And there was the Mediterranean.

A few days later we parted. I left for Carqueiranne with a suitcase full of Soviet clippings. My little inn was tidy, discreet, quiet, ideal for work. My friend Jean Bernier, who knew of my project, joined me for my entire stay. Every evening he would read what I'd written that day, encouraging me with his words and expressive gestures. I had no way of knowing that ten years later he would support Hitler, who would then be Stalin's ally, just as Kazantzakis would heap praises on General Franco. Well, politics makes strange bedfellows. As my work drew to a close I wondered what to call my press summary. Bernier suggested: *La Russie nue*. I didn't particularly like it, but I couldn't find anything better. I decided to let Panaït decide. He accepted the title. The book came out in December, after the two others.

I didn't read *Soviets 1929* till it was out. To my great surprise, it wasn't at all the compilation of documents Panaït had prepared me for, though it did contain important documents, but a text written in the first person and signed "Istrati." This book expounded the broad lines of the Trotskyite thesis: against the growing and abusive authoritarianism of the bureaucracy; for the restoration of democratic norms within the party; against the prosperity allowed wealthy peasants, etc. But in essence nothing distinguished it from official Soviet dogma. As the Trotskyites themselves had affirmed at the party's congress of 1927, "We have no disagreement with the party on any matter of principle." The focus was still "the proletariat" and the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—that is, official fictions. Some sort of simulacrum of democracy was accepted for the party but not for the working masses. Secret balloting was rejected. Bukharin was attacked for encouraging the peasants to get rich; Trotsky had said this long before Istrati. Even the scandalous trial of the engineers from the Shakhti coal-basin, that sinister miscarriage of justice, was taken seriously in *Soviets 1929*.

I wondered if Istrati had even read the transcript of that trial. Maybe he had, but it wouldn't have made much difference, because he wouldn't have read it very carefully: the absence of logic had never discomforted him, he just gave his temperament free run. Once he had written, "I suppose I've never really grown up." As for the bureaucracy, which he denounced, what was it really but the party itself, the selfsame party of which Trotsky had written, "No one questions the party's will. The party is always right. In fact, being right means being on the party's side, because history has closed its doors on all other ways of being right."

My impersonal press summary was entirely different, essentially a collection of undeniable facts culled from official sources. It composed a picture of Soviet society that refuted all the platitudes about the regime. The cuttings were

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selected for their generally revelatory quality. They contradicted Lenin's theory about the withering away of the state and the withering away of the suppression of the police, the standing army, and the bureaucracy—also his theory of the freedom of the press. They proved that Soviet praxis had betrayed the program of the October Revolution. Lenin had promised that "the struggle of parties to win power will take place peacefully within the soviets," while already Bukharin and Tomsky were declaring that "With us, one party has power, the rest are in prison." Echoing Lenin, *Izvestia* confirmed that "the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . is a power bound by no law." All this was recorded in my book.

Meanwhile Istrati had published "The Roussakov Affair" in *La Nouvelle Revue Française* (it reappeared in *Vers l'autre flamme*, Istrati's personal volume of our Soviet trilogy). The piece produced a sensation with the reading public and an outcry in the Stalinist press. But Istrati cherished illusions about its ultimate effect: a great deal more would have been required to unsettle a public opinion intoxicated by the unrelenting propaganda of the Communist fronts. As for the outcry in the Stalinist press, it was particularly hate-filled, indeed saturated with personal abuse, in the true Stalinist style. The crowning infamy was perpetrated by Henri Barbusse, that whore of the Soviet machine, who wrote a nauseating apologia for Stalin.

But Istrati's cruellest ordeal was his rupture with Romain Rolland, whose conduct, though hardly as low as Barbusse's, was vile and deplorable. The moral and intellectual collapse of this formerly individualist thinker who had embraced Stalinism became plain in (among other documents) a letter to Jean Guéhenno where he wrote that the coauthors of the Soviet trilogy were "hiding under Istrati's mantle." Istrati's mantle was scarcely that, as I have explained in these pages. Other passages of Rolland's letter were utterly base.

The problem was that Istrati venerated Rolland: "I am his creature," he used to say. . . . Thus the break-up was heartrending for Panaït. It was not merely a matter of Rolland's stand on *Vers l'autre flamme*, for his very adherence to Stalinism is one of that period's great enigmas.

The only volume of the trilogy that continued to attract attention and controversy was the first one, *Vers l'autre flamme*, by Istrati himself. The other two more or less vanished. It is not my intention here to dwell on the reception of these books, except to note the Trotskyites' unhappiness over Istrati's deviations from their doctrine. This reaction was perfectly expressed in the Trotskyite periodical I've already mentioned, *Contre le courant* (no. 38). It was called "No, Istrati!" and was signed by the same Magdeleine. In her article she entreated Istrati to return to the fold of "Marxism," the basic dogma common to Trotskyites and Stalinists alike. (Unfortunately for her, poor Panaït had no conception of what this credo was all about.)

I had not tried to influence the form of Istrati's book, as both Stalinists and Trotskyites accused me of doing. I reckoned, rather, on the effect of his natural style and sap. If I had intervened, however, it would have been to point out to my friend, concerning his enchanting journey down the Volga, that the majesty of that river and the beauty of its riparian countryside are the work of nature, not of Bolshevism, and that the luxury of the steamboat was a product of the old regime, retained to amuse the revolutionary parvenus with whom, despite himself, he had hobnobbed during that first stage of his visit. But the ex-proletarian writer was ridding himself of his obsession according to his own lights, scribbling feverishly away with as little care of the shape of his account as he had shown in his three previous books.

Of course, the Stalinist hacks showered him with insults. And the valiant Istrati fought back as best he could. . . . Something similar had already happened to me, and I'd replied with contemptuous silence.

I cannot conclude this memoir of Istrati without mentioning the tragic fate of our friend Rakovsky, whom Istrati last saw in exile at Astrakhan in 1928. Rakovsky was to meet the fate of the Communist opposition that called itself "Bolshevik–Leninist," a name that failed

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to procure it immunity from the dreadful ordeals reserved for it by Stalin. Many of these diehards were liquidated by the secretary-general of the very party they had defended as "always right." Many others "confessed their errors" and glorified Stalin in order to reenter the All-knowing, All-powerful Party—"there is no salvation outside the Church." Trotsky called them capitulators and cowards. He failed to understand that these wretches, morally and physically crushed by the GPU's repressive machine, were no longer themselves. They have a claim on our compassion and our understanding; we need not praise or blame them.

Rakovsky was one of those who submitted in 1934, who repudiated Trotsky and were repudiated by him. He assumed various secondary tasks and vanished once again under obscure circumstances, not to reappear until, accused and as good as condemned, he was led into the limelight of the 1938 show trials of Bukharin and others. But by then he was no longer Rakovsky. He was, in Emile Vandervelde's phrase, "a poor human rag."

In the office of the "examining magistrate" (that is, the professional torturer) he confessed everything they told him to. ("Give me anyone for 24 hours," said Beria, "and I'll make him confess he's King of England.") In an article entitled "Confessions in Moscow" I showed that everybody was lying in these show trials, which were designed to dishonor the principal leaders of Lenin's party and then to murder them. I proved that the prosecutor, the accused, the judges, the lawyers, and the witnesses were all lying (*La Vie intellectuelle*, organ of the Dominicans of Juvisy, April 10, 1938). Everything that has been disclosed since then only confirms my judgment. For that reason I'm not going to stoop to a serious discussion of Rakovsky's absurd admissions. But I'd like to draw attention to certain pseudo-confessions that oddly illumine this sinister melodrama.

During his trial Rakovsky named several names: Emile Buré, the editor-in-chief of *L'Ordre*, my American friend Max Eastman, and then two more Frenchmen, Louis Dreyfus and Nicolle. These men were supposed to have been his accomplices in various fictitious crimes. He mentioned a conversation with Buré, who was living in Moscow when Pierre Laval visited that city in 1935. I was in *Le Figaro*'s printing shop when the dispatch relating these confessions arrived—I was writing a blow-by-blow commentary on the Moscow show trials for that newspaper, which was then under the direction of Pierre Brisson. At once, despite the late hour, I phoned Buré at his home. He was indignant: "That's the craziest lie I've ever heard! I didn't even get to see Rako when I was in Moscow, though heaven knows how hard I tried! They simply wouldn't let me see him!" I replied, "Then you'll have to draft an energetic denial for *L'Ordre*." "You bet I will," he answered. The denial failed to appear. Some time later I learned that *L'Ordre* was subsidized by the Soviet Embassy.

The other implicated Frenchmen categorically denied the lies extorted from Rakovsky. Their names figured in the public declaration made by Monzie, the only European, the only political figure in the civilized world who reacted with decency to the publication of these "confessions" (except of course for Vandervelde, whose memory I salute). His heartfelt cry, published in *Le Matin* (March 7, 1938) under the title "The Mad Folly of the Moscow Trials," I herewith offer, slightly abridged:

> I met Rakovsky over 30 years ago. I ran into him again in 1924 when he was Soviet ambassador in London, and I negotiated with him when he became Soviet ambassador in Paris. I contend, whatever they say in Moscow and whatever he says himself, that my friend is quite incapable of treason. Yes, he was in Trotsky's faction in 1927, and the declarations he made in the name of loyalty to his convictions and to his friends won him only public obloquy followed by banishment. But it is precisely this attitude that precludes all suspicion of duplicity. . . .
>
> The confessions regarding certain supposed machinations conducted with Nicolle and Louis Dreyfus are utterly devoid of any point, indeed they are literally senseless. I affirm that Rakovsky was the irreproachable servant of his country. . . . My memory is clear, my certainty absolute. This man could not act basely. I don't care about the trial, I care only about the appalling threat suspended over the head of a friend to

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whom, through the good offices and the professional courage of your newspaper, I address a reminder of my loyalty.

Why had Rakovsky named the names of three Frenchmen and an American in such a way as to implicate them in his "crimes"? The answer is obvious: it was the only way for him to alert Europe and America to the fact that he had been forced to lie, that all in that hideous script was lies. And why was Rakovsky not condemned to death like his codefendants Bukharin, Rykov, Yagoda, Krestinsky, and others? Precisely because he had well-known friends to whom Stalin wished to show consideration (or to seem as if he was doing so), knowing he could always order the murder of Rakovsky and others some other time.

And that is precisely what he did when his accomplice Hitler tore up the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and attacked the Soviet Union. Stalin then ordered the execution of the last survivors of the various Communist oppositions who were still languishing and in some cases already dying in the dungeons of the Gulag. So much was revealed, though without hard proof, by the rare veterans of Lenin's defunct party who made it out of the Gulag during the brief thaw of the de-Stalinization period.

I am not unaware of the slander and persecution, from both left and right, that darkened the final years of Panaït Istrati, a man closer to Don Quixote than to Gil Blas—so kind, so generous, so sincere, so emotional, and so sensible of others' distress.

His biography, by Edouard Raydon (*Panaït Istrati, Vagabond de génie*, Paris, 1968) and Ion Capatana's book (*Panaït Istrati, ou l'Homme qui n'a adhêrê à rien*, Soutraine-par-Rantigny, Oise, 1941) made short shrift of these infamies. I mention only what I myself have been able to read with profit. There is also a doctoral dissertation by Mme. Monique Jutrin (*Panaït Istrati, un chardon dêracinê* ["an uprooted thistle"], Paris, 1970), which I haven't read but about which I've heard only good things. Gallimard has recently republished Istrati's chief works in four volumes. Finally, the new edition of the first volume of the trilogy, *Vers l'autre flamme* (Paris, 1980), edited by the highly competent Marcel Mermoz, who has also provided a substantial introduction, offers 15 additional documents indispensable to understanding the moral of this story. □

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The last years of Istrati's life were laced with fierce polemics, expressed in letters and articles, as disenchantment with what he had observed in the U.S.S.R. turned to bitterness. He had come to believe that fascism and communism were all of a piece and even went so far as to write that fascist terror was less "inhuman" to the degree that it did not pretend to govern in the "name of the proletariat." The French Communist intellectuals (Henri Barbusse et al.) accused him of having become a fascist and loosed a campaign of vilification so violent that Romain Rolland, himself no stranger to Stalinism or polemic, noted in his* Journal *(July 1934–June 1935) that he had refused to join Barbusse and the others in "this public execution" of "an old friend" who had "lost his mind"* (inconscient). *Awaiting "the marvelous spring," hoping that he could leave his sickbed for the Mediterranean coast he loved, Panaït Istrati died in the early hours of the morning of April 16, 1935. (Source: Monique Jutrin,* Panaït Istrati, un chardon déraciné, écrivain français, conteur romain, *Paris, 1970.)*

Translated from the French by DAN HOFSTADTER □

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Phillip Berryman

Another View of El Salvador

Far from being "perhaps the most comprehensive portrait yet drawn of the inner workings of Salvadoran politics," Gabriel Zaid's article "Enemy Colleagues" is a confused and confusing polemic. Its publication, to the extent that it immobilizes *Dissent* readers with a "no decent alternatives" frustration, thereby serves current U.S. policy.

Before readers are swept away by Zaid's seemingly encyclopedic knowledge (in comparison to the skimpy coverage in U.S. media), they should note that his main sources are Mexico City dailies and that he gives no evidence of having followed events in El Salvador firsthand.

Zaid's main points are largely summed up in the cover blurbs: "Shuffling Back and Forth Between Junta and Guerrillas," "The Elites Change, The People Suffer," "The Power of Abstention" (during the January 1981 "final" offensive). Further themes are the supposed mirror savagery of guerrillas and official troops and the opposition of both extremes to "conciliators" in the middle.

More than the detailed "refutation" the editors graciously invite, Zaid's article calls for a framework to make intelligible the unfolding of events in El Salvador and at least less bizarre the behavior of individuals and organizations.

While Zaid is very intent on revealing the pathology of the guerrillas—devoting fully 40 percent of his article to the killing of the poet Roque Dalton and extrapolating its significance onto the whole opposition—he virtually ignores the most important political force in El Salvador, the popular organizations that grew up in the early and mid-1970s.

Conditions for many Salvadorans became desperate during the 1970s. Some of the "unsolved social problems" (in State Department parlance) may be briefly alluded to: 50 years of virtually uninterrupted military rule, rapidly increasing numbers of landless peasants completely dependent on largely seasonal day labor (as much as 40 percent of the rural population today), with effects such as declining calorie intake (the lowest in the hemisphere except for Haiti). Alliance for Progress-type programs were no answer: cooperatives do little for people with no land. And avenues of reform were systematically cut off; for example, the UNO (National Opposition Union), a coalition of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and a Communist-front party, with José Napoleón Duarte as its candidate, won the 1972 election—but lost the vote count. This fraud served to radicalize many peasants who were now open to nonelectoral types of organizations.

Into this context stepped the popular organizations. In fact, much of the preparation had been done by Catholic church people in the late 1960s and early 1970s with a new kind of evangelization using both the Bible and Freirean "conscientization" and establishing "basic Christian communities." It is impossible to overestimate the effect of this pastoral work in helping peasants begin to move toward active involvement.

In late 1974 one such Christian community in San Vicente was attacked by troops when the people occupied idle land offering to pay the owner the going rate for rent, and several people were killed. After this experience they formed the UTC (Union of Rural Workers). In the meantime other peasants had revitalized FECCAS (Christian Federation of Salvadoran Peasants), which was Christian Democratic in origins, as a kind of peasant league. At first they joined part of a larger coalition, called FAPU (United Popular Action Front), but after a complex history of government repression, demonstrations, and a dramatic occupation of the cathedral, FECCAS and UTC, together with ANDES (National Association of Salvadoran

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Educators), formed the Revolutionary People's Bloc—BPR. (Zaid does not mention either FECCAS or UTC, which later merged and became the largest and most militant peasant organization, either out of ignorance or because it would contradict his thesis of "elitism.") FAPU continued to organize and later emerged as the second most important popular organization, especially strong in urban labor unions.

At this point it would be good to backtrack to 1970 and the founding of the major guerrilla groups, FPL (Farabundo Martí Popular Liberation Forces) and ERP (People's Revolutionary Army), splits from the Salvadoran Communist party. Again Zaid neglects to mention that Salvador Cayetano Carpio, founder and present head of the FPL, was not a university product but a baker and long-time labor militant.

During the early 1970s the guerrilla groups were scarcely heard from, except for a well publicized kidnapping in 1971. We come then to the case of Roque Dalton. Neither Mr. Zaid is (I presume) nor am I privy to the inner secrets of the guerrilla groups and both of us are dependent on documents. It is difficult for us to imagine what it is like to belong to a small clandestine group, living in daily danger of being killed, because of the slightest error or betrayal of a *compañero* and subject to a total discipline, including the extreme (to us) of being willing to accept "execution" if revolutionary "justice" demands it. I certainly condemn the killing of Roque Dalton, and the facile rationalization for it. What I find totally unacceptable is Zaid's use of this episode to explain all the behavior of the guerrillas such as their self-hatred for being bourgeois. What I find most significant is the process by which immature, militaristic, and inturned organizations of a few people became the spearhead of a genuinely national and popular insurrectionary movement.

ZAID CORRECTLY DEBUNKS the literalness of the "14 families" in El Salvador, seeming to imply that there is no significant "oligarchy."However, wealth is tightly concentrated—Eduardo Colindres has gathered extensive information on the holdings of 20 extended families (in his book *Fundamentos Econômicos de la Burguesía Salvadoreña,* San Salvador, U.C.A. editores, 1977). And, more important, the oligarchy is organized in many specialized "chambers of commerce" (of coffee growers, etc.), which are all members of the powerful ANEP (the National Association of Private Enterprise).

For some time many technocrats and a small sector of the oligarchy had argued that the only solution for El Salvador was a "Taiwan model" for the economy, with export industries taking advantage of the country's only "natural resource," cheap, disciplined labor. The prelude to such a shift would be land reform (as in Taiwan). Accordingly in 1976 the government of Col. Molina announced a mild and gradual land reform that would begin in one part of the country. Landowners would be paid the market value of their land and given incentives to reinvest in industry. While the government called it a "life insurance policy for our grandchildren" to stave off peasant revolt, the oligarchy rejected the plan, rallying around Gen. Humberto Romero, the official candidate for the next elections.

Once again the UNO fielded candidates, this time putting up a retired general as presidential candidate and tempering talk of reforms. Once again there was fraud. The opposition held a weeklong vigil to protest until it was attacked by troops. Some say 50 were killed, but the real number may never be known. (Shortly afterward people told me of seeing trucks carry bodies away and fire hoses used to wash the streets. The third popular organization, the LP–28 [February 28 Popular Leagues] takes its name from this massacre.)

During this period, early 1977, systematic attacks on both Catholic church personnel and popular organizations began. Two priests were murdered and perhaps two dozen were either arrested, tortured, expelled, or not allowed to return to the country. In May 1977 there was a military sweep in the area of Aguilares as troops went looking for peasant leaders. Afterward the army occupied the town of Aguilares and used the church as barracks. The power structure clearly saw the popular organizations and the Church as linked.

During the 1977–79 period there was a dramatic increase in the militancy of popular organizations and in government repression. Typically the organizations would organize large demonstrations marching through San Salvador, strikes in the countryside, or occupations of factories or government buildings, demanding salary increases (the official daily rate was two dollars or so for agricultural work) and better conditions (such as specifying how many tortillas or how many spoonfuls of beans agricultural laborers should receive). These actions frequently met with repression; in the countryside members of ORDEN (Democratic Nationalist Organization), a military-linked paramilitary organization, and of the popular organizations frequently clashed. These popular organizations, particularly the BPR, mushroomed despite the repression. I remember hearing peasants say, "Better to die of a bullet than of hunger."

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TOWARD THE END of this period it became increasingly clear that there were links between the popular organizations and the guerrilla groups. It is reasonable to suppose that very early and perhaps even from the beginning there were some guerrilla members in the popular organizations. However, they followed their own dynamics and were the genuine expression of the peasants', workers', and slum-dwellers' aspirations. Eventually it became clear that each guerrilla (or as they prefer, "politico-military") organization had its own popular organization, and its own "party." It is not a case of "overlapping" as Mr. Zaid says, bewildered as he is by all the initials, but of different "levels" in the struggle.

During this period there was fierce ideological rivalry among the three main popular organizations (BPR and FAPU with LP-28 a distant third), both over questions of analysis and strategy. To an outsider like myself these discussions often looked scholastic—for instance, whether President Romero's government was properly called "fascist" or "fascistoid." Whatever their excesses, however, these organizations were the most genuine expression of the aspirations of the poor. Archbishop Romero recognized this, and he counted some of the top peasant leaders among his friends. He even wrote a pastoral letter on "The Church and the Popular Organizations" (August 1978).

Through the middle to late 1970s the guerrilla groups' main activities seem to have been a series of kidnappings of wealthy businessmen and some government officials for purposes of ransom; the resulting funds were used to build up a "war chest." FARN had split off from ERP partly over the killing of Dalton.

SOMOZA'S FALL emboldened the popular organizations. They began to overcome their feuding, at least to be able to march in demonstrations together. One heard chants: *Romero y Somoza / Son la misma cosa!* ([President] Romero and Somoza / Are the Same Thing!) Military officers were afraid, knowing that Somoza's army had fallen apart when he left—with officers hijacking planes and troops running away in their underwear—despite the agreement made with the Sandinistas that those not personally guilty of crimes could form part of a new integrated armed forces. Watching the growing militancy, a group of them decided to act preemptively and staged a coup on October 15, 1979 (less than three months after Somoza's fall). That it was "engineered in Washington" is plausible but not proven, and some say Washington's idea was that Romero should resign, and that special elections should be held, which the Christian Democrats should win. Proclaiming their intentions of reform and making a special mention of the new Nicaraguan government (thus a kind of code word) the coup-makers gathered around them a mix of politicians, administrators, intellectuals, technicians, and businessmen in the government (two of the three civilians in the first junta were professors at the Catholic University). Those civilians who entered the government were making one last effort, very late in the day, to solve the country's problems through serious reforms rather than war.

Could this formula have worked? Only if the government could have mustered real power over the army and security forces and were able to weed out those responsible for the repression, and if they could have worked out some agreement with the popular organizations (and thereby with the armed groups). A group of perhaps several dozen army officers were retired and some left the country. However, while Col. Majano and the "reform" minded officers went about making proclamations, the hard-liners, particularly Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia, secured control of posts with troop command.

Reactions among the popular and guerrilla groups varied: ERP–LP-28 did call for immediate insurrection, perhaps dreaming of something like Nicaragua; FARN–FAPU maintained contacts with some sectors of the military and put on pressure through demonstrations; FPL–BPR was always profoundly skeptical of the army's ability to "change its spots" after 50 years in power. Even at that time the other groups criticized the ERP–LP-28 actions (in which Zaid sees Joaquin Villalobos sacrificing "cadres and ordinary citizens") as reckless and adventuristic and particularly criticized its zigzag policies. Zaid reflects the view, conventional in the U.S., that the left has sought to sabotage the reform process, fearing the loss of its own support.

A WEEK AFTER THE COUP I was in San Salvador and saw a FAPU demonstration (actually a funeral for two militants killed while leafletting) attacked from the rear by armed troops, leaving at least three dead. That same day I heard Archbishop Oscar Romero, addressing a meeting of the families of the "disappeared" after arrest (under previous governments) issuing a challenge to the new government: if you cannot tell the families what happened to their relatives it will be proof that you have no control over the repressive forces. Afterward I briefly greeted some of the new cabinet members, told them of the attack we had seen in the morning—and could not but feel that they were in an impossible situation.

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The rate of repression went up sharply, from perhaps 100 to 200 a year killed in the later 1970s to about 300 a month in late 1979. The civilians in the government felt they had no power—for instance, when the U.S. sent a "Defense Survey Team" to study the Salvadoran military's "needs," they were not even informed (the Carter government seeming to follow a "two-track" policy—State and Pentagon). Rather than either trying to make a deal or being overly provocative, the popular organizations seem to have decided to let the "reform" junta reveal itself by its actions.

Recognizing their impotence the civilians in the government en masse announced their resignation on January 3, 1980. Salvador Samayoa, the minister of education, appeared on TV to announce he was joining the FPL guerrillas. (Later in the year he was captured and eventually released—one of those family connections Zaid finds so intriguing.) At this point the Christian Democratic party, with strong U.S. urging, agreed to take the civilian part of the government, but a number of the more honest members (among them Ruben Zamora, and also Hector Dada, a junta member) quit within weeks. From their inception the Christian Democrats have always been motivated by both desire for reforms and for an anti-Communist stance, and the split in the party in early 1980 reflected this tension. In any case, the party was largely an apparatus without a base. Far from being motivated by a capricious desire simply to be on top, the civilians who gave the junta formula a try reluctantly came to the conclusion that they had to join the opposition: what remained of the "center" joined the left.

AN ELOQUENT ILLUSTRATION that the "centrist" military is a fiction is afforded by the fortunes of Maj. Roberto D'Aubuisson. He was retired at the time of the coup because of his connections with repressive forces and with paramilitary death squads (he is the reputed head of the "White Warriors' Union"). In February 1980 he publicly accused, on TV, a list of people of being Communists. One of them was Mario Zamora (Ruben Zamora's brother), who was still in the government. A few days later Zamora was shot dead in his house. A few weeks later D'Aubuisson and several others were caught in a coup attempt and jailed under orders from Col. Majano. At that point all the country's officers (several hundred, divided into two groups) met and voted to have D'Aubuisson set free and Majano replaced as head of the Junta by Col. Jaime Abdul Gutiérrez! Among the documents found on D'Aubuisson was evidence that he had arranged the assassination of Archbishop Romero (Ambassador White later furnished copies of it to the State Department).

The main development during 1980 was the unification of the opposition. The guerrilla groups formed the United Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), although there were some zigs and zags on the part of FARN, which continued to explore the possibility of alliances with the young officers in the military. It should be made clear that the three main armed groups are FPL, ERP, and FARN—the Salvadoran Communist party and the Revolutionary party of Central American Workers being very late arrivals and occupying distant fourth and fifth positions.

On January 22, 1980 the popular organizations celebrated their unification into the CRM (Mass Revolutionary Coordinating Body) with what was surely the largest demonstration ever held in El Salvador. Estimates of numbers vary widely but 200,000 seems reasonable. This in a city of 800,000, and a country with a total population of 5 million. The march stretched on for several kilometers, and the last group had not left the starting point when it was attacked and people had to flee. A similar occasion was the funeral of Archbishop Romero. What amazed me was the matter-of-fact and disciplined way the people reacted under fire.

In April the FDR (Revolutionary Democratic Front) was formed, in effect a broadening of the CRM that includes political parties, dissident Christian Democrats, university people, church groups, and a small but important organization, with several hundred members, called MIPTES (Independent Movement of Professionals and Technicians). Its founder, Enrique Alvarez, a former minister of agriculture and (yes, Mr. Zaid) "plantation owner" (who had instituted reforms on his own land), became the FDR's president.

The balance of 1980 was largely devoted to a preparation for the impending showdown while some people still hoped for a way out. Majano and the "reform officers" were gradually shoved aside so that by the end of the year none of the original coup-makers were in the country.

BY LATE 1980, around 1,000 civilians a month were being killed by government or right-wing paramilitary forces. Tens of thousands of people had been forced to flee their homes. (Revealingly, the flow of refugees started with the "land reform," which was carried out by military actions in the countryside.) Guerrilla actions were still isolated attacks and bombings of buildings.

In January 1981 the guerrillas launched the long awaited "general" offensive—which some enthusiasts called a "final" offensive, no doubt with Nica-

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ragua in mind—and hoped to present the incoming Reagan administration with a *fait accompli*. The results were mixed: the strike was largely successful in the countryside but not in San Salvador (where the reporters stayed), apparently because people there were not ready to risk all without greater guarantees. Nevertheless, the offensive was hardly a failure since the insurgents controlled more territory afterward.

While the Carter administration had paved the way for a deepening U.S. involvement—with "nonlethal" military aid and, at the end, more money, advisers, and equipment—Reagan and company immediately made it a "test case" of American resolve to stop Soviet expansionism. The Salvadoran military became increasingly dependent on U.S. aid and political support.

Throughout the year the insurgents gradually built up their strength, so that by August they had semi-liberated zones in about 30 percent of the country. When they realized the seriousness of the military situation, Haig and others began to push for studies of options and unleashed another propaganda barrage from October to mid-December.

The nature of the war at present can be described simply. Government forces are killing large numbers of the civilian population (about 1,000 a month) but few guerrillas. There is some logic in their actions since those they deem "suspects" may indeed be guerrilla sympathizers. The guerrillas are engaging in hit-and-run attacks on the military and forcing them to be spread thin or to mass large groups for attacks in one area while leaving other areas vulnerable. Rather than aiming at any dramatic sweep, they seem to be almost imperceptibly asserting greater control.

Zaid seems to see the obstacle to peace in El Salvador as "those who believe in violence" on both extremes, although he puts more blame on the government side. In his account he implies that guerrilla methods are just as ruthless and terroristic as those of official troops. However, there is no documentation of a pattern of guerrilla terrorism against civilians. They target their violence at official forces, paramilitary groups, and *orejas* ("ears"), all of whom are responsible for the death of innocent civilians. There are perhaps some cases in which the notion of "responsibility" for death is stretched. However, all on-the-scene reports indicate the guerrillas are highly respectful of the civilian population (one journalist, for instance, said that an FPL guerrilla who raped a peasant woman was himself executed), and a recent *New York Times* article reported that guerrillas were told before battle not to shoot fleeing soldiers if they are unarmed.

How do the sides line up? Are most people in the middle "caught between repressive fires"? Robert Leiken testified before a congressional committee in September 1981 that a third of the people supported the insurgents and at most a fifth the government; and half were "neutral." But among these latter there was "an overriding hatred of the military" and a feeling of "what can be worse than what we have?"

From reading Zaid one would conclude that even if victorious, the Salvadoran opposition would split between the guerrillas and the political forces, and among the guerrillas themselves. When I arranged a meeting with Sandinista leaders in Costa Rica in November 1978 the representatives of the three "tendencies" could not sit at the same table. Yet within weeks they had united and continue to work together to this day with the very different problems of making a revolutionary program work. I believe something similar would happen in El Salvador. Despite widely repeated charges that the guerrillas are "crazies" who would dump the suit-and-tie "bourgeois" politicians soon after taking power, I believe they are pragmatic enough to realize that they need the administrative, professional, and technical experience and skill of those elements of the bourgeoisie willing to work in a revolutionary context. When I met Enrique Alvarez in El Salvador a few days before his kidnapping, torture, and death, he spoke with great admiration for the revolutionary groups, saying that their leaders were highly sensitive and intelligent and want the change to come with the least social cost. It hurt him when they were called "crazies."

TO HIS CREDIT Zaid says that any "foreign intervention" would "aggravate the problem instead of solving it."

Zaid's own solution is a cease-fire, a de-arming of the violent groups, and elections under international supervision. The very rationality of this suggestion insures that it will not be used. Given freedom to propose a serious alternative in an election campaign, the left would win. Who could oppose it? A military candidate? The Christian Democrats, stained with so much blood?

Nevertheless, negotiations do offer the only sane way out of the present situation. As distasteful as a negotiated settlement would be to the Reagan administration, the alternative is worse: bankrolling and becoming increasingly involved in a long, dirty war that could be "won" only by something approaching genocide and that would cost international opprobrium and great domestic dissent.

It would be unfortunate if Gabriel Zaid's observations, which might seem to reinforce the

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understandable suspicion of all things Leninist in *Dissent* readers, would prevent them from understanding events in Central America and from acting responsibly to prevent the Reagan Administration from adding to the tragedy. □

GABRIEL ZAID Replies

Firsthand testimonies, such as Phillip Berryman offers, are plentiful in Mexico. Salvadoran opposition figures live here or pass through frequently. Mexican or Mexican-based journalists arrange frequent trips to El Salvador, openly or in secret. The government, the press, the universities, and the artistic and intellectual circles are as a whole favorably disposed toward the Salvadoran opposition, which encourages the abundant publication of reports, interviews, letters, manifestos, and articles concerning El Salvador.

Sympathy and the sheer abundance of material have had a "permissive" effect on publishers and readers alike. They read and publish under simplistic formulas, despite the appearance of items in this mass of information (published but not read) that invalidate any simplistic formula. Most of the quotes in my article come from those publications most widely read by the Mexican left: the dailies *Excélsior*, *Uno más uno,* and *El Día*; the weeklies *Proceso* and *Siempre*. Thus the tacit theme of my article is reading: a criticism of the *hypocrite lecteur*, *mon semblable*, *mon frère*—with the special meaning this has in Mexico, where (innocently enough, in most cases) the name of Roque Dalton is used to take up collections and gather signatures in support of his murderer.

The "framework" Berryman proposes "to make intelligible the unfolding of events in El Salvador" does not differ much from the conventional wisdom here in Mexico: that the opposition is the entire Salvadoran people, which, in a desperate situation, has opted for violence. Since my article is a refutation of this simplism and since Berryman limits himself to offering his personal testimony in support of it, I have little to add, beyond a few clarifications.

1. The popular organizations are certainly very important, and the entire Salvadoran picture would change if they could bring the guerrillas under their control; but that has not happened. The question of who should submit to whom goes back to Castro, who from a small armed *foco*, or nucleus, gained control of the entire opposition. This was seen by Régis Debray as a *Revolution in a Revolution*, in a book that circulated widely and served as the inspiration for this *foquismo*,* now theoretically repudiated (even by Debray) though still alive in practice. The Salvadoran guerrilla movement was inspired by *foquismo*. Roque Dalton wrote a book in Havana to defend Debray from "right-wing critics"—that is, the Communist parties, which preferred civil action in the cities (strikes, demonstrations, propaganda) over armed action in the country. The first Salvadoran guerrillas were Catholic university students who became radicalized, joined the Salvadoran Communist party (PCS) and ended by finding it insufficiently radical (Dalton considered it to be center-right).

The question of whether the armed communists should submit to the civilian communists,** or the other way round, was settled in El Salvador by the defeat of the civilians. This came about in two stages. In the first, the armed camp, failing to win control of the PCS, abandoned the party in the early '70s to form guerrilla groups. The PCS continued its alliance with the non-PCS left. This alliance of the civilian opposition, headed by the Christian Democrats, drew both on other parties and on the popular organizations for support, in a kind of popular front that won the 1972 and 1977 elections—though its triumph was never recognized. When a leftist faction of the army staged the October 1977 coup and launched a program coinciding with the objectives of the civilian opposition, it invited that civilian opposition into the government and they accepted. Thus was formed the civilian-military junta, which excluded the leader of the Christian Democrats, José Napoleón Duarte—then in exile in Venezuela—and left out the guerrillas as well.

Duarte returned at once to take advantage of the new situation and was greeted by a demonstration of over 50,000 sympathizers (*New York Times*, Oct. 26, 1979). Joaquín Villalobos, commander of

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* A word impossible to translate, it pertains to *foco*, or nucleus, in Zaid's previous sentence. Perhaps the closest term would be "vanguardism" as used in left-wing vocabularies. — EDS.

** Mr. Zaid appears to use the word "communism" not to connote party affiliation but a spectrum of ideological opinion. — EDS.

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the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) and murderer of his comrade Roque Dalton (under the false accusation that he was a CIA agent, which to this date he has not withdrawn), refused to give a chance to the non-guerrilla left just entering power. He accused it of being a "variant of imperialism" and, the day after the coup, set out in effect (by his own statements, deliberately) to provoke the armed right, which thus had an excellent pretext for adopting a hard line.

In the wake of this initiative, the non-guerrilla left [government] occupied a very difficult position. It saw itself as holding two basic bargaining cards with the army's right wing, the oligarchy, and the United States: first, the popular support demonstrated in the earlier elections, and second, the guerrilla pressure. However, it couldn't count on the latter and was beginning to lose the former because the guerrillas would not accept a role that in effect subordinated them to the non-guerrilla left. On the contrary, the guerrillas used their influence against the civilian coalition: they set out to destroy its popular support, provoking levels of repression unknown even a few months earlier. Thus the reformist alliance went down in a crossfire and was forced to polarize: either leave the junta and submit in effect to the armed left, or remain in the junta and submit in effect to the armed right. Napoleón Duarte and Guillermo Ungo, fellow members of the civilian left and co-winners of the 1972 elections, wound up at opposite poles: Duarte with the army (as president of the Republic), Ungo with the guerrillas (as president of the Democratic Revolutionary Front); each believing that, somehow, by his political weight, he could manage to impose himself on his respective militaries; both mutually accusing each other of playing the role of legitimizer, à la Kerensky, in the transition toward a hard-line regime.

Most of the leaders on the left sided with Ungo, not Duarte. There was a split in the Salvadoran Democratic party. In the case of the PCS, the line to be adopted was of communism under arms: the PCS itself soon took them up. Naturally, the rupture of the leftist coalition in power was much celebrated by the guerrillas, who moved to step into the army's role within a new coalition of the left, now in opposition.

The guerrilla groups sought to take over the popular organizations and ended by each having its own party and its own popular organ. The clearest example of this domination was the ridiculous spectacle of the Popular Leagues–28th of February (taken over by the ERP). They announced to the press that the ERP would support the coup: "we expect to learn their position this afternoon, which should agree with our own." But they had to eat their words and line up against the junta.

In January 1980 the leftist opposition coalition staged a massive demonstration against the repression. This was a genuine protest against the regime, but by no means a direct support of the guerrillas. The *New York Times* (Jan. 23, 1980) estimated that there were 100,000 demonstrators (twice the number that turned out in support of Duarte). In March 1980, 30,000 people attended the funeral of Archbishop Romero (*New York Times*, March 31, 1980). Again, this demonstration could not be interpreted as a direct support of the guerrillas, but rather of Archbishop Romero, and as a new repudiation of the regime.

The true show of support for the guerrillas came a few months later, with the arrest of Salvador Samayoa, ex-education minister in the junta recently turned guerrilla. The teachers' union and the popular organizations called a general two-day strike (June 24 and 25) demanding his release. They met with extraordinary success: 125,000 people joined in the action, paralyzing 90 percent of the commercial activity (*Facts on File* 1980, p. 497). This prompted the belief that the beginning of the end was at hand, and preparations were made for a more intensive general strike, for August 13–15. But this turned out to be a startling failure: more than 80 percent of the stores remained open (*Facts on File* 1980, p. 633). Perhaps the explanation lies with some of the "preparations": the guerrillas had carried out nine political assassinations a few days before (the *New York Times*, Aug. 12, 1980).

The triumph of the armed communists over the civilian communists and the apparatus of opposition in general carried a high political cost. Important opposition leaders, such as Colonel Majano, chose to withdraw to the sidelines. The late Archbishop Romero and after him Archbishop Rivera y Damas kept their distance from both the regime and the guerrillas. The final result was evident in overwhelming displays of non-support for the guerrilla movement:

(a) Some 500,000 Salvadorans (10 percent of the population) have left their homes and are in the situation of having "nothing to lose but their chains." Yet they have not taken up arms. The armed opposition continues to number from 4,000 to 6,000 people. Commander Villalobos admits the significance of this fact in a recent interview (*Proceso*, March 29, 1982), in which he appears confident that a popular uprising will indeed soon be possible: "Now . . . far fewer will run away and far more will join in the fighting."

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(b) In January, 1981, the guerrillas formally called on local forces to take up arms in a simultaneous insurrection of all armed groups, accompanied by a general strike of indefinite length until power had been seized. The strike was neither general nor indefinite. The sweeping popular support they were expecting never materialized.

(c) In March 1982, the guerrillas strenuously sabotaged the elections, in spite of which participation proved several times greater than during the June 1980 strike.

2. There is indeed documentation of guerrilla terrorism, but it remains invisible for a reader like Berryman. For example: I'm not the one who "sees Joaquín Villalobos sacrificing 'cadres and ordinary citizens' "; it is the statements of Villalobos himself and of the BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc), collected in my article, that speak of this sacrifice aimed at forcing the non-guerrilla left out of the junta. There are other examples documented in my article, but Berryman doesn't read them. For instance: the declaration of the commander of the FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance), confirming that the journalists the FARN had singled out would be assassinated if they didn't leave the country. Berryman himself accepts the killing of peasants, if one translates the guerrilla newspeak, with its talk of "ears," traitors, and scum who give information to the army (or are simply accused of doing so). Berryman's understanding of these painful necessities in the struggle of good against evil reaches remarkable extremes: his endeavor to comprehend the extreme discipline "of being willing to accept 'execution' if revolutionary 'justice' demands it."

If Berryman believes that the guerrillas are nobly willing to be murdered by their own comrades, it will be very hard for him to see any sort of terrorism. Clearly he believes that the "taxes" the guerrillas demand on the highways or the food they collect from the rural populace are handed over without fear, as a voluntary contribution. Just as he believed that the guerrillas "do not plan to put pressure on the people" in sabotaging the elections.

According to Pierre Blanchet (*Nouvel Observateur*, March 13, 1982), the most serious recent estimates attribute 24,000 civilian deaths to the right and 6,000 to the left. (In other words, approximately one civilian has died for every armed man on both sides.)

3. When I wrote my article, I hadn't read any admission from leftist sources concerning the shipment of Cuban arms to El Salvador. I have since come across two. This doesn't alter the general sense of my article.

Hans Jürgen Wischnewski, vice-president of the German Social Democratic party, has stated that Castro "does not hide having in the past sent arms to the opposition and does not rule out a change in his position [the suspension of deliveries] if the Salvadoran military should oppose a political solution."

Joaquín Villalobos tacitly admitted the Cuban aid in an interview (*Proceso*, March 29, 1982):

> Q: The hardening of the U.S. position is due to your having received outside aid. . . .
>
> A: The people and the revolutionary movement of El Salvador have the right to avail themselves of means and resources wherever and whenever necessary.
>
> Q: Then you have in fact received aid from Cuba?
>
> A: When we receive aid, it doesn't necessarily mean that we have become the tool of any particular political position. We've bought arms in the United States too. . . .

4. Salvador Cayetano Carpio ("Marcial") is no mere baker. He studied four years for the priesthood, according to his own statements, and is a writer in the vein of "socialist realism." In 1952 he published a book (*Secuestro y capucha*) in which the author and "protagonist endures everything with a smile on his lips because the workers' movement sings in his heart" (*Proceso*, Aug. 4 and 25, 1980). Recently he wrote a long epic text that he gave to the magazine *Por esto* (Dec. 24, 1981), in which he continues his heroic self-dramatization: "Reader, you have before you pages written in hours snatched from sleep, conquering hunger and weariness." These pages include a passage of high "socialist realism" in which, under the strain of finding himself surrounded and under fire from army artillery, Commander Carpio listens to one of his men, "Ruperto, very young but brave in action, who says between sobs: 'I don't mind dying, just don't let our Commander-in-Chief fall.' " He also includes two poems by two guerrillas, one titled "Comrade Marcial" in homage to the commander and the other entitled "Emma Guadalupe Carpio" in homage to his daughter. In both cases, the style is clearly collegiate, not peasant.

Translated from the Spanish by DAVID PRITCHARD □

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Merle Goldman

The Chinese Intellectuals

Like those who knew about the Holocaust, my colleagues in the China field and I did not speak out loudly and publicly about the persecution of intellectuals in China's Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. A whole generation of Westernized intellectuals were decimated. Those who did not die of natural causes were purged or killed or committed suicide only because they were intellectuals. The institutions they helped to create—the universities, research institutes, journals, libraries, and other creative enterprises—were also decimated. The destruction of China's cultural life may take generations to repair.

The survivors, those fortunate enough to have been imprisoned or sent to the countryside, describe their experience as comparable to the Holocaust. Their analogy is not entirely correct. Millions of people were not killed systematically. Though Mao and his supporters set the anti-intellectual tone, the persecution of the intellectuals was due more to the chaotic nature of the time than to an organized government policy. Nevertheless, the situations were comparable in that the intellectuals were persecuted primarily for what they were, rather than for what they did. Virtually all intellectuals and their families, whether on the right or the left politically, were subjected to attack.

Where were the Western China scholars when this calamity befell our intellectual colleagues in China? We should have been more sensitive to their plight and more aware of what was going on than the American public or even American government officials. The Chinese newspapers were filled day after day with pictures of intellectuals being paraded through the streets in dunce caps and being humiliated verbally and physically at mass meetings. There were reports that the well-known writer Lao She, author of *Rickshaw Boy*, committed suicide after attacks by Red Guards. As in the Holocaust, we knew but we didn't want to believe. It was too horrible.

Double Standard

IT IS SAID that "those who study the Soviet Union hate it, while those who study China love it." We scholars of China are enamored of its history, culture, and people. We did not want to believe that a country that had developed such a high level of civilization could be so cruel to its intellectuals. We had a double standard. We applauded when our colleagues in the Soviet field condemned human rights violations in Russia. We rationalized that the treatment of intellectuals under Mao was not as bad as their treatment under Stalin. That might be true, but a lesser degree of violence is no excuse. Moreover, persecution of intellectuals in the Cultural Revolution was far worse than any human rights violations in post-Stalinist Russia.

While some radical scholars praised the Cultural Revolution as the model for future societies in which there would be true participatory democracy and some right-wing scholars denounced it in order to show the perfidy of the Communists in contrast to the Guomindang, most of us mainstream historians remained detached. We associated passing moral judgments on political events with Confucian China, Victorian England, and, worse, the communist and fascist regimes that used history as a tool of social and political control. The idea of passing moral judgments is alien and counter to our training as historians and professionals. We are to be skeptical, even-handed, and understanding. We point out the complexities and ambiguities in human affairs. But as we all know, there is no such

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thing as value-free scholarship. Just by writing on a particular question or by quoting a particular passage, we focus attention on an issue we regard as important. Unfortunately, not enough of us in the China field focused on what was happening to the intellectuals under Mao, nor were we forceful enough in bringing their plight to the attention of others.

Yet, do we have a right to make judgments and interfere in the affairs of another country? Are we not arrogant when we apply our standards of human rights to others with very different traditions? True, China does not have a tradition of human rights in our legal and institutional understanding of the term. But it does have a tradition of responsibility, especially for the literati, to speak out against abuses of power. There are aspects of Confucian tradition that uphold an authoritarian government and the status quo, but there are other aspects that can support a liberal government and dissent. Unlike the West, Confucianism did not guarantee a loyal opposition legally, but it justified one ideologically. To criticize government misdeeds was not the literati's right, as in the West, but their responsibility. Literati risked death to protest against corrupt officials and propose fundamental reforms. Thus China has a tradition of intellectuals criticizing their governments precisely in periods of despotic rule. Moreover, the Western traditions of individualism, legality, and democracy were introduced into China in the early decades of the 20th century. Therefore, in supporting dissident intellectuals in China, we are upholding their traditions as well as our own.

Rationalizing the Silence of the Intellectuals

OUR RELUCTANCE to condemn China's treatment of the intellectuals may have had more to do with American than with Chinese politics. We feared a return to the McCarthy era of unthinking opposition to Chinese communism and to anyone who spoke positively about its achievements. Despite their cruelties and injustices, most of us believed that the Chinese Communists were the first rulers in a hundred years to bring China out of chaos, famine, and weakness. Appreciation of their accomplishments overrode our concern for our fellow intellectuals. Most of us in the China field opposed American participation in the Vietnam War and were incensed by the depiction of China as the real enemy. We wanted normalization of United States relations with China, a country of nearly a billion people. We feared that if we pointed out and criticized the darker side of the Communist rule, we would impede the movement toward normalization.

We can rationalize our silence with the excuse that it would have been futile to have criticized China during the Cultural Revolution of 1966–69 because China had cut itself off from the outside world, both East and West. In that xenophobic period, China's leaders would not have listened or cared. But in the mid-1950s, when intellectuals also were persecuted, China wanted contact with the outside world. If American China scholars could not have had an impact because relations between our two countries were severed, the voices of our European colleagues might have been heard. But, with the exceptions of Simon Leys and Roderick Farquhar, the same silence existed in Europe as in the United States. In the early 1970s, we missed another opportunity to protest the repression of the intellectuals. Since China wanted something from us, we might have had leverage on the issue of human rights as we had in the Soviet Union during the period of détente. But again we remained virtually silent.

For some of us, there were some practical considerations. As normalization appeared imminent and as it appeared possible that China scholars would be able to see their country of study, from which they had been barred since 1949, most did not want to jeopardize their chance to get a visa. There were a few exceptions. In 1973, shortly after Nixon's first visit to China, John Fairbank reviewed *Prisoner of Mao* by Jean Pasqualini, which described prison camps in China. Given prominent coverage in the *New York Review of Books*, Prof. Fairbank's review focused attention on the darker aspects of the Chinese system. For several years thereafter, Prof. Fairbank was unable to visit China.

My visit to China in 1974 as the China scholar with the delegation of American university presidents illustrates the value of speaking out. It seemed strange that such a high-level university delegation would be invited to visit China's universities at the time when the radical Gang of Four, Mao's wife and her allies, dominated them. Since we were guests of the Chinese, we would be considered impolite if we were critical. Fortunately some of the presidents in the delegation did not suffer fools very well and challenged the intellectual wasteland we encountered. We also had a two-hour interview with Deng Xiaoping, who complained bitterly of China's economic and technological backwardness. Only later did we realize that our delegation may have been used in a power struggle by Deng and the bureaucratic leaders against the Gang of Four. Deng wanted to bring back more

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conventional university education, while the Gang of Four insisted on continuing the politicized education of the Cultural Revolution. By remaining silent we not only would have harmed our Chinese colleagues, but we also would have hindered the emergence of the intellectual and political forces in China that would benefit our nation as well as China.

Shared Values

OWING in part to the missionary influence and to our own scholarly efforts, we have tended to see China as we would like it to be and not as what it is. But China scholars should heed the advice of Stanford historian Gordon Wright, in his presidential address to the American Historical Association in 1975. He urged that historians consider all evidence and interpretations, but that they not hesitate to take the next step—to make judgments, focus on questions, and draw conclusions based on their own values. This means that while we show appreciation for China's achievements, we should not hesitate to speak out against its terror.

We certainly cannot prescribe for China. The post-Mao leadership, like China's 19th-century Westernizers, wants to adopt Western science and technology, but keep out Western liberal, humanistic values because these values threaten political control. Moreover, as opposed to Russian dissidents, most Chinese dissidents have not asked for help from the outside world. Some Chinese intellectuals say that our protests would make their situation even more vulnerable. But what could have been worse than the millions of people killed, purged, or imprisoned in the Cultural Revolution? Today the attacks on intellectuals and dissidents are different than in the Maoist era. There are not the large-scale, anti-intellectual campaigns and purges of the 1960s and '70s. Nevertheless, the advocates of human rights who emerged from the underground in 1978–79 have been imprisoned and silenced. A number of well-known writers have been accused of "bourgeois liberalism." It is difficult to know the proper time and most effective way to express our concern. However, if it appears that a large-scale persecution against intellectuals or any other group is underway and we restrain our protests as we have in the past, then we disregard China's humane values as well as our own. □

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Samuel Hux

Are 300 Parties Too Many Parties?

A mental arrogance seems to afflict us when we consider Spain. When Americans read of right-wing plots in Spain against the new democracy every several weeks or so, if they are wise they know the old Spanish right must somehow be harnessed. But if they are "sophisticated" they cluck their tongues about the democracy itself and lecture that it is time for ideological politics to cease in Spain, time for the political consensus of a Common Front (different from the right-leaning "national fronts" and left-leaning "popular fronts" of the past) that serves the *nation* instead of *factions*.

I would like to lodge a small protest. It seems to me that the Spaniards, who have faced enough political difficulties in the past, are being advised to do not merely what is difficult, but impossible. They are being advised to practice a "democratic" politics of a sort that can't exist in a parliamentary democracy, and to which the closest approximation is what Franco always said he was doing. The Spanish democracy does not seem, so far, to be listening—and a good thing it is.

To the Anglo-American sensibility, the conglomerate Democratic and Republican, Labor and Conservative parties seem the height of political reason. In Spain, however, there are some 300 parties—a rough count and depending on when you're counting. Some are regional parties affiliated with national parties; some are independent. There is no one socialist party in Spain but several. There is no center party but a massive moderate front, the Unión de Centro Democrático, with constant threats of secession by member parties. The Coalición Democrática (formerly the Alianza Popular) is a parliamentary alliance of several parties. I'm setting aside the inevitable loonies of antiparliamentary left and right, who reject the Cortes—the Spanish parliament—anyway.

The very factionalism of Spanish politics should be appreciated for what it is, what it promises, and what it avoids. It is the antithesis of the dulling Oneness of the last few decades. Politics became a lost art in Spain . . . or, rather, an unachieved art, since it had barely been there to be lost before the Franquista unity was imposed. So it has to be *learned*—and can be learned better if it feels

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"natural," not a violation of character. And that character, most analysts and historians of Spain have agreed, is individualist, often to the point of self-absorption.

Ramón Menéndez Pidal (*The Spaniards in Their History*) has made a strong observation of Spanish individualism:

> The Spaniard is inclined not to feel a sense of solidarity with the community except insofar as it will bring him immediate advantages, for he will always neglect indirect or future benefits. Hence he is rather indifferent to the welfare of the community or its problems, but in compensation he possesses a lively perception of his own individual case as well as that of his neighbor.

Having spent a fair amount of time in Spain, I have little trouble in yielding to Señor Menéndez's observations. But I'm not sure the contemporary consequence of what he observes is apparent.

Now that politics is an actual issue-oriented practice, instead of Falangist pomp and a caudillo's pronouncements, that is, now that politics is possible, perhaps the Spanish individualist can learn to compromise his pursuit of self-advantage with those of several other pursuers in a union of the like-interested. Perhaps it's helpful that he be able to take small steps toward a sense of responsible community with a small group, that he come to identify with a small party (relative to our standards), an autonomous faction, which in turn is headed by a council of people with sufficient capacity for abstraction to join that faction with a larger alliance. I think this is precisely what Spaniards are doing.

With the aid of some conversations I recall from four years ago, I try to imagine myself a Spaniard, asserting my special distinctions ("I, who am as good as you are . . ."—an ancient Spanish code). Perhaps I'm an *albañil* (a bricklayer or a mason) and member of a bricklayers' union. I realize that, with the Cortes now a real parliament, the *albañiles* are better served if they have some punch in Madrid—which means a labor party. The Communists I do not trust. The Socialist Workers' party is large—which does mean power, but I feel a bit lost there. Besides, I never liked Andalusians (they're very big in it); my fiancée left me for one, fool that she was. I shall cast my lot with the smaller Popular Socialist party. Should they ever formally unite with the Socialist Workers, I'll see how I feel about that. (They did a few years ago.)

NOW IT COULD BE PROTESTED that I'm showing an abysmal forgetfulness of history; that what characterized Spanish politics before the Civil War, and led to it, was precisely the factionalism I now find so hopeful. But I think that protest itself, and it's a pretty standard one, reveals a poor memory.

That the Second Republic (1931–36) was faction-ridden is true. Even pre-Gaullist France could hardly rival it. And there were parliamentary intrigues, public scandals, governmental crises (11 governments in 5 years if one counts only prime ministers and caretakers), strikes, all that's usually called "social unrest," and political violence. That last, however, can hardly be considered new to Spanish history and peculiar to the early 1930s; nor are intrigues, scandals, and crises peculiar to any time or place. As for the strikes and unrest: well . . . it was the 1930s and things were not greatly different elsewhere; the Spanish accent is not given to understatement. It was not a pretty picture, indeed it was ugly. But to expect a pretty picture after nearly a decade of military dictatorship in the 1920s and after centuries of repressive cultural history is the sheerest arrogance.

To say that the Republic, given its factionalism, could never have succeeded is to take the fact of its death and argue with presumptuous hindsight that the only conceivable death is suicide. The argument is sophistical. One must not assume that here were a bunch of Republican factions quarreling until they came to blows and then tore the house down in their fracas.

Rather, (1) another group of Spaniards who had never bought the idea of a Republic in the first place and had plotted against it from its inception—who were mortally offended by its existence and would have been even if there had been no strikes, no seizures of church property, no restrictions upon the prerogatives of the officer corps, no violence, no nothing—this group came together with (2) yet another group who were ambivalent about the Republic's existence and would stand representatives for election to the Cortes without pledging allegiance to the republican ideal, but were not ambivalent about the unrest the Republic could be blamed for. And (3) together they decided that the "rule of factions" must end; while (4) an antiparliamentary extreme left did all it could to fulfill the prophecy that a "bourgeois" republic could not work.

When the bourgeois left government of Prime Minister Santiago Casares Quiroga, Galician Autonomist senator—formally supported by a Popular Front that comprised approximately 60 percent of the elected Cortes—was challenged by an open rebellion of militarists, monarchists, Falangists, and assorted conservatives and reactionaries, that could hardly be called Republican suicide. The worst that could be said is that the Republican

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factions "offended"—by action, by inaction, but mostly by their being there—and thereby "invited" their own murder.

The Spanish Civil War began through a rebellion to end factionalism! And that's a fact to remember when judging factionalism today.

There's another way to put this. "Factionalism" has two meanings: affiliation with one of several groups, and dissension. If we're talking about parliamentary democracy of human beings, the first meaning has to be there, and the second meaning, to some degree, will be there. And if one tells the Spaniards not to be factional, one's telling them, following the first meaning, to have a Cortes that isn't a Cortes and, following the second meaning, not to be Spanish. □

Lucy Komisar

A Talk with Spain's Socialist Leader

Madrid

On the day of the rightist military assault on the house of parliament last year in February, Felipe González, general secretary of the Spanish Socialist Workers' party (PSOE), was taken out of the chamber at gunpoint and brought to an anteroom, where he was to spend 15 hours. Observers believed his removal signified a death sentence; he thought so too.

Many months later, in his party headquarters, the memory of that awful day was still fresh. Security was tight. I entered the seven-story building through one-way mirrored doors that were buzzed open by a guard.

González greeted me cordially—a handsome man, casually dressed, with dark, longish, wavy hair, 40 years old. More than most of Spain's present political leaders, he is a symbol of the new era. González is the son of a livestock handler for a Seville landowner, joined a clandestine socialist youth group in 1962, studied law and became a labor lawyer, and was arrested for political and union activities ten times before he was 30. In an hour-and-a-half interview he talked about the political situation in Spain and the changes brought about by the attempted coup.

Spain is still suffering economically. Unemployment stands at 14.4 percent, inflation at 14 percent. Basque terrorism as well as disagreement over the future of the autonomous states continues. But now, instead of leading a sharply critical opposition, González sees his job in strengthening the government. There won't be another coup, he said, but added that he wouldn't have predicted the attempt of February 23, 1981. And it is not the army that holds the greatest potential danger for Spain, he observed.

"The greatest capacity for conspiracy against democracy isn't found among the military," said Gonzalez, "but in the group of civilians that has lost its political power and privileges of *franquismo*. . . . Since Franco's death until today, there has been a minority sector of society—probably no more than 4 percent of the population if the opinion polls are correct—that has tried to bring back the dictatorship. This sector continues to be powerful, not because it has much popular support or even much economic power—but because the Spanish political process in recent years has been an evolutionary process of reform, without a definite rupture with the past. And so this 4 percent is entrenched in the institutions of power." It is most visible in the courts and in the ultrarightist newspaper *El Alcâzar*. The center/right-wing politicians of the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), partly because of their roots in the old *franquista* regime, are unable, or unwilling, to remove these people from power. There would be danger if this group should win over sectors of the army.

"The majority of the army, however, respects the force of law," said González. "That doesn't mean they like it a lot. . . . In our new, short history of democracy, one can detect that the army thinks democracy will not favor it as an institution, though there is a minority among the military that believes democracy is better than dictatorship for a modern European state."

The conspiracy in the army was not wider than has been published, he told me; otherwise the secret could not have been kept so well. But though the majority of the army didn't act in favor of the coup, most would have had a hard time acting against it—were it not for their loyalty to the king. Another reason for the coup's failure, González added, was the opposition of the business and financial world.

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There is "not much" danger of a coup now, he said. (If severe sentences are handed down in the trial of the plotters, that will have some impact on army attitudes.) But after the coup attempt, socialist policy took a 180-degree turn, and its earlier pounding criticism became a muted opposition. The government, run by the UCD with a parliamentary minority, now could no longer govern alone.

"My job is to insure that the executive power, although it is not ours, is strong enough to defend itself from the attacks of democracy's enemies," González said.

Although the UCD rejected the socialists' proposal for a grand coalition, the parties are working together to solve Spain's major problems. The PSOE helped draw up a pact with the socialist union to ban strikes for two years and limit pay hikes to 11 and 13 percent in exchange for a government pledge to create 350,000 jobs and provide subsidies for unemployed heads of households, who were not all getting aid. González said the government thereby "changed a policy that had been neoliberal, according to the best Manchester school and the postulates of the president of the United States or Mrs. Thatcher in England."

The parties also have negotiated an autonomy plan that sets up 16 federated states, with elections scheduled for 1983.

González is more critical on the subject of government handling of rightist violence. "The government, being of the right, has more difficulty striking at the violent extreme right than at the violent extreme left. That produces a situation of disequilibrium," he said. The day before, a group of youths putting up street posters for a fascist rally had thrown rocks and a Molotov cocktail at three buses carrying Basque children on a socialist-sponsored visit into Madrid. Several children were hurt. "I am convinced that those who were putting up posters in the street were known," said González. "It is possible to detain, try, and sentence them, but I'm afraid there will be no detention."

Even when the government seeks to act against the right, it can't always get its own security apparatus to work for it. It is difficult to change a nearly half-century tradition of fighting only the left, he observed. But he rejected the notion that the government was afraid to lean too hard on the military. "I think the government has the obligation of acting prudently with respect to what the army can do. Politics is always the product of a relation of forces, and prudence is a basic element of politics in the Spanish situation. One shouldn't criticize too readily," he said.

GONZALEZ BELIEVES that the government's economic failures, the PSOE's statesmanlike reaction, and disputes over democratization within the Communist party have boosted his own party to where it could win the 1983 elections. A Gallup poll after the coup attempt—when people might have been hesitant about provoking the army by bringing leftists to power—gave the PSOE 42 percent, compared to 30.8 percent in the 1979 elections. "A North American company did the poll; it must be serious," González joked. The poll gave the UCD 23.6 percent, the rightist Democratic Coalition 8.9 percent, and the Communists 7.9 percent.

But González won't let the government fall now and force early elections. Socialists fear this could create a destabilizing vacuum of power. "My greatest concern is not to win the elections, but that there be democracy in Spain," said González.

When the PSOE does run, it won't be, à la française, in coalition with the Communists, who got 10.5 percent of the vote in the last election, although the parties cooperate on the local level when they share a majority.

González sees his prime task not in working for radical economic change but for the modernization of the state, "transformation of the authoritarian state into a democratic state, and of a centralized state into a state of autonomies." He wants to democratize the economy within the framework of the market, "but without accepting its mystification." "We don't intend to go to a process of nationalization as a philosophy of the party, nor do we want a statization of the economy."

For the American government, which believes the PSOE would win an election today, the key question is not internal policy but Spain's position in the Atlantic Alliance. Both Socialists and Communists favor renegotiation of the treaty that allows U.S. bases here, but they oppose entrance into NATO.

Asked how he can have a policy that appears so contradictory, González says, "We are for defense of the status quo. What worries us is a change at a time of international tension. And for Spain, what does integration into NATO add to our national security and welfare?" He rejects the argument that bringing the army into NATO could turn its attention away from internal politics.

González won't say he would take Spain out of NATO if he came to power, but he would follow the dictates of a popular referendum. He's planning to be in a position of having to make that decision at the start of his prescription for the consolidation of Spanish democracy: "A moderate left government for 25 or 30 years." □

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Thomas McLaughlin

Police Shows for the Reagan Era

On Fridays the tough cops take over on TV. *Strike Force* (10:00 P.M. Fridays, ABC), starring Robert Stack who used to battle the mob as Elliot Ness in *The Untouchables*, offers us a trio of sadistic rapist killers who cruise L.A. singles bars, pick up unsuspecting girls, torture, mutilate, and murder them. After the Strike Force saves the latest victim, we break for the last round of Bayer commercials. But it is in the epilogue of this gruesome story of male sexual madness that the real depravity comes through. Stack and his commanding officer sit in a chic restaurant and get started recalling what is sure to be a long series of stories about the kinkiest strippers they've ever seen. The show ends with an almost grotesque freeze of Stack's face as he grimaces a laugh at Two-Tassle Tina.

Earlier, at 9:00 PM on NBC, there's *McClain's Law*, starring James Arnes, who in *Gunsmoke* brought law to Dodge by sheer courage and moral integrity. Now he's an aging but preternaturally tough policeman who disdains the computer and relies on his "nose for police work." In one episode a friend of McClain's falls victim to another sort of monster—the vicious armed robber who preys on decent, hard-working small businessmen. The show isn't nearly as crude as *Strike Force*—here you can feel the influence of the same network's hit, *Hill Street Blues*, layered over a thousand formula cop shows. We are shown a victim who will not accept his vulnerability, who trains himself to handle a gun and kills the same punk who had terrorized him. The twist in the formula, the *Hill Street Blues* touch, is that when he gets another chance he can't do it—won't do it—he already has one nightmare to live with. Just in time the police save him, of course, and McClain shares a moment of understanding with him—two men who have been forced to kill and have survived the horror because of their unshaken sense of justice.

The shows are similar in a number of ways. Each has a wholesome black cop in the background. Each is set in California. Each relies on our time-tested approval of its stars, heroes from a simpler, morally clearer era. Each is centered around its audience's fantasies of victimization, sexual or economic. Each, most important, relies on the old frontier virtues and on police violence to save us from a world gone off its axle, as one of the cops calls it. These are the programs of the paranoid right, strangely blended with the middle class, whose members see their values and lives threatened by crazed, vicious punks and feel betrayed by a government and judicial system that can't protect them.

The punks in *Strike Force* are unspeakably slimy. They come from the kinky affluent California that represents the depths of our moral collapse to many Americans. The show is filled with their leering faces, caught by the freeze before each commercial as they begin their three-day ritual of cruelty with a new victim, just as film lovers of a more innocent time faded away during their first passionate embrace. The rest is left to the horrified imagination of the audience. And the victims of this horror are the daughters of that anxious audience. One is a shy, lonely girl who finally works up the courage to try to meet some nice guys. The other is more experienced at the bars, but underneath she is a dedicated, life-affirming nurse in an old folks' home. What the audience sees is an embodiment of its fearful fantasy—the innocent daughter brutalized by men from a world that has gone beyond our control. We need the Strike Force's power—and the reassuring certainty and swiftness of its investigations—to cope with that chaos.

But the sexual politics of *Strike Force* has more rhetorical impact than this appeal to authority. The show is obviously horrified at the atrocities, but the horror is neither feminist nor puritanical. The cops flirt with every girl they meet, and, as we saw, aren't above enjoying a vulgar story or a pilgrimage to a strip joint. The punks dominate and destroy women by a violence that the cops abhor, but the cops themselves reaffirm traditional male power over women, which includes the duty to protect them. *Strike Force* allows the audience its fearful and sadistic fantasy and at the same time flatters its values and institutions.

What *Strike Force* does with sexual fears, *McClain's Law* does with economic anxiety. Here the victims are hardware-store owners, neighborhood restaurant managers, representatives of the economic system on its most intimate and local level. The enemy is the hardened criminal of the underclass. The show depends on its audience's physical fear in its own businesses and homes, and more profoundly on its economic fear of that underclass. Certainly the physical fear the show exploits has its ground in real city experiences, but for the large

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majority of the show's audience, its economic fearfulness of the underclass is more central. Either the underclass is competing for the audience's jobs and privileges, or it is indulging in legalized theft by welfare and Food Stamps. So the moment when the decent storeowner fires four shots into the punk gives the finishing touch to a fantasy of class revenge.

But the cunning of the episode is its one deviation from the formula. Throughout most of the show we are watching NRA propaganda—the reason for possessing a gun is the failure of government to protect innocent citizens; the user of a gun must be trained and responsible; the benefit of owning a gun is an increased sense of self-reliance and freedom. When this formula is broken by the storeowner with the stricken conscience, the show manages to have it both ways; it avoids fully affirming violence while it adopts a tone of tragic necessity. Violence, it suggests, is inevitable in this corrupt world, but the good citizen resorts to it only as a last alternative—in the void left by government irresponsibility. At the end it is the police who save the hero, and their responsiveness to his dilemma turns the show into a more hopeful fantasy of the government finally come round, at least serving the citizens it had deserted in the name of reform and equality.

THESE SHOWS, THEN, are dramatic allegories of domestic, new right ideology. But to regard them as overt propaganda would be to exaggerate the commitment and involvement of TV as a system. TV works as propaganda, but it functions in a more subtle and amoral way. TV wants to satisfy any constituency that it can discern. It is willing to enact almost any political fantasy—it can turn any faction into a market. What gives us *Strike Force* also gives us *Hill Street Blues'* air of tough-minded liberalism. To the system that produces these shows, liberal and conservative ideologies have one thing in common—they can be used to sell products.

The propaganda power of TV does not lie in its political message, it lies in the economic behavior it stimulates. The function of *Strike Force* is not to indoctrinate: it is to confirm the audience in a passive state of mind so that the real job, of marketing, can proceed. These shows reaffirm the received values of their audience, but that is a means to an end, not the end itself. What TV wants from its audience is not belief but the proper economic behavior.

In this way TV differs importantly from film, which, having to sell no product other than itself, can have as its very function the dissemination of a political allegory. The anticorporate messages of Jane Fonda's recent movies are their reason for being; the neoconservatism of a film like *Absence of Malice* can legitimately be read as subtle and effective indoctrination. But on TV the political allegory is always a function of the economic needs of the medium, and for this reason the medium necessarily supports the very social inertia that it reflects. The message is simply a demand to buy, to affirm the economic system in the most tangible way possible. The politics of the audience matter only as keys to their manipulation. No matter what the politics, the person who is watching television is participating in the system, and that is all TV asks. □

Steve Meiss

Airborn — Again

From the moment the first bit of political awareness dawned on me I spent a lot of time being annoyed at William F. Buckley, Jr. Lately I've been wondering why he persists in his loud and public rituals of intellectual scratching and self-righteousness. He has, to my mind, spent his entire adult life defending his right to wallow in luxury amidst oceans of poverty, defending the indefensible. Though it would be comforting to find Buckley stupid, he obviously isn't.

Not long ago I treated myself to an hour and 20 minutes of Buckley. The first hour was his own *Firing Line* (interesting metaphor), the last 20 minutes a puff-ball cutesie-poo profile of the great man by Morley Safer.

Buckley devoted his show to an attempt at convincing the Reverend William Sloane Coffin that America's most pressing need is to build more and bigger nuclear weapons and that our second most pressing problem is curing ourselves of the idea that nuclear war is both unthinkable and insane—though I may have his priorities backward.

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Buckley's notions of liberty and freedom are even weirder than I had thought. He spent the whole hour expressing not only a willingness to risk Armageddon, in pious defense of his cherished ideals, but I got the impression that he is somehow actually looking forward to risking it. (The Reverend Coffin seemed to share my impression.)

Whatever Mr. Buckley's real feelings about the desirability of nuclear war, I cannot take his genuflections to it in the name of freedom at face value in light of his unceasing support of some of the world's most tyrannical regimes, such as Pinochet's Chile, Somoza's Nicaragua, and bigotry's South Africa. Nor is it likely that Mr. Buckley is so dense that he can't see that political freedom and economic freedom are interdependent.

So what is it with this guy? Why all the newspeak and doublethink? Perhaps Buckley's abuse of the king's English is part of the answer. He displays a disturbing penchant for confusing the symbols of reality with reality itself. He reminds me of Lewis Carroll's caterpillar. This is all the more disturbing when one considers that Buckley apparently attaches far more importance to being precise in his own mind than to communicating his ideas to others. To top this off he uses the wrong words on occasion. Witness the title of his book on how the filthy rich while away their spare time puttering about in boats. He titled it *Airborne*. To be borne is to be "supported by." A boat is not supported by air. A boat is water-borne, even if it is moved over the medium that supports it by a differential in air pressure we call wind. "Water-borne" wouldn't be a very snazzy title, though. Still, a certain amount of precision was sacrificed here for the sake of pizzaz, unless Mr. Buckley thinks that the word is indeed real. Now if he can make the word real I can't argue with him about anything; then everything he says must be true. Nuclear war then is indeed "winnable."

"What's My Disease?"

I am trying to sell the TV networks on a new program. It's a sure winner. It cashes in on the popularity of the Doctor programs, and at the same time draws on the Quiz fans. The ratings will be enormous. The title of the program will be *What's My Disease?*

A distinguished panel of physicians is introduced and seated at a long table, facing the audience. The contestant-patient then is brought in, to face the doctors. The doctors, by asking the contestant clever questions, diagnose his disease, or try to—such questions as "Is your disease caused by a known micro-organism? Does it cause pain in the region of the Nuciform Sac? Is it invariably fatal?" The panel would be allowed a specified number of questions, after which they would have to guess the disease, or the contestant would win. If he won he would be awarded an appropriate prize, such as six free house calls, a free operation or, where warranted, a free funeral. If one of the doctors guessed the disease, he would be awarded a prize, such as free legal defense at his next malpractice suit.

The program could be livened up by the introduction of "distinguished guest panelists." A full-fledged jungle witch doctor, complete with nose bone, would excite interest, as would a psychic healer. Robert Young might be induced to appear wearing his *Dr. Marcus Welby* costume. A veterinarian would be useful when contestants could not answer questions; vets are good with patients who cannot describe their symptoms.

The program staff would try to find contestants with rare or unusual diseases. Something like Henoch-Schönlein's Purpura, for example.

In cases where the physical appearance of the contestant might reveal his disease, the panel would have to be blindfolded. Bubonic plague, for example, produces skin eruptions that are very distinctive. Any doctor who had read medieval history would have no trouble with it. Although the idea of doctors reading history may seem ludicrous to some, it is not an impossibility.

The big thing would be the popularity of the program. An added bonus: the stations could chalk up the program against the time the FCC requires for programs of an educational or informative nature.

Sponsors would be no problem. Medicaid mills and drug companies would be naturals. Cemeteries and funeral homes would probably want a piece of the action, though they would add a note of unwelcome morbidity to the program. Morbidity would be a mistake.

STEPHEN ROANE □

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IN SAFER'S SHOW, two things stuck out. One was a clip of Buckley confessing, in what he himself seemed to regard as a moment of self-deprecating humor, that he had lost $6 million on the *National Review*. That is to say he has spent $6 million of his inheritance defending the right of the rich to really put it to the poor. . . .

Safer, none too subtly, implied that Ronald Reagan is in fact a creation of William F. Buckley, Jr. ("Now there is Ronald Reagan. Before there was Ronald Reagan there was Barry Goldwater. Before there was Barry Goldwater there was the *National Review*, and before there was the *National Review* there was the idea of the *National Review* in the mind of Bill Buckley.") Buckley himself made no attempt to dispute the idea; I got the impression that he agreed with it. Fair enough; but why settle for being the king-maker when you might be king? Look, after all, at the king that has been made.

If, as Mr. Reagan's advisers have offered, what you see is what you get, what we got was a cowboy version of Jerzy Kosinski's character Chance, the gardener, a genial buffoon molded like so much putty by men who think they've seen the word of God held aloft by His invisible hand.

This brings me to the one thing about Buckley I have always overlooked and that is the religious baggage he carries around. The tenets of his faith decree, as I read it, that wealth and pride are not high on the list of qualities God looks for in us sinners. Might not Mr. Buckley fear that on Judgment Day he will be like the camel trying to pass through the needle's eye? This does seem like a reasonable fear—unless one could prove that Jesus is a laissez-faire capitalist. If Jesus would be advocating a "free market" then you could spend $6 million writing your own letter of indulgence, and your salvation would be assured.

HOW DO ALL THESE PIECES FIT together to explain Bill Buckley's dizzy antics? Maybe they don't, but they give me an idea for a byzantine novel. This novel is going to be about some Irish-American kid who is born into great wealth and spends the rest of his life trying to justify his fortune and privilege in the eyes of a God who demands humility and charity from His children. My protagonist will really want to go for the humility and charity stuff but he can't quite draw the line between secular and spiritual salvation. So the God of his upbringing will not grant him the absolution he so desperately wants. Eventually my hero will abandon the God he knew as a child and will immediately replace Him with another God whom he will call Natural Law. (There is only one God and Milton Friedman is His prophet.) This new God will tell him everything he wants to hear. The defense of his unearned riches will no longer be sophistry. Now it will be a liturgy, a worship of certain truth. But a truth shared with no one is no truth at all, so he will proselytize and will bear witness to his God—in public, loudly. Other souls living in fear of their good fortune will join his church. They will worship together while yachting off Newport.

Yet this congregation will still yearn for ordeal, for sanctification. So they will choose from among their ranks some simple-minded fellow—perhaps one who has lived his whole life in the fantasy land of movies, TV, and the General Electric Corporation, to lead them to a purifying trial. They will spend years training this guy to be a Judas goat who will lead them to the holy place. Then they will give their dim-witted automaton the purifying flame, the man-made incarnation of the sun god's fiery heart. Then the blind Judas goat, thinking he's only playing a role in an elaborate Audie Murphy western, will lead those troubled souls and the rest of the world to the altar in the nuclear *abattoir* to be purified. I know that this is a ridiculous plot. Of course, nothing like this could ever occur in real life; but all the same it should make an interesting story. I think I'll call it *God and Man Aboard Looking Glass.* □

Myth and Ideology
in
U. S. Foreign Policy:

East Timor and El Salvador

by Noam Chomsky

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Dan Rothstein

A Troubled Israeli Patriot

THE WEST BANK STORY, by Rafik Halabi. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 304 pp. $12.95.

On the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, the protests, demonstrations, and riots by Palestinians are intensifying. After the return of the Sinai, Israel's refusal to consider relinquishing any more territory has helped stir a new wave of anti-Israeli activity. The formal annexation of the Golan Heights now has even provoked violent opposition from the formerly quiescent Arab Druze sect. In response to all this unrest, Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon vows to continue a policy of harshly putting down any signs of Palestinian opposition. Prime Minister Begin's government declares that the 1.1 million Palestinians living in the occupied territories will have to accept permanent Israeli rule, signaling the hardening of a shortsighted position. This policy, however, does not go uncontested in Israel.

The West Bank Story, by Rafik Halabi, an Israeli television correspondent, presents some of the Israeli opposition's thinking. Halabi, a member of the Druze sect (one of only two Arab sects that serve in the Israeli army), has written an account of his life and work that offers a powerful exposition of the dangers inherent in the present government's policies. His book does more than cover many of today's immediate problems in Israel and the West Bank. As a man caught between two nationalisms, who defines himself as an Israeli patriot though he is not a Jew, Halabi's account invites attention to broad issues.

The book focuses on the conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians by tracing the deepening of that antagonism since the 1967 Six-Day War. Taken aback by its success in 1967, Israel was ill-prepared to rule over a million Palestinians who were living on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. Halabi describes the emergence of two different approaches to that rule. One proposed that the occupied territories be used as a bargaining chip, to be given up in exchange for a real and lasting peace with neighboring countries. The other, opposing view, at the time a minority position, argued that the territories should be annexed. As for developing a strategy for rule in the territories, temporary or permanent, Halabi cites the advice of Yigal Allon, the late deputy prime minister, who warned that, in shaping its occupation policy, Israel must recognize its opportunity to establish genuine coexistence.

HALABI RECOUNTS AND COMMENTS on the years and events that followed. He relates that immediately after the '67 war Arab leaders in East Jerusalem persuaded the local population to maintain order and to refrain from any act that might provoke the military government. Yet the cooperation they initially advocated was soon to change into open confrontation. By the end of June 1967 the Knesset had formally annexed East Jerusalem, and new Jewish neighborhoods began to spring up in that part of the city. In July local Arab leaders began to organize resistance. Israel responded by deporting the first group of political leaders (not to Jordan or Lebanon as soon became official practice but, interestingly enough, to other cities in Israel proper). These deportations, Halabi writes, whatever they may have achieved from the Israelis' point of view, only hardened the opposition of local Arab leaders.

On the West Bank, Halabi relates, Israeli policy

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did manage to quiet a large segment of the local population. But from the outset some, including the Union of Palestinian Teachers, encouraged civil disobedience. Others went further and joined a network of terrorist cells organized by then little-known Yasir Arafat, who had slipped across the Jordanian border into the West Bank at the beginning of the occupation. Although all leaders articulated some kind of unified opposition to Israeli rule, the West Bank Arab leadership was far more divided than the community in Jerusalem. Those in the south, linked to Sheikh Ja'abri, the mayor of Hebron, favored close ties to Jordan's King Hussein and temporary acquiescence in Israeli rule. Those in the north rallied to the more radical leadership in the cities of Nablus and Ramallah. In the Gaza Strip, terrorist cells dominated political life.

All the areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip gradually moved toward open confrontation with the military authorities. Yet, Halabi writes, the military still believed it could quiet the local population because, as one senior military official put it, "the Arabs are intimidated by force, and a firm hand will settle them down." At one point the military government dismissed Rashad A-Shawa, the mayor of Gaza, for having refused to follow orders. The dismissal backfired, sparking more acts of violence against the military. Soon thereafter the military governor asked the deposed mayor to resume his duties, and only then did anti-Israeli actions subside.

Even if resistance was temporarily thwarted, political jostling in the wider Arab world influenced the development of a fiercer and radicalized opposition to the occupation. In 1970 King Hussein, threatened by the growing influence of the PLO in Jordan, massacred thousands of Palestinians and drove those who remained alive to new refugee camps in Lebanon. Halabi then heard many Israeli army officers conclude that the Palestinian movement was in its death throes. But these attacks and hardships only alienated West Bank residents from King Hussein and drove them into the arms of the PLO. The little support Hussein still retained in the West Bank was eroded even further when he refrained from entering the 1973 Arab-Israeli war.

In December 1974, a conference of Arab nations in Rabat, Morocco, recognized the PLO as the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, thereby initiating, Halabi writes, a new era on the West Bank. Dramatic changes followed in the relationship between Palestinians and Israelis in the occupied territories. At just this time Halabi began his career as the Israeli television correspondent responsible for covering the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.

ISRAEL WAS MORE DIVIDED than ever. What had been two differing political views after the 1967 war had evolved into a bitter and emotional confrontation between two camps. One, growing in influence, called for unilateral annexation based on historical right and security imperatives. The other side argued that suppressing another people could certainly not guarantee the country's security and would lead to moral decay. While these positions hardened in Israel, conflict between Palestinians and Israelis deepened as resistance to the military government increased.

Halabi, as a highly visible television reporter, often was an easy target for both Palestinians and Israelis unwilling to consider the legitimacy of each other's positions or needs. Resented by those Israelis who did not appreciate his commitment to presenting all sides of the news, and detested by many Palestinians because of his continuing identification as an Israeli, Halabi had to face the tragic irony of being attacked by both sides.

As an Israeli, Halabi had an impeccable background. Early in his life, with the encouragement of a strongly pro-Zionist father, he had left his native Druze village near Haifa to study at an elite Jewish high school. From there he went to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and graduated with a degree in the Hebrew language and literature. Then came his post as an assistant to Teddy Kollek, the mayor of Jerusalem, and thereafter service in the army's officer corps. With each step his personal life and career were tied more strongly to the fate of the country.

At the television authority, a state-funded but semi-independent body, Halabi joined a group of Israelis committed to the highest standards of critical, in-depth investigative reporting. Their dedication to addressing all aspects of Israeli society, including the most unpleasant, incurred the wrath of the present government and of the Labor governments that preceded it. Presenting the news no matter what the consequences (including threats on his life), Halabi was soon accepted as a friend and colleague. Reflecting the views of many who worked with him in Israeli television, he writes of how he believed, when he began working, that

> . . . if I presented the harsh truth about life in the territories, I could make the Israelis see that their blind devotion to the conventional wisdom was actually undermining the security of the State of Israel. I wanted desperately to believe that the faithful reporting of events could somehow bridge the yawning chasm between two peoples and revive

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the hope in the prospect of attaining peace through mutual respect and recognition.

After a year on the job, Halabi regretfully realized the difficulty of bridging that chasm.

The events Halabi covered in the years that followed did little to bring the two peoples closer together. In April 1976 the Labor party allowed municipal elections on the West Bank, fully expecting the PLO to call for a boycott. Surprised by the PLO decision to encourage participation, the government was even more overwhelmed by the outcome of the voting. Swept out of office were the older leaders who had advocated loyalty to Hussein and cooperation with the military government; swept in was a group of young, educated, and fairly wealthy new leaders most of whom identified openly with the PLO.

The following spring another radical leader came into power, this time in Israel. And with Menahem Begin's election, the establishment of Jewish West Bank settlements by the ultranationalist Gush Emmunim group, which had begun in 1973 during the Labor party's administration, increased significantly. By December 1980 there were 68 such settlements (though with a population of only 17,500 people) strategically scattered all over the West Bank; more have been added since.

This increased settlement activity following the 1977 elections heightened Arab fears about the intentions of the Begin government. At the same time the new Arab leadership on the West Bank began to take positions that were independent of the official PLO policy made in Beirut. They called, for example, for coexistence based on a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel. The often mentioned desire in some Israeli political circles for an indigenous Palestinian leadership willing to deal with the Israelis seemed to materialize.

Tragically, the move toward peace with Egypt decreased the likelihood of any dialogue between the Israeli government and the West Bank leadership. Believing themselves threatened by the Camp David accords, the mayors, despite some popular demonstrations of support for Sadat, followed PLO directives and denounced the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty. The Begin government, on its part, anxious to establish what it called "irrevocable facts," increased the settlements in the occupied territories and reacted harshly to Palestinian protests. This tough policy only strengthened the resolve of the opposition. When a government attempt to expel the mayor of Nablus, Basem Shaka, was blocked by the Israeli Supreme Court, the Arab mass demonstrations that followed prompted Ibrahim Tawil, the former mayor of El-Bireh, to tell Halabi: "I'm glad that Shaka was arrested. It would have taken us years of struggle to reach this kind of mass unity and elation." Eventually though, after surviving an attack on his life, Shaka as well as Tawil and other West Bank mayors were dismissed by the military government in the spring of 1982.

Despite hostility from both sides, Halabi continued to report on settlement activity and the resulting opposition among West Bank Arabs. He uncovered many of the rabidly anti-Jewish statements made by West Bank leaders. However, in June 1980, when he reported on the expropriation of private lands (rather than "public domain") for the sake of building the Elon Moreh settlement near Nablus, Halabi was attacked in the Knesset by Ariel Sharon, the man in charge of the settlements and then minister of agriculture. Soon thereafter, Halabi's responsibilities were restricted by the director of the television authority (a recent Begin appointee); he no longer had the right to cover any activities connected with Jewish settlements on the West Bank.

HAVING WITNESSED and reported on such crucial events in recent Israeli history, Halabi provides valuable insight into today's problems in the occupied territories. Unfortunately, his book fails adequately to address some other important aspects of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians.

First, Halabi's treatment of Israeli opposition to the settlement activity and government policy is insufficient. He seems to assume his readers' prior knowledge of that by no means trivial public opposition. Given the space he devotes to the PLO and Jewish settlement activity, one might have expected a full discussion of the Israeli peace movement, its strengths and weaknesses.

Second, the book focuses on a few major personalities, glossing over the real divisions in Palestinian society between wealthy landowners and political leaders on one side and the poor fellahin (peasants) on the other—although the more oppressive aspects of the occupation may have united them for now. It might also have been valuable to discuss which Palestinians have benefited economically from the occupation. Has the opening of job opportunities for Palestinians in low-paying jobs in Israel increased or decreased the gap between the wealthy and the poor? How has this affected the politics of the region, if at all?

Finally, Israeli society is also divided along class and cultural lines in ways that may indirectly influence government policy in the territories. For example, Oriental Jews, who came originally from

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Arab countries in North Africa and the Middle East (where many of them suffered harsh discrimination and persecution), are often said to be supporting Begin, primarily because of his chauvinistic and anti-Arab policies. Alas, however, the Oriental Jews have also suffered economically, culturally, and politically at the hands of various Israeli Labor party governments. Has that past experience discouraged them from moving away from Begin now, despite the present government's diversion of scarce resources away from social needs in Israel to the West Bank settlements (populated almost entirely by Ashkenazi, not Oriental, Gush Emmunim settlers)? Halabi's comments on these matters—also part of the larger West Bank story—would have been relevant.

Despite these failings, the author's unique perspective and intelligence makes the book informative and interesting, offering an analysis of the past as well as suggestions for the future. Halabi concludes the book with a warning that the relentless friction between Israelis and Palestinians is bound to polarize the two camps ever more drastically. He nevertheless continues to hope, believing that he and others who share these concerns not only can but must act soon to prevent further polarization. □

Robert Leiter

Dispensing with Justice

THE CHILD SAVERS: JUVENILE JUSTICE OBSERVED, by Peter S. Prescott. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 244 pp. $12.95.

Peter Prescott, book critic of *Newsweek,* wrote this study of the Juvenile Justice System in New York City, knowing and keeping in mind that he was not qualified to discuss either the causes of juvenile crime or the means of preventing it. He intended simply to portray the process of justice, without offering solutions.

> I wanted particularly to write about some aspect of the condition of human rights in our society today. It seemed to me that if, as I suspect, these rights are not a stable commodity, children (who are often held by our society to be marginal citizens) might have the most difficulty maintaining theirs. Perhaps the best place to watch these rights deteriorating would be a courtroom from which both press and public are excluded.

The reasons for the exclusion of press and public have their origin in the establishment of the juvenile courts:

> From its inception in medieval English chancery courts, juvenile law has been of all legal disciplines . . . the least firmly grounded in the assumption and traditions of "due process." From its inception, juvenile law has been carefully isolated from the rigors and precedents of common law; in fact, its philosophical underpinnings derive not from law but from humanitarian concerns and from prevailing fashions in sociology.

Parens patriae was the earliest expression of this concern, "a legal provision allowing the state to assume, in the event of presumed parental default, responsibility for the custody and protection of children within its jurisdiction—and of their property interests as well." But *parens patriae* is viewed by legal historians, either with irony or contempt, as merely a "quasi-legal camouflage for a multitude of legal sins."

The philosophy that supports the juvenile court is based on the works of Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria. Both believed that the law should provide penalties severe enough to maintain security and order but that anything beyond this was tyranny. The concept came to be known as the "laissez-faire" approach to crime. A criminal was to be punished only after the crime was committed, and the punishment was to be specific in the hope of deterring future criminals.

As Prescott notes, these theories "fit the American temper—its can-do optimism, its hustling determination to do good, to do the impossible, to straighten out intractable problems with liberal lashings of generosity and technology." Juvenile court was to be the child's friend, "the state as wise adult sitting in for the child's defaulting parents." The emphasis upon a "personalized" and "socialized" justice allowed lawmakers to proclaim constitutional guarantees unnecessary. Because children were not considered criminals—were, in fact, considered incapable of committing a crime—they would not be granted equality under the law, nor would they be stigmatized by a criminal record. Press and public were barred from the court to protect the child's interests.

But because there were no restraints upon the

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court, judges did as they wished with children. Decisions were rarely monitored. And this has continued almost unabated to the present. Today lawyers are not unwelcome in the juvenile system, but "in the profession's opinion it is not a forum for real law (and certainly not for real fees)." For instance, hearsay testimony is permitted in child-abuse cases. And many attorneys

> . . . seem unfamiliar with a basic premise of trial practice, which is that the business of a defense lawyer is to defend his client vigorously, and not condescend to him or, having predetermined his guilt, conspire with judge and prosecutor to arrive at a semblance of equity.

Through the work of one man, a lawyer named Charles Schinitsky, who plays a prominent role in *The Child Savers*, many of these abuses are beginning to be corrected. Schinitsky has argued that when a defendant may lose his liberty, then by rights the case is an adversary proceeding. Singlehandedly he has insisted that lawyers always be present in New York juvenile-court hearings as checks against the abuse of judicial power. But though Schinitsky has accomplished much, the New York City courts are, as Prescott shows, a troubling mess.

A GRAVE PROBLEM of juvenile justice centers on how juvenile criminality is viewed by our society. The more violent the incident, the greater the attention shown. But though Prescott, by his own admission, gives an unbalanced amount of attention to violent crimes, and though

> . . . there are children from whom society must be protected. . . . *what the press doesn't tell us . . . is* how few of these sensational cases there really are, what a small percentage they represent among the hundreds of thousands of children who run afoul of the law.

For example, there are the cases of PINS (People In Need of Supervision). At the worst, Prescott says, these children are ungovernable. "At best, they are victims of parents who need help in raising children, or who want the state to relieve them of their children. More often than not, the parents don't know what they want."

Abuse and neglect cases are legally difficult to define. The law guardian is placed in a difficult position, for the child is not the accused and often is not present at the hearing. Yet the Lawyers' Code of Responsibility is clear on the matter: a lawyer must represent the will of the client. But what do you do, Schinitsky asks, when a kid who's had both arms broken wants to return to his home? Insisting on the child's best interests tends to cloud the issue. And one of the saddest ironies about abuse cases is that, though the parents are at fault, it is the child who is shipped off to an institution.

In one of the many disturbing case studies that Prescott cites, a mother, Delores Martin, was accused of lesbian practices with her four-year-old daughter, Lila. "The case is odder than it sounds, for shocking as the allegation is, no one seriously thinks the child much damaged by these events; they must serve as an excuse to pry the girl away from a mother who is demonstrably mad."

It was Emily White, a particularly competent and sensitive worker at the Neglect and Abuse Bureau, who devised a game in which Lila confessed to what her mother had done. " 'You be the mother,' Emily said, 'and you do to me what she did to you. . . . ' " Lila, obviously bright but frightened, after a time complied.

Delores Martin saw nothing wrong in having sex with her child.

> She belongs to a family homosexual group called "The Cloth," which meets regularly in her home and includes Lila's paternal grandmother. Though she is on welfare, Martin claims to play pro ball and expects to be paid $17,000 when, any day now, she is called to play for a team called the Nationals which is managed by Yogi Berra. Her skill in baseball has something to do with the "new eyes" she received as a child, after plastic surgery.

The case was only resolved when Lila's father sued for custody, and won. But he was characterized in the proceedings as a wino who had never married Delores and who had once attempted suicide.

> From time to time, Delores Martin has appeared in Family Court seeking a modification of visiting rights, but each time the judge has denied her application. There is no reason to think the case is finished. Such cases in Family Court tend to continue indefinitely.

THOUGH THE FOCUS of *The Child Savers* is narrow, the book comes to tell us much about our country's entire justice system. It is all here: the lawyers who put their names in for occasional Family Court work, not because they are idealistic but because they are incompetent and need the money; these same second- and third-rate lawyers buying their way into judgeships; probation officers in despair over psychiatric reports filled with Freudian jargon; police officers at odds with district attorneys who, they contend, "manage to combine laziness with overwork and who will allow two killers immunity if they will testify against a third, 'when all three of them should fry.' "

But what is most distressing is that if we search

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through any of the literature on the juvenile justice system—say, Lois Forer's *No One Will Lissen*, Lisa Richette's *The Throwaway Children*, or the chapter on the subject in Charles Silberman's *Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice*—we find that since the early 1960s nothing has changed. We now have only a larger bureaucratic and legal maze.

Mr. Prescott cannot be held accountable for presenting us with a lamentable situation. He wrote his book in the best journalistic tradition—to point out that a situation exists. He offers the Charles Schinitskys and Emily Whites as the true heroes of his sad tale. We can only hope that such people continue their fine work and emerge victorious. □

Rand Smith

Modes of Power In the Coal Fields

POWER AND POWERLESSNESS: QUIESCENCE AND REBELLION IN AN APPALACHIAN VALLEY, by John Gaventa. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 267 pp. $16.95.

In this study of a coal-producing valley in central Appalachia, John Gaventa recounts one of his earliest experiences in the region—a conversation with a retired miner living in one of the valley's innumerable hollers. Accompanied by a local community organizer, Gaventa had climbed the narrow path to the miner's cabin to seek his support for a citizens' lawsuit challenging the low taxation of surrounding coal property. As Gaventa and the organizer described the local injustices they had "discovered," they registered the miner's reaction. To their disappointment, he showed no surprise, no outrage, only resigned acceptance. How, confronted by glaring inequities and exploited openly by a dominating coal company, could this miner and thousands like him in the valley so passively accept their condition?

This is the central issue of Gaventa's study, and his answer is clear: to understand why people do not rebel in situations of exploitation, one must understand power relationships. For Gaventa power is more than repression, coercion, or even influence; it is also the capacity to determine which issues become "proper and acceptable" subjects for public debate. Power is the cultural and ideological domination of peoples' *perceptions* of their situation—in a word, their consciousness.

Power and Powerlessness is a case study of how powerful interests linked to a multinational energy corporation exercise domination over the people of Clear Fork Valley, near the Cumberland Gap on the Kentucky-Tennessee border. Following an extended (overly so, to my mind) theoretical discussion of power, Gaventa divides his study into three parts. The first examines the historical formation of power relationships in the valley, focusing on early coal development and efforts to unionize. As the U.S. became industrialized in the late 19th century, demand for coal rose and the mountains of Appalachia swarmed with developers and speculators snapping up coal rights from unassuming mountaineers. One of these was a Scot, Alexander Arthur, who formed a London-based company called American Association, Ltd. and secured coal rights to over 80,000 acres in Clear Fork Valley for as little as 50 cents an acre. Arthur built a local coal empire that soon determined economic life, political institutions, and, more subtly but just as surely, set the dominant values of the valley.

Arthur's coal empire dictated a new economic order, destroying noncommercial farming and imposing dangerous work, low wages, and economic dependency on the local population. Resistance to the company proved futile. For the miners, economic survival meant bending to the company's will. In turn, the local political authorities bent to the need to establish a "good business climate." The traditional culture of the mountaineers was simultaneously degraded and appropriated: the new elite patronized the locals as "idle and shiftless" and renamed towns, schools, and streets. Why was there no rebellion? Gaventa tells us

> . . . the answer lies in the powers of the industrial society for establishing control and for breeding consensus. The process was like a colonizing process; the development of dominance of one set of values and procedures over another . . . out of which the dominant set of values and procedures is accepted by the colonized.

In this first section of the book, we are also given an account of the "rise and quelling" of union protest, focusing especially on the Depression coal wars of 1929–33. The sad fact is that rank-and-file militancy met fierce resistance not only from coal

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owners and their political flunkies. In the fall of 1933, when the miners of this area (UMWA District 19) sought to gain control over their union, they were crushed by John L. Lewis, who also imposed his own "consensus" and proceeded to rule through a hand-picked representative, William Turnblazer. Turnblazer remained District 19 president for many years, then was replaced by his son, William Jr., who was convicted in 1972 along with other District 19 officials for conspiracy to murder the leader of the UMWA reform movement, Jock Yablonski.

There are problems with this analysis. In addition to drawing questionable parallels between the Arthur-dominated coal empire and the Lewis-ruled UMWA, this section raises but does not adequately resolve a fundamental problem inherent in the author's "ideological domination" approach to power. Even if one accepts his "colonization" analogy, how does one establish that ". . . the dominant set of values and procedures (was) accepted by the colonized"? Gaventa's approach is to analyze what he inelegantly calls the "ideological apparatus," or the process that shaped people's wants and beliefs: the introduction of consumerist values by the new elite, control over "the socializing agencies of government, church, school," and so on. But how can we be certain that these values were *accepted* "by the colonized"? The obvious answer is that without measuring the values of the people themselves, we cannot be certain. And this the author does not—perhaps cannot—provide.

The second section, "The Maintenance of Power Relationships," brings the historical discussion into the present and again draws an equivalence between coal company and UMWA domination. This section is the weakest of the book. Originally written as an Oxford Ph.D. thesis, it contains lapses into "dissertationese"—jargon and convoluted statistical manipulations.

A chapter on the UMWA again demonstrates the pitfalls of the "ideological domination" approach. Gaventa asks: Why did District 19 continue to support Tony Boyle and oppose the reform movement in the UMWA? (Boyle was defeated in a special 1972 election by Arnold Miller, 56 percent to 44 percent; but in District 19 he received 81 percent.) His answer: "The position of dependency within the union, relative to the powerlessness outside it, allowed and encouraged the response of loyalty to the regime when challenge to it occurred." Plausible; but the evidence is thin. Galenta cites a few "myths" that were widely circulated by Boyle forces about Yablonski and his outside supporters, but he gives no evidence that these myths were more widely accepted in District 19 than elsewhere. To do so would require a comparison of District 19 with anti-Boyle districts, but this is not attempted.

The author's own evidence supports an alternative explanation for the vote for Boyle in District 19: the district frequently received huge "loans" from the International. Didn't District 19 officers and members have good *material* reasons for supporting Boyle? Does one then need to speak of "ideological domination"?

THE MOUNTING OF PROTEST against the coal company by people in the valley is the theme of the final section, and this is the book's most original part. It shows the conditions under which rebellion becomes possible and demonstrates the limits of that rebellion.

Rebellion becomes possible when people begin to believe in their collective power. In Clear Fork Valley, this occurred in 1972 when a crew from England arrived to make a film about American Association's operations in the valley. At first fearful to speak before cameras because of possible reprisals, local citizens came to see the filming as an opportunity to address grievances to their absentee owners indirectly through the media. The citizens later obtained a copy of the film and used it to build support within the valley and elsewhere. "Outside agitators"—the film crew and community organizers, including the author—were probably a precondition for this protest.

This section describes various approaches the citizens took to confront American Association: appeals to regulatory agencies regarding the company's destructive strip-mining, media campaigns in the U.S. and Britain, attempts to form a stockholders' protest, and so on. The people learn that the company's power has many faces. If "consensus" no longer works, other guises are required: political influence, legal maneuvering, threats, and repression. In the end, the company's resources simply overwhelm the protest, and the movement subsides. But the people had gained, however briefly, a sense of collective strength, and the company no longer could easily equate quiescence with loyalty.

Whatever its problems of method, *Power and Powerlessness* is to be saluted for underlining the importance of "ideological domination" in power relationships. While difficult to measure, such domination surely exists. The author's approach clashes sharply with much contemporary research that either interprets quiescence as a sign of positive approval of the status quo or views rebellion as the inevitable consequence of anger generated by oppressive conditions. He attempts to demonstrate

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that oppressive conditions do not necessarily generate anger and rebellion while also cautioning that quiescence may not indicate approval of one's plight but may result from domination of consciousness by those who wield power. This book joins a handful of studies, such as Barrington Moore's *Injustice* and Sennett and Cobb's *The Hidden Injuries of Class*, which examine, in Moore's phrase, "the social bases of obedience and revolt." □

Lloyd Harrington

A Good Voice in Canada

The Good Fight: Political Memoirs 1909-1958, by David Lewis. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada. 542 pp. $24.95.

With the death of David Lewis in May 1981, democratic socialism in Canada lost one of its most dynamic leaders. In this volume of political memoirs Lewis records the intelligence and decency of a Russian-Jewish family that emigrated to Montreal in 1921. Young David, who at the age of 12 had to sit in class with six-year-olds because he did not speak English, was at Oxford 11 years later as a Rhodes scholar.

In Svisloch, a *shtetl* that became part of Poland at the end of World War I, David Lewis experienced three years of German occupation—to be followed, in 1919, by six months of Bolshevik rule. Of the two, Bolshevik occupation was more stressful. David's father, a leather worker and a leader in the local Bund, was arrested and in danger of execution for his Menshevik sympathies, which only confirmed his assessment of the Bolsheviks as inherently ruthless. Neither father nor son ever departed from that early evaluation.

In Montreal, Lewis senior became a cutter in a men's clothing firm, an active member of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union, of the Workmen's Circle and, somewhat later, Canadian secretary of the Jewish Labor Committee. Young David Lewis's first decade in a new land involved him in efforts to master a new language and to achieve good grades.

In 1930, Lewis's activity in the Montreal branch of the Young People's Socialist League took him to a Yipsel national conference in New York, where he met Walter Reuther. This friendship was to be of great value to a struggling Canadian socialist in the years ahead. And in the months prior to his July 1932 departure for Oxford, David Lewis participated in two Toronto meetings where a "brain trust" of the soon-to-be-established Cooperative Commonwealth Federation party (CCF) was organized as the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR). When he got back from Oxford, in August 1935, the CCF was a political reality.

Within days of that return to Montreal, David's, and his wife Sophie's, political life began to unfold. A four-page handwritten letter from CCF leader J. S. Woodsworth detailed the stark penury of the new party, but urged Lewis to aid the small Ottawa parliamentary group.

Lewis went to Ottawa to work at a legal job, and also as the unpaid assistant national secretary of the CCF. In 1938 he assumed the post of national secretary full-time. His return to the law, 12 years later, was dictated by the need to provide for his growing family.

While pursuing this more lucrative career in Toronto, Lewis served as national vice-chair, and later as national chairperson of the CCF in the 1950s. He took a leading role in the formation of the New Democratic party (NDP)—whose principal components were the Canadian Labour Congress and the CCF. In 1962 Lewis entered upon an impressive parliamentary career as MP for Toronto's South York constituency.

Ideologically, David Lewis projected opposition to all dogmatism. Lewis, with his European experiences, was much perturbed when North American socialists mindlessly repeated that fascism was simply the "final stage of capitalism." He was forthright in asserting that since fascism completely destroyed the working-class movement, it could reasonably be argued that the difference between capitalist democracy and fascism was the difference between life and death. "And that difference," Lewis was to insist, "is big enough."

Lewis had been a first-hand witness to the disunity of the left in Europe, and in the context of the early 1930s he was to entertain some thoughts of unity with the Communists. But he was quick to sense, even with Moscow's about-face in 1935, a continuing, if now unexpressed, conviction in the

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Communist camp that social democrats remained the enemy.

Neither assimilationist nor religiously observant, the Lewis family in Canada adhered to their Jewish identity with pride. Respect for their ancestors was part of their lives. As socialists in the Bund tradition, however, they were not Zionists. This failure to make peace with the Zionists led to humiliating political defeat. In 1943, a still youthful David Lewis sought election to Canada's House of Commons from the largely Jewish riding of Montreal Cartier, where the Lewis parents still lived. With Lewis finishing at the very bottom of the poll—the successful candidate was a Communist!

But Lewis, even then, was in the painful process of accommodating himself, not so much to the ideology of Zionism—which he and his father had long rejected—as to the harsh realities of the Jewish predicament in the Hitler-blighted years.

Any solution that would provide a place of refuge for homeless and persecuted European Jews was welcome.

As a prominent political figure on the Ottawa scene, Lewis inevitably was involved in the constant pleading with federal bureaucrats and Members of Parliament about easing Canada's harshly restrictive immigration rules. Permitted entry, in David's words, were "pitifully few victims" of Hitler's madness. "I did not become a Zionist", he relates, "but I ceased being critical of Zionism because the survivors of Nazism . . . were entitled to find a home where they would feel fully secure and free as Jews."

THROUGHOUT THE 1950s the CCF opposed the policies of continentalism, which had long characterized the country's lop-sided economic development. If the energy ideas of the CCF had been implemented in those years, Canada would be far more free of external forces in that sensitive area today.

CCF leader M. J. Coldwell and his socialist colleagues, inside the House, with Lewis outside, as CCF national chairperson, vigorously advocated a publicly owned natural-gas pipeline that would bring the gas from Alberta's ample gas fields west to British Columbia and east to Ontario and beyond. Canada's Liberals were also urgently pressed by the CCF to develop a long-range national fuel plan that would comprehensively embrace coal, electric power, oil, and gas in a working partnership with the ten provinces. But Canada's federal Liberals dismissed the CCF proposals in favor of a plan to have a needed pipeline built through private—mainly U.S.—interests. When the funds required for the vast undertaking failed to materialize, the Liberal administration provided the money from the public treasury. Canadians were taxed to underwrite an outside takeover of essential natural resources!

It is a recurrent Lewis contention that ideology is far from dead, and he insists that democratic socialists are commonly less dogmatic than their "free-enterprise" adversaries. Lewis insists that "it is the defenders of the capitalist ethos who are doctrinaire."

In *The Next America* (1981) Michael Harrington has perceived the United States as being the "most ideological nation on the face of the earth." Clearly, David Lewis would have extended that perception northward to take in the branch plant operators and their political servants in his own land.

THE Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL), which has incorporated Canada's CIO affiliates and several purely national unions since the early 1940s, had given near-unanimous support to the CCF. But a majority in the older Trades and Labour Congress of Canada (TLC) had declined to support the socialists, in deference to traditional AFL policies. By the mid-1950s, however, with the merger of the two labor federations imminent, a majority for support of the CCF—or of a new party with the same social democratic philosophy—was evident. And the CCF, which was showing signs of running out of steam on its own, adapted itself with surprising grace to a projected union with the merged labor movement.

"The CCF," in Lewis's appreciative assessment, "was never a movement which degenerated into a party; it was always both at the same time." He recounts his efforts in those delicate transitions so needed to meld a Canadian unity of trade unions and democratic socialist thought.

It is unfortunate that David Lewis did not live to continue these perceptive memoirs: to include a record of his parliamentary years, and to evaluate his leadership of the New Democratic party. Only a full-scale biography of the eminent Canadian socialist can now fill that need. □

Coming
In Our Next Issue:

Socialism and the Gift Relationship

by Michael Walzer

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James P. Young

A Critique of the Welfare State

LEGITIMACY IN THE MODERN STATE, by John H. Schaar. New Brunswick: Transaction Books. 359 pp. $14.95.

This volume collects the essays of one of the most thoughtful academic theorists writing on American politics today. While not systematic, they are learned, eloquent, intellectually independent, deeply troubled and often deeply troubling.

Part of the interest of Schaar's work is that he does not fit easily into any of the standard ideological categories. On the dust jacket his publisher notes that he often draws on conservative sources and indeed he does. Moreover, he is frequently critical of the left in these essays. Schaar argues that if his criticism of the left seems disproportionate it is because the right has not succeeded in producing anything in recent years worth bothering with. If Schaar is a conservative at all, he is not the ordinary sort and is most certainly worth bothering with.

Schaar's position can perhaps best be defined negatively; above all else he is not a liberal. He is disturbed by the long association of liberalism with capitalism and despises that tradition's lack of concern for authority and community as well as its corresponding commitment to what he sees as a corrosive individualism. Following Hannah Arendt, Schaar believes we are well down the road to a loss of any humanly meaningful authority so that there is a real sense in which law and order is the basic issue of our time. But again, this is not the standard rightist vigilante position and Schaar warns us that we are perilously close to the condition against which Henry Adams warned when morality is confused with the police. We are faced with a crisis of legitimate authority, Schaar believes, with the absence of the sense of willing obedience that stems from the existence of a healthy social order.

If one must have a label to characterize Schaar's position it should probably be that of a radical democrat. Again following Arendt–and before Arendt, Aristotle–his deepest belief is that the life of politics, the life of "ruling and being ruled in turn," is the highest, most fully human form of life. "When we quit the field of politics," he writes, "we quit the best proving ground for the development of our humanity." Much of Schaar's argument results from his view of classical liberalism as a doctrine in which political action is systematically downgraded and in which the center of human activity is shifted away from the political arena into the sphere of economic striving. At its best, sometimes liberalism can be sublimated into artistic pursuits, as John Adams suggested when he said that he engaged in politics in the hope that his descendants would be spared that necessity and freed for higher things. Schaar is quite right to note the irony of the career of Henry Adams who *was* so spared and who anguished over it to the day of his death.

It is possible to sympathize with Schaar's position; to be able to participate meaningfully in politics is undoubtedly of great human importance and it is a right not readily available in complex, bureaucratized, representative democracies. And yes, it is true that liberalism—and even more specifically capitalist liberalism—has contributed to this situation. At the same time it is not at all clear that Schaar fully recognizes the potential dignity of the private life. Surely we would have missed the histories of Henry Adams had he been able to realize his political ambitions. . . .

What *is* genuinely disturbing is a political system that actively discourages participatory activity from those who wish to engage extensively in the life of politics. If that life is not necessarily the highest form of human action, it is surely of potential importance not only as a means for the protection of one's interests but also as a means of self-development and collective social reform. Among contemporary barriers to participation, however, one of the most important is economic deprivation. From this point of view, the welfare state with all its undisputed deficiencies is a vital necessity; it offers the hope—however frail—of distributing economic well-being widely enough to provide a common basis for political action.

Despite this, Schaar is, to say the least, not an enthusiast for the welfare state. In the war on poverty, he tells us, poverty won a decisive victory. But this is radically misleading. As Sar Levitan and Robert Taggert have shown in their fine study *Promise of Greatness*, the programs of the Great Society had a substantial positive effect, particularly for blacks and the poor, and there was even a modest, if temporary, movement toward redistribution. It is not a criticism of these programs as such that their effects were undermined by the war in

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Vietnam. Clearly, purposive social action undertaken by government can "work." As the Reagan administration progresses we shall discover the value of these programs—as they are eroded or destroyed.

BUT SCHAAR'S CRITIQUE of the welfare state goes much deeper than an assertion of its ineffectiveness. For him the welfare state is mistaken on principle because it is a part of the whole modern, Faustian project—the attempt to subordinate nature and the inevitable vise of large-scale, bureaucratic, and technologically dominated organizations that is associated with this ultimately Sisyphean effort. In the end, this endeavor leads to the destruction of the environment, the establishment of a set of low, material goals, and the triumph of gigantic, inhuman institutions. The price is too great, Schaar believes, and the only way out is to abandon not just the welfare state but the state as such. The attempt to use the state as an aid to the solution of the problems of modernity has only succeeded in making it a part of the problem. We must move away from statist, centralized, and specialized organizations. Our watchword must be, "All Power to the Fragments." Only then, Schaar maintains, will meaningful participation be established and meaningful authority restored.

It is difficult to be deeply enthusiastic about the welfare state, but to contemplate life without it is possible only if one is prepared to accept widespread suffering. The deficiencies of the welfare state cannot be corrected by its abolition. A modern political economy exhibits most of the costs Schaar notes, but it extends benefits as well, beginning, needless to say, with increased life expectancy. Participatory democrats need to find ways to engage in meaningful political action within the framework of the large state. We require opportunities for face-to-face democratic politics, but we also need large-scale representative institutions. We are caught in a dilemma only half of which is brought into focus by Schaar. The problem for democratic theorists is to find institutional mechanisms that will allow the integration of participatory and representative politics. Given his hostility to the modern state, John Schaar will not help as much as he might in seeking this delicate balance, but we are in his debt for a sensitive and often brilliant articulation of the participatory ideal. □

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



3 is reprinted from *Dissent*, Spring 1981, and was there entitled "Breaking Faith." # 2, entitled "The Sunbelt Society," is out of print.

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LETTERS

Rights in Yugoslavia

Editors:

The complicated, long struggle for democratization of the political and economic system in Yugoslavia is not made easier by one-sided, uninformed, and irresponsible articles like the one by Jeri Laber on "Human Rights in Yugoslavia" (*Dissent*, Spring 1982). One-sided because it is based on reports by bitter regime and system opponents; uninformed because it accepts without any qualification the description of Yugoslav reality by (among other people) right-wing, separatist Croat nationalists; and irresponsible because it levels the charge that political prisoners are tortured, a charge based on no more than "several people have told me . . . " that it was so.

Imagine for a moment *Dissent* running an article (with all due respect for the fact that signed articles do not necessarily represent the view of anyone but the author) about Israel based for the most part on interviews with PLO supporters and their lawyers and stating that "some people also claim that political prisoners are subjected to *torture*." Presumably by political torture we do not mean occasional individual abuse of prisoners, which I am sure occurs in all systems, but a *policy* of having political prisoners tortured. I assume the editors might have wanted some firmer evidence before printing such a charge about Israel, or Britain, or West Germany, or Italy, or Spain—all charged with the use of torture, by the PLO, the IRA, the West German terrorists, or the Red Brigades.

Questions of political dissent and civil liberties are more complicated in cases that involve support for armed terrorists or for forcible separation of territory in multi-ethnic communities: there was not a *hint* of the fact that the Yugoslav authorities' problems with the Albanian nationalists in Kossovo or with the Croat separatists are anything but a matter of repression of political dissent normally and civilly expressed. In both cases armed terrorism plays a role. In the case of the Croat separatists, mostly terrorist groups in migration who claim a pure line of descent from the fascist Ustashi "independent Croat state" of 1941–44, and in the case of the Albanian nationalists, who have links with the adjoining Albanian state, things are clear and do not require the fevered imagination of government agents to conjure up.

Well and good, one might say, but is not the situation exacerbated by restrictions on free political debate, turning otherwise reasonable people into allies of terrorists and separatists? That is not an unreasonable position and happens to be the one I hold. Yes, I also believe that there are cases of political repression in Yugoslavia; but there is not a hint in the Laber article about these problems.

On the contrary, we are merely told that the regime has special problems in Croatia because it is fearful of "the outspoken liberal intelligentsia and the powerful Catholic Church." Again, one could have expected in a balanced article the merest mention of the fact that the present dispute between the regime and the Church is over the repeated attempts of the Church to rehabilitate Cardinal Stepinac, who was condemned in the early postwar years for his support of the genocidal Ustashi state during the war, and that the specific Croat intelligentsia the regime has problems with (including some of the former Partisan generals and prominent former Communists) are nationalist separatists rather than liberals or for that matter democrats. Again, to make my position clear, I do support the right of right-wing nationalists to free political expression; it will not do, however, to pretend that these are just nice liberal intellectuals and that they do not have ties with extremely unlovely emigré circles abroad.

Yes, there are problems with democratic rights in Yugoslavia. On the one hand, the Yugoslav system is so much freer than that of any other East European state that it does violence to common sense to insist that it is just more of the same. The vast majority of Yugoslavs can travel abroad freely; workers strike without legal penalties, sharp and broad debate can be found in the Yugoslav journals and press, and the tendency is for the democratic "space" to increase. It does not help the many dedicated democrats inside and outside the Yugoslav party and the political system to run one-sided oversimplifications about the very complicated terrain where they will have to continue the good fight. The real Yugoslavia, rather than the ideologized caricature created by the "leading dissident Djilas" (presumably elected by the Western press) and the separatist minority of Croat intellectuals, is that of, say, the former editors of *Praxis*.

Dissent might do worse than run a few solid articles on the real Yugoslavia, and surely the notion that reality is complicated should not be strange to my fellow editors.

BOGDAN DENITCH

JERI LABER Replies

It appears that Mr. Denitch and I do not share the same concept of human rights. While admitting that there are "problems with democratic rights in Yugoslavia" and affirming his own support of "the right of right-wing nationalists to free political expression," Mr. Denitch cannot refrain from taking pot shots at "nationalist separatists" and the "extremely unlovely emigré circles abroad" with whom he claims they "have

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ties." These attacks sound surprisingly like those that Yugoslav officials would mount to justify the repression of intellectuals. I note that Mr. Denitch does not substantiate his charges with even as much as "several people have told me," although contacts with emigré circles abroad, be they lovely or "unlovely," are among the major "offenses" for which many Yugoslavs are now imprisoned, and for excessively long terms at that.

All of the five political trials that I mention in my article were of individuals who have been adopted by Amnesty International as prisoners of conscience and who have neither advocated nor practiced terrorism or violence. My own information, by the way, came not from "right-wing separatist Croat nationalists," as Mr. Denitch claims, but mainly from Serbian intellectuals with whom I met in Belgrade. (Indeed, as I pointed out in my article, Croatia right now is virtually "off limits" to curious foreigners.)

As a newcomer to the Yugoslav scene, I intentionally steered clear of discussing the political complexities of nationalism and terrorism that beset the government. As an "old-timer" in the field of human rights, however, it was clear to me that the people about whom I wrote are being persecuted, arrested, or imprisoned for exercising their rights to free expression and free association, as guaranteed by the 1975 Helsinki Accords as well as other legal instruments.

Whether Yugoslavia is "freer than any East European state"seems irrelevant in this context. As long as people are being punished there for expressing their beliefs, the Yugoslav system is not free. Reality *is* complicated, Mr. Denitch, but in this one important area it is refreshingly clear. □

Schweitzer's Dismissal

Editors:

David Bromwich (*Dissent*, Winter 1982) refers to Major General Robert Schweitzer, who was dismissed from his post as chief of the National Security Council's Defense Policy Cluster. Bromwich attributes the dismissal to Schweitzer's warning of "a drift toward war" with the Soviet Union.

While these words may have been a factor, the main reason for the dismissal was another segment of Schweitzer's speech. The speech, to the Association of the U.S. Army, was made during the heat of senatorial debate on the proposed sale of AWACS reconnaissance aircraft and other military equipment to Saudi Arabia. At the time it appeared that the Senate would veto the sale. The atmosphere was permeated with grumblings, innuendoes, and outright accusations that senators opposed to the sale were buckling under pressure from the "Israeli Lobby" and the "Jewish Community."

In discussing the AWACS issue, Schweitzer said, if the Saudi arms package is blocked, the U.S. would lose $8.5 billion in sales and tax revenues. He claimed the Saudis would then buy Nimrod planes from Britain and Mirage fighters from France, and when this happened, Israel would ask the U.S. for help to meet the new threat, present a "list" of weapons it wanted, and ask

Keeping the Record Straight

The following letter was sent to Elizabeth Young-Bruehl, author of a recently published biography of Hannah Arendt, published by Yale University Press. As of the third week in June, Ms. Young-Bruehl has still not favored us with a reply.

March 21, 1982

Dear Ms. Young-Bruehl,

I must express to you my dismay over your inaccurate and tendentious report, on page 360 of your book, concerning the *Dissent* forum on Hannah Arendt's Eichmann book held in 1964.

Your summary of my remarks is totally inaccurate. I said nothing about "the ruthless Trotsky." I spoke about Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky's biographer, who reported that in Vorkuta, Siberia (the Gulag) a group of prisoners, experienced oppositional Bolsheviks and some non-Bolshevik leftists, went on a hunger strike during the late thirties against the Stalinist authorities. After many days the strike was broken. These tough politicals gave in, cold, starved, defeated. My point was that if such people could be broken by the totalitarian apparatus, it was mistaken, or inhumane, to expect, or to bemoan the absence of, resistance—with or without the *Judenräte*—from starved, terrorized, defenseless, and unarmed Jews under Hitler's reign.

More troubling to me is your sentence that Alfred Kazin was "ushered out with a roar from Lionel Abel. . . ." The facts are these: Kazin strode up to the platform after the discussion period was closed by the chairman, that is, me; he had not previously indicated that he wanted the floor; I would have been entirely within my rights to deny it to him when he came up. But since I wanted to lean over backward in behalf of fairness—and perhaps because I sensed that high-minded writers would appear one day to immortalize this

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for the "50 percent grant aid that you've given us in the past." Schweitzer, in a not-too-subtle warning to Israel and American Jews, added, "I wonder if there isn't going to be some backlash in the U.S." because Israel will be asking American taxpayers "to buy them out of a threat" they helped bring about.

Peter Daly, the National Security Council spokesman, referred only to these latter comments when the dismissal was announced. Daly said Schweitzer was speaking for himself and that his views on a possible backlash did not reflect the views of the NSC.

HERBERT L. SOLOMON
Brooklyn, N.Y. □

A Displeased Reader

Editors:

When I caught the title "Anti-Semitism on the Left" in the Winter 1982 *Dissent*, I looked forward to startling revelations. I was disappointed to find only Jean Améry's slander against anti-Zionist leftists rewarmed from years past. I was surprised that the editors could do nothing better to fill space than to print what has become part of the standard operating rhetoric of the Begin regime as it plunders Palestinian land.

Améry's equation of anti-Zionism with anti-Semitism is a vicious attack that demonstrates to what depths supporters of Israel must sink in order to defend the indefensible. Charges of racism made against anti-Zionists are the last rhetorical weapons of a nation that must rely on lies and force to defend its lunacy.

Améry's arguments are as fallacious and poorly supported today as they were years ago. While he pointed to the anti-Semitism in Arab propaganda, he neglected to discuss Israel's internal racism directed against both Asiatic Jews and Palestinians and its unseemly friendship with the South African racists. He could not explain exactly how anti-Zionist Jews can be anti-Semites either, offering only the feeble argument that they are "self-hating." . . .

As Améry pointed out, Jews have a right to a national identity. So do Palestinians, despite Israel's attempts to deny that to them. Unfortunately, Améry confuses the Jewish right to national identity and freedom from persecution with a right to steal the Palestinians' land and convert them into the proletariat and underclass of Israel. The position of *Dissent* seems odd, considering that it usually shows at least lukewarm support for socialism.

Améry can hardly be blamed for the perpetuation of his muddled slander, now that he is dead. The same cannot be said of *Dissent*. . . .

JACK NEFF
Columbus, Ohio □

event—I gave him the floor. He spoke as long as he chose to. He was not "ushered out"—a phrase that can only mean that he was physically removed or cut short. When he finished, he went back to his seat and the speakers on the platform began their summaries.

The atmosphere of this meeting more closely resembled a contentious session of the House of Commons than the usual faculty meeting; but everyone who wished to speak was heard out, and no one kept from speaking. That a majority of those who spoke were critics of Arendt's book may tell us something about the opinions of the people who came, the readiness of Arendt's supporters to speak out, or whatever; but it was not the consequence of any plan or stratagem by the sponsors of the meeting. Both sides were represented, and Arendt herself could have spoken at length had she chosen to.

I must say that the sentence about Kazin being "ushered out" has angered me. We of *Dissent* have made it a point of principle, and honor, that whenever we hold a public forum, the floor is granted to whoever wishes to participate in the discussion period. We have a record of tolerance and freedom on such matters that we cherish, and I do not take lightly any insinuations that we have behaved otherwise.

As I recall, you and I had one, perhaps two encounters in which you mentioned you were writing your book. I also recall that I indicated a readiness to talk about my relations with Hannah, which would have included of course the *Dissent* forum. You chose not to take up that offer, though taking it up would not have required you to credit automatically everything (or anything) I told you.

Given what you have in your book, I wonder whether you decided as you did because you knew only too well how you wanted that page to read.

Sincerely yours,

IRVING HOWE □

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Leninism & the Revisionists

Editors:

While your Fall 1981 issue was most stimulating, it did revive a disturbing question: is the liberal-left community so sharply divided along generational lines as to prevent serious engagement in political action or even debate? The exchange between Irving Howe and Ronald Radosh, while encouraging at first glance, doesn't dig very deeply into the question of the possibility and necessity of representative government. And one point in Dennis Wrong's stimulating article raises the question more sharply. There is much good sense and theoretical progress in Wrong's piece, notably his reformulation of the Schlesinger cycle theory even though it may stress material factors in electoral choice too heavily.

But Wrong's analysis of the left's position on foreign policy, however shrewd on the domestic political risk, suggests a great mental distance from the younger generation of academics. The widespread refusal to admit a signficant enemy on the left is more than "a mechanical negation" of "global anti-Communism." Rather, it involves a positive acceptance of Lenin's theory of imperialism, often in the form of the dependency theory developed by Latin American scholars, as a sufficient explanation of the dynamics of modern state relations. The move to (an often unacknowledged) Leninist position is most marked outside the U.S. (notably in Wrong's native Canada), but is also strong in some areas of American scholarship. The revisionist historiography of the Cold War is now orthodoxy among historians, according to its most influential leader, William Appleman Williams. Those who hold this position see America as the principal if not exclusive villain of contemporary history, and it is probably futile, as well as dangerous to the intellectual integrity of the left, to disguise this view in order to work for an electoral alliance. What is needed first is a vigorous and explicit discussion of the sufficiency of the revisionist vision of aggressor America spoiling the chances of socialism in an otherwise defensive and reactive world.

Fred Matthews
London, Ont., Canada

Dennis Wrong Replies

I'm aware of the prevalence of neo-Leninist views in some fields, especially among younger academics shaped by the "generational" experience of the New Left in the '60s. As I suggested in the article, the adoption of these views by the larger liberal-left community, including the Democratic party, would simply work to the advantage of Republicans, and the most right-wing Republicans at that, for there is not the slightest indication that any large segment of the American electorate is prepared to embrace so negative a view of American foreign policy. Dubious interventions in Latin America may very well—and deservedly—become unpopular, as did the war in Vietnam, but the position Fred Matthews describes goes far beyond the rejection of particular U.S. actions abroad.

Is there really an absence of "vigorous and explicit discussion" of revisionist claims? Hardly in the pages of *Dissent*, where we published Henry Pachter for many years. William Appleman Williams is surely not the most reliable person to pronounce judgment on whether his own opinions have become an "orthodoxy among historians." There is, in fact, a whole school of "post-revisionist" historiography on the origins of the Cold War, which has explored, as the revisionists did not, available Soviet sources and has also made use of new material released under the Freedom of Information Act. These scholars, unlike the prerevisionist "traditional" historians, do not minimize American misreadings of and overreactions to Soviet intentions and actions, but on balance they treat Soviet behavior in the early postwar years as, in Vojtech Mastny's words, "the ultimate cause of the Cold War." The relevant studies are those of Mastny, John Lewis Gaddis, Daniel Yergin, and William Taubman (all of them, incidentally, young men). I plan to review collectively several recent books by these scholars in a forthcoming issue of *Dissent*. There is also Robert Maddox's scathing exposure, published in 1973, of the empirical deficiencies and questionable use of sources by revisionist writers (many of whom were not specialists in diplomatic history nor even in a few cases professional historians). On the theoretical side, Barrington Moore, Jr. and Robert W. Tucker are only two prominent scholars who have criticized the neo-Leninist theory of American "imperialism." "Dependency theory," after a long run, has also begun to get its lumps—rather belatedly, it seems to me, for the political implications it supposedly suggests rest on a doubtful counterfactual assumption, namely, that dependent areas would, if left alone, have conformed to the Japanese model of economic development. □

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Beyond the Welfare State
Edited by Irving Howe

In the face of Reagan administration cutbacks in social programs, it may seem optimistic to put together a book about going *beyond* the welfare state. But the reaction against welfare may prove to be the final effort of the American right to return to a *laissez-faire* economy, which existed in theory but never in fact. In the belief that a modern industrial society must accept a large amount of governmental intervention, Irving Howe introduces some of the major social critics of our time who examine the inner dynamics and problems of the welfare state and its prospects for the future. These authors, all contributors to *Dissent* magazine, show why the welfare programs have failed both here and abroad and what could be done to make them succeed.

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